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Over the last 30 years, a discourse surrounding ethics has emerged in the British military 
which has recently been defined as a corporate ethics in the form of Army Core Values. The 
emergence of, and connection between these codified, corporate ethics and soldiers’ values 
in everyday life and combat situations is poorly understood. This research will begin to shine 
a light on this relationship, taking the British Army’s infantry as its example. It will offer an 
historical overview of the emergence of a discourse of ethics, with particular attention paid 
to the tensions between an ethics of killing or violence and an ethics of restraint. It will argue 
that this embrace of ethics is closely tied-up with processes of state making through the 
legitimation of state violence, and war making through the legitimation and restraint of that 
violence by those that enact it.  
Through 22 semi-structured interviews and observations conducted with the cooperation of 
a British infantry company, it will explore how these Core Values are tied up with what Pierre 
Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic capital’,  shaping and guiding combat conduct via a soldier’s specific 
place within their social relations and providing sources of moral legitimation, ex-ante and ex-
post, for activity in the context of warfare. It will claim that, arising from this focus on values, 
we must look at the formal and informal social processes by which values come to be 
‘adopted’ by junior soldiers, and subsequently contribute to shaping their ethical conduct in 
combat. It will argue that the army’s adoption of its corporate ethics relies on an underlying 
ethics of recognition.  Additionally, through a focus on the intuitive and embodied habits that 
Bourdieu draws our attention to through concept of habitus, it will argue that ethical conduct 
in combat ought to be considered as much a form of skilful, practical coping, as it is a critical 
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British Army Ranks 
 
Field marshal 
Field marshal is the highest rank in the British Army. Throughout the 20th century it was reserved for 
army and army group commanders in wartime, and retiring Chiefs of the General Staff. Peacetime 
promotions to the rank of field marshal have now been discontinued. 
 
General 




A lieutenant general usually commands an army corps or a division. 
 
Major general 
A major general commands a division or brigade. 
 
Brigadier 
A brigadier commands a brigade in the field or holds a senior staff appointment. Originally, the rank 
was known as brigadier-general, the lowest general officer rank, but since the 1920s it has been a 
field officer rank. 
 
Colonel 
Colonels normally serve as staff officers (responsible for the army's administrative needs) in 
between field commands at battalion and brigade level. 
 
Lieutenant colonel 
A lieutenant colonel commands an infantry battalion, artillery regiment or cavalry regiment. They 
are responsible for the unit in the field and when stationed in barracks. 
 
Major 
A major commands a company, squadron or battery, normally around 150-200 men. Within a 





A captain is in charge of a company or serves as its second-in-command. 
 
Lieutenant 
A lieutenant commands a platoon. 
 
Second lieutenant 
A second lieutenant is the lowest commissioned officer rank in the British Army. 
 
Warrant officer class 1 (WO1) 
This is the senior rank of warrant officer. WO1s are responsible for the discipline and equipment of 
officers and men. Appointments include bandmaster, conductor and regimental sergeant major 
(RSM). 
 
Warrant officer class 2 (WO2) 
This is a senior management role focused on the training, discipline and welfare of a unit. 
Appointments include company sergeant major (CSM) and troop sergeant major. 
 
Staff sergeant 
This is the highest rank of non-commissioned officer in the army. Staff sergeants play a senior role 
combining man and resource management, or commanding a platoon. They can also hold other 
appointments, such as company quartermaster sergeant. An infantry staff sergeant is always known 
as a colour sergeant. 
 
Sergeant 
British sergeants normally serve as platoon or troop sergeants, often acting as a second-in-











This is the lowest rank of non-commissioned officer. A lance corporal usually serves as second-in-
command of a section. It is also a rank held by specialists such as clerks, drivers, signallers, machine-
gunners and mortarmen. A lance corporal in the Royal Artillery is called a lance bombardier. 
 
Private 
Private is the lowest rank of trained soldier. Various regiments and corps have equivalent ranks such 
as trooper, gunner, guardsman, sapper, signalman, fusilier and rifleman. 
 






















British Army Formation 
 
Corps made up of two or more divisions (now unlikely to be deployed as a purely national formation 
due to the size of the British Army); e.g., the ARRC. 
◾Division made up of two or three brigades with an HQ element and support troops. Commanded by 
a Major-general.  
◾Brigade made up of between three and five battalions, an HQ element and associated support 
troops. Commanded by a Brigadier. ◾Battalion of about 700 soldiers, made up of five companies 
commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, or 
◾Battlegroup. This is a mixed formation of armour, infantry, artillery, engineers and support units, 
and its structure is task specific. It is formed around the core of either an armoured regiment or 
infantry battalion, and has other units added or removed from it as necessary. A battlegroup will 
typically consist of between 600 and 700 soldiers under the command of a Lieutenant Colonel.  
◾Company of about 100 soldiers, typically in three platoons, commanded by a Major.  
◾Platoon of about 30 soldiers, commanded by a Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant or, for specialist 
platoons such as recce or anti-tank, a Captain. ◾Section of about 8 to 10 soldiers, commanded by a 
Corporal.  

















Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introducing the Social Object 
 
"This love that motivates men to do the most touching, brave, selfless things for their 
brothers…Not the lover’s love of egos and nurturing and selfishness. Its purer than that, 
deeper than that…You understand why soldiers charge machine guns or hold out to the death 
while others escape.” (Bury, 2010:136) 
The above quote makes an important observation regarding military service that combat soldiers 
throughout the history of organised warfare would recognise, that the drive which motivates them 
to engage in combat and possibly kill, is dependent primarily upon comradeship and the social bonds 
developed in the context of military life, rather than the motivation of fighting for some national, 
political, or religious ideology: ‘the men seem to be fighting more for someone than against 
somebody’ (Grinker & Spiegel, 1945:45). These social relations are not always definable in terms of 
words like love and friendship; however, they still bind together soldiers in unique ways. 
Comradeship is the manifest state which arises from the social relations developed in this context. 
The values which incubate these social relations, such as Selfless Commitment and Courage (Army 
Doctrine, 2000), and which serve to tie together soldiers as comrades, and bring about the 
experience of comradeship have existed in various forms for as long as humans have organised 
themselves for the purpose of war. The degree of success any military has had in motivating men1 to 
fight, can be measured in part by how successfully they have been able to instil the values which 
contribute to bringing about this intense experience of comradeship between fellow soldiers. These 
values contribute implicitly and explicitly to the maintenance of social relations of trust and 
teamwork between peers which form the foundation of primary group cohesion (Seibold, 2007:286). 
The ability to resist within the context of combat, or to put it in the military vernacular of today, an 
individual’s ‘fighting power’, is dependent on the cohesion of the primary group and its tendency to 
avoid social disintegration (Janowitz & Shils, 1948).  
 
1 This research will predominantly employ the male form when referring to combat soldiers, the rationale for 
this is that arguments and evidence used in support of this chapter are drawn from studies on all male combat 
divisions/units. This does ignore the historical and ongoing part women have played in combat roles in state 
and non-state fighting groups, it rather offers one line of analysis concerning male only combat units. Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s 2016 announcement that women would gradually be phased into close combat 
frontline roles, will in the future necessitate further research on the impact of mixed gender combat units on 
group cohesion in the British Army.  
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While values of comradeship and commitment to the group seem timeless, however, over the last 
30 years, an explicit discourse of ethics has also emerged as a feature of the organisational cultures 
of numerous state militaries. There are various means of accounting for this, but one recent factor is 
the reaction to the operational experiences of, and political pressures around what is termed 
Counter Insurgency (COIN) warfare. Another is the emergence of the concept of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’, which brings with it an explicitly moral and ethical ‘turn’ to the application of 
militaristic violence by the state. This ‘turn’ towards formalisation of ethics has also precipitated a 
transformation in associated fields- psychological research on the post-combat experiences of 
soldiers has looked beyond Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and has attempted to explain 
feelings of guilt in terms of ‘moral injury’ (Maguen and Litz, 2012), related to the contravention of 
deeply held moral beliefs in the context of combat. Underpinning this emerging institutional 
emphasis on ethics has been a focus on corporate values, in the case of the British Army, this is 
manifest in what are referred to as it’s ‘Core Values’: Selfless Commitment, Courage, Discipline, 
Integrity, Loyalty and Respect for others (Army Doctrine, 2000:1-3).  
The connection between these codified, corporate ethics and soldiers’ values in everyday life and 
combat situations is poorly understood. This research will begin to shine a light on it, taking the 
British Military as its example. It will offer an historical overview of the emergence of a discourse of 
ethics, focussing on the tensions between an ethics of killing or violence and an ethics of restraint- a 
hallmark of the COIN operational environment. Through 22 semi-structured interviews and 
observations conducted with the cooperation of a British Infantry Company, it will explore how 
values are tied up with what Pierre Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic capital’, shaping and guiding combat 
conduct via a soldier’s specific place within their social relations and providing sources of moral 
legitimation, ex-ante and ex-post for activity in the context of warfare. It will claim that arising from 
this focus on values we must look at the formal and informal social processes by which these values 
or ethics come to be ‘adopted’ by junior soldiers, and subsequently contribute to shaping their 
ethical conduct in combat. Additionally, through a focus on the intuitive and embodied habits that 
Bourdieu draws our attention to, it will argue that ethical conduct in combat ought to be considered 







1.2 Framing the Questions 
The research is structured around five interlinked questions: 
(a) As mentioned, the first question this research will attempt to shed light on is: why has ethics 
emerged as an explicit discourse within the British Army? This also represents the connected attempt 
to understand the implications this has had for the soldier’s themselves in terms of their experiences 
of this discourse predominantly within the context of the combat setting. On this basis of this initial 
question, further research questions were formulated to try to go about understanding these 
phenomena. In respect to the turn in the military towards ethics, as framed by both an explicit 
institutional discourse and the situated social practices which reflect it, there has yet to be a 
comprehensive study of this. In addition, in existing work on military ethics there is a significant 
cleavage between two accounts of conduct ethics which is also poorly understood; that being 
between an ethics of violence and an ethics of restraint. Additionally, these institutional and 
individual responses to this emergent discourse of ethics have taken place in the context of recent 
operational experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and also against the backdrop of the doctrine 
of ‘humanitarian interventionism’ which have had major impacts on the organisation of the Army 
and its internal understandings of the question of ethics. This work contributes to understanding its 
responses to these experiences. With these broad framings in mind the following sub-questions 
have been developed as a means to unpick these ‘problems’.  
(b) The ‘turn’ towards ethics is partially identified by the emergence of a codified corporate ethics, 
resulting from this, how do the soldier’s themselves understand Core Values? Do they have 
significance as a possible system of personal ethics?  
(c) What are Core Values? Is it possible to provide a sociologically grounded account of them? There 
is currently a notable absence in professional sociology as much as in military ethics, in terms of 
providing a substantive account of how ethics in the context of the military sociologically ‘work’ in 
respect to individual soldiers and the institution itself. Military ethics as an academic discipline has 
largely been ignored by sociologists and is undertaken by military scholars, political philosophers etc. 
This brings to light Burawoy’s notion of the divide between critical and professional approaches to 
sociology (Burawoy, 2004) and goes some way in accounting for the spontaneous sociology 
(Bourdieu et al, 1991) which has characterised the manner in which military ethics has been dealt 
with so far- ethics having been treated as given in the sociological sense. By treating the social object 
as novel and by attempting to examine one’s prenotions (Bourdieu, 1991) concerning it, it is possible 
to frame further questions: What is the relationship between Core Values and the soldiers 
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themselves? What is the relationship between Core Values and ethical conduct? Which addresses the 
lack of attention to the ‘moral dynamics’ of military power (Mileham, 2008)).  
(d) Arising in part from the lack of theoretical diversity within the field of military ethics, there has 
been little attention paid to the following question: Can ethical expertise be treated also as a non-
deliberative activity beyond the traditional emphasis on critical moral judgements? This line of 
analysis locates itself also within the Moralitat/Sittlichkeit debate and challenges the Kolbergian 
(1971) account of moral maturity being equivalent to the critical application of moral rules. This 
question invites a development of the notion of habitus along more phenomenologically grounded 
lines. This will develop the work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus in their account of a phenomenology of 
moral expertise through its application to an empirical setting, and further contribute to a 
phenomenological reading of Bourdieu (Atkinson, 2016). This connects closely to the emphasis on 
the distinction between military training and ethical education which plays out in the academic 
treatment of the subject within the body of literature devoted to it in military ethics, as well as the 
Army itself. Through developing a focus on the non-reflective aspect of ethical conduct it challenges 
this dichotomy.  
(e) Whilst there have been some empirical studies undertaken with junior soldiers, there is still a 
dearth of literature taking their individual testimonies as evidence. This raises the following 
question: how have junior soldiers specifically, understood this institutional discourse of ethics? This 
work will address this absence by taking the voices and experiences of junior soldiers in relation to 
the question of ethics in combat. The rationale for this is that junior soldiers are more often than not 
the individuals who engage in direct combat and are the implicit targets of the prescriptions made 
by those discussing military ethics, which is often focused on the question of ethical conduct on the 
battlefield- this relates to notions of restraint in combat. This further contributes to an absence in 
the literature which sees ethical education as being predominantly directed to the commissioned 
ranks. Underpinning this is the idea that sound ethical conduct at the level of the junior soldier will 
automatically follow from sound moral leadership from commanding officers.  
 
1.3 Outline of Thesis 
This chapter so far has introduced its focus and the questions that it will address. The following 





Chapter 2: Problem Definition 
As mentioned, the two main questions which this research intends to examine are:  1. Why has an 
institutional discourse surrounding ethics emerged in the British Military over the last 30 years? And 
2. How have soldiers experienced this ‘turn’ towards ethics? These questions presume a broader 
engagement with debates in the field of military ethics, an academic and professional discipline 
which is primarily a legitimising discourse which has emerged from the associated premise that state 
sanctioned violence can be founded upon a legitimate moral claim. The moment that this claim is 
accepted in principle, then a discourse on an ethics of violence necessarily becomes an ideological 
partner to this. This debate is also one which is predominantly exclusive to the state, and for the 
large part excludes an ethics of violence in relation to non-state actors. This is no accident, and it is 
tied closely to ongoing processes of state-making in relation to maintaining the claim on the 
monopoly over legitimate violence. These overarching themes concerning the moral legitimisation of 
state-violence and its relationship to state-making have broadly defined the discipline of military 
ethics and provide the entry point for this chapter which seeks to define the main problems which 
will be analysed throughout the thesis with respect to the two overarching research questions. 
This characteristic feature of the discipline of military ethics has shaped the form of its engagement 
and the types of questions it has asked. This chapter argues that this implicit normative discourse on 
state violence has meant that military ethics has often asked a restricted set of questions and has 
failed to employ a broad range of analytical means to answer them. Military ethics has generally 
framed itself as an applied field which “is at its core practical and professional. It is meant to be the 
handmaid of the profession of arms. It exists to assist thoughtful professionals to think through their 
real-world problems and issues” (Cook & Syse, 2010:121). This is fundamental in reference to the 
main questions this research is intending to ask which essentially are questions concerning a meta-
analysis of transformations in the discipline of military ethics, as these are inseparable from military 
responses to the question of ethics. This chapter examines the question, ‘why has a discourse on 
ethics has emerged in the British Military over the last 30 years?’ with respect to the claim that this 
discourse on ethics is closely tied up with the field of military ethics as a legitimising discourse. This 
discourse has been shaped by broader transformations in warfare and society but has largely failed 
to account for these transformations in respect to itself and the type of questions it has asked.  
The second question, ‘how have soldiers experienced this ‘turn’ towards ethics?’ seeks to shift the 
emphasis in military ethics from a predominantly normative analysis to an explanatory one. This is 
not however a denial of the normative underpinnings to this research. It addresses a broad failure to 
ask the most fundamental sociological question of this discourse on ethics and ethics themselves- 
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what are they sociologically in relation to the institution, and how do soldiers come to experience 
them? This invites a new set of analytical perspectives which are better suited to answering this 
question. It answers the criticism that military ethics and its treatment of ethics itself represents a 
“petrified philosophy of the social” (Bourdieu et al, 1991:21) in that it brings in a prenotional 
sociology of ethics, the individual and institution, which has rarely been examined as such. One 
aspect of this prenotional sociology of ethics which has characterised military ethics is its implicit 
Kantian account on ethics. This has had outcomes for the field which this chapter intends to 
problematise. By implicitly treating ethics in this Kantian sense, it has excluded perspectives which 
attempt to examine the embodied dimensions of ethical conduct. This chapter discusses how 
military ethics has only treated ethical conduct as a reflective activity. This tendency has contributed 
towards empirical research on military ethics being wed to military hierarchy, such that the role 
senior ranks have in shaping institutional ethics leads to experiences of junior soldiers and their own 
role in shaping ethical conduct being foreclosed.   
 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework which will provide the means by 
which to examine the emergence of an institutional discourse on ethics in the British Military and 
how soldiers have come to experience this. This implies that any theoretical framework must be 
capable of accounting for further associated questions. The first relates to why this discourse on 
ethics emerged at all in relation to the military and state violence, which with it brings in questions 
concerning the relationship between the military, the state and associated themes surrounding the 
moral legitimation of state violence. The second requires a focus on the role of ethics in relation to 
the military itself, and the processes by which this discourse of ethics has emerged, evolved and 
come to be a formal and informal feature of the institution itself. The third must interrogate the 
relationship between the formal and informal features of this discourse on ethics and the individual 
practices of soldiers. In essence, what do these ‘ethics’ mean to soldiers in terms of reflective beliefs 
and embodied ethical conduct. By attempting to shed light on these questions, the theory employed 
needs to provide an overarching account of the military as an institution or otherwise; of the 
relationship between the military and the individuals which comprise it, which speaks in some sense 
to broader debates around social structure and human agency. Finally, it works from the assumption 
that ethical conduct is more than just a Kantian reflective process by drawing attention to the non-
reflective dimension of human practices in relation to this.  
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This chapter begins by presenting a brief overview of how theorisation on the military and military 
socialisation has largely neglected the question of ethics and ethical conduct. It then goes on to 
introduce the work of Pierre Bourdieu as a means of not only addressing this gap in the literature, 
but also of accounting for the relationship between the military, considered as a distinct, structured 
social space and the practices of the individuals that comprise it.  To do this, it provides an exegesis 
of Bourdieu’s concepts of Habitus, Capital and Field and situate these in relation to the research 
questions. These relational concepts draw together the various levels of analysis the research 
questions are concerned with. The structural level is addressed though conceptualising the military 
as field- a semi-autonomous, structured social context. This is also discussed in relation to the state 
as a meta-field of power which provides the basis for accounting for the relationship between 
processes of state formation, the military and the emergence of a discourse of ethics related to the 
moral legitimation of state violence which takes place in chapter 4. The individual practices of 
soldiers and regularities of those practices in relation to this field are considered through integrating 
Bourdieu’s concept of capital and underpinning this drive to accumulate capital in relation to 
practices of recognition seeking. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, considered as a set of dispositions 
and practical abilities which shapes the way an individual acts and perceives the world, provides a 
means of understanding the individual soldiers experience of processes of military socialisation and 
the relationship of this to military ethics and values. Bourdieu’s account of habitus as dispositional 
and concerned with practical abilities, opens up the second half of the chapter which looks at the 
phenomenological dimension to Bourdieu’s work and how this may be integrated within Hubert 
Dreyfus’s account of a phenomenology of ethical expertise. The penultimate section introduces the 
key concepts necessary for the development of a phenomenology of ethical conduct. It provides an 
exposition of phenomenology and its relationship to Bourdieu and embodied social practice, 
emphasising the non-deliberative dimension to ethical conduct. The final section expands on Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus’s general phenomenology of skill acquisition with respect to its relationship to the 
Bourdieusian concepts of Field and Habitus as a means to providing the theoretical foundations for 
Chapter 8.  
 
Chapter 4: State-Making and the Military Field  
This chapter and by extension chapter 5 will address itself to answering the first research question, 
why has an institutional discourse of ethics emerged in the British Military over the last 30 years? To 
do this it will apply Bourdieu’s account of the state as having the monopoly over symbolic power as a 
means to understand the general emergence of an ethics on state violence, as this was the precursor 
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to the institutional discourse on ethics in the British Military. It will understand this ethics of violence 
as ongoing process of symbolic violence, which sees various forms of state and non-state violence 
(mis)recognised according to the symbolic categories of legitimate violence and illegitimate violence. 
It will also look at how these symbolic classifications of violence and acts of (mis)recognition shape 
understandings of violence beyond the state at the micro-sociological, interpersonal level.  
As discussed through the theoretical framework of this research, Bourdieu claims that the state is a 
meta-field of power, a ‘structuring structure’ which produces the principles of classification which 
other fields derive the categories by which social reality is constructed. These principles of 
classification are at the same time principles of division which impose social hierarchies and symbolic 
categories. This chapter argues that if the state has the monopoly over both legitimate physical and 
symbolic violence, then there exists a clear relationship between the monopoly over symbolic 
violence and the claim that state violence is legitimate. The quality of something being legitimate 
immediately brings into view questions concerning the exercise of symbolic power. The 
(mis)recognition of violence as being legitimate brings into focus relations between the meta-field of 
power- the state and all other fields.  
State-making is contingent on how states have come to be classified, and that classification partially 
requires that the state can make the ongoing claim that its monopoly over violence, is over 
legitimate violence. Under the common definition of state-ness, when state-violence is challenged as 
non-legitimate it follows that the foundations of the state itself are challenged. The state then 
constructs and imposes symbolic categories concerning violence in a broad sense and state violence 
in a specific sense. The question then is by what processes does the state come to exercise symbolic 
power in relation to the (mis)recognition of state violence as necessarily legitimate, and conversely 
non-state violence as necessarily illegitimate? This chapter argues that the military can be best 
understood as a field. It is the primary repository of physical capital which the state draws upon. It is 
also a site of struggle between individuals over various forms of capital which define the structure of 
the military field. By paying attention to these social practices, in particular the ways in which the 
military has come to define what constitutes legitimate violence, this chapter claims that the military 
field in respect to the symbolic classification of violence is an extension of the states’ ongoing 
attempts to make itself through making state violence legitimate.  
The military field is one where the symbolic categories concerning violence both specific to the state, 
and in a wider sense, are constructed in significant ways. It then goes on to locate the empirical 
focus of this research, the British Army Infantry, as a specific socially and historically situated site 
within a military field; understood against the background of wider processes of interconnection 
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related to war and globalisation. This chapter then moves on to examine the Nuremburg laws as the 
one of the most significant acts of symbolic violence by the state concerning the legal codification 
and symbolic ordering of violence, precipitated by the experiences of ‘total war’ through the 20th 
Century. The legal codification of state violence in the Nuremburg Principles was a response to the 
indeterminacy and danger that the conditions of violence presented to the modern state at the end 
of the Second World War. In parallel to the disciplining and normalisation of practices which the 
legal codification represented, it necessitated an act of symbolic violence such that state violence 
was legitimate within these codified boundaries and this legitimate violence could only be claimed 
by the state.  
The second section of this chapter applies Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic violence and 
(mis)recognition in relation to how military violence has shaped symbolic classifications of violence 
generally. It will look at how representations of military violence come to shape wider notions of 
what constitutes legitimate and non-legitimate forms of violence. It examines the rituals and 
practices involved in military life and militaristic violence, and how they contribute to the wider 
symbolic structuring of certain types of violence as being legitimate within society. It ends by 
opening up the further question of how these processes of symbolic violence come to relate to the 
soldier themselves and the function of the military in war-making as the military is the primary site 
of physical capital and also the primary site by which violence is structured symbolically. The military 
then, symbolically inscribes legitimacy onto its own violence. These preceding chapters have 
attempted to answer the first question of why a discourse of ethics has emerged with respect to the 
state, the following chapters will examine this phenomenon through a focus on the practices 
involved in ‘making’ war and the soldiers experiences of this in relation to ethics.  
 
Chapter 5: Methodology 
A necessary context for the second part of the thesis, the methodology chapter will provide an 
autobiography of the qualitative component of the research from the perspective of the experiences 
and identity of the researcher himself, attempting to pick out some key events which have shaped 
its development. It will examine these experiences through the Bourdieusian frame of encountering 
the military field with respect to questions concerning the researchers own habitus. It will outline 
the choices that have been made in terms of the overall approach to research; data collection and 
analysis; and potential hurdles that were faced both methodologically and ethically. Some key 
methodological prescriptions will be examined in relation to the work of Bourdieu in terms of his 
approach to conducting sociological research, specifically, how the researcher goes about 
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constructing the social object. It will discuss the normative objectives of the research which have 
shaped its current form in significant ways. The overarching aim of the research is one which hopes 
to contribute to furthering understandings within and without the military on how soldiers can be 
better prepared, and developed in an ongoing sense, to face the ethically complex operational 
environments that will characterise future conflicts.  
 
Chapter 6: War-Making and the Problem of Violence 
This discourse on an ethics of state violence considered as a process of symbolic violence originating 
from the meta-field of the state, is also closely connected to how that violence comes to be enacted 
and by whom it is enacted. This (mis)recognition of state violence as morally legitimate, not only 
supports the ongoing process of state-making, but also connects to ongoing forms of war-making. 
This symbolic classification of state violence has been shaped firstly by how states have come to 
fight wars; and secondly by the responses of individuals engaged in fighting those wars.  War-making 
refers to the first phenomena and relates to how warfare has transformed during the years since the 
end of the second world war, whereby Western state militaries have found themselves increasingly 
engaged overseas fighting non-conventional wars in counter-insurgency environments (e.g. Malayan 
Emergency; Vietnam; Iraq 2; Afghanistan) as well as the post-1989 discourse of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ which marks the broader ethical ‘turn’ in conflict. The second phenomenon is 
concerned with the overall problem of violence which has faced state militaries since their 
emergence, that being how to motivate men to engage in organised state violence against an 
implicit resistance to do so. This resistance is primarily conceptualised by this research through 
Randall Collins notion of ‘confrontational tension’ (2008), however this confrontational tension can 
also be understood as an embodied response to the possible contravention of individual ethical 
norms. Accepting that this resistance to violence is in some way connected to individual ethical and 
moral norms, the problem of violence is then set squarely in relation to the ongoing discourse of 
ethics that the state and military have engaged in recently. This chapter will argue that the ongoing 
discourse on an ethics of state violence, considered as a form of symbolic classification, is directed 
towards individual soldiers as a means of overcoming this problem of violence generally through the 
formation of an ethics of violence which provides the potential for the moral legitimation of 
violence. The purpose of this is to shape the individual reflective and embodied responses of soldiers 
to confrontational tension through shaping personal ethical responses to the possibility of violence.  
War-making and state violence as a phenomenon is non-static and has changed considerably over 
the last 30 years. The increasing engagement of state-militaries in ‘non-conventional’ counter-
23 
 
insurgency warfare and the discourse of ‘humanitarian violence’ implied by ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ has brought about an associated set of ethical implications which are distinctly 
different from the ethics of violence which has predominantly shaped military organisations during 
the post-war period up to 1989. The counterinsurgency environment which is the predominant focus 
of this research, is complex in the sense that restraint of violence is as an overarching strategic 
feature and has consequently become an ethical problem to overcome. This chapter looks to the 
British Army Infantry’s experiences in the Northern Irish war during the early 1970s as a key turning 
point with respect to the questions it raised about effective implementation of a ‘minimum force’ 
doctrine. These experiences would in no small way shape future engagements with the question of 
ethical conduct in the context of militaristic violence.  
These processes represent the contemporary connection between war-making and the problem of 
violence. State militaries have become increasingly successful in shaping soldier’s responses to 
confrontational tension in conventional warfare through an ethics of violence which draws primary 
justification for that violence from primary group relations- simply put, ‘you fight for the person next 
to you’.  Counterinsurgency warfare and offensive ‘humanitarian interventions’ strategically require 
a restraint of violence as success is no longer determined by overwhelming the enemy with superior 
force. This paradox between an ethics of violence and an ethics of restraint in warfare has 
increasingly shaped the ongoing symbolic classification of state violence and how it has been 
directed to soldiers and wider society. This chapter attempts through applying Bourdieu’s concepts 
of symbolic violence and (mis)recognition, to account for how the state and military, considered as 
fields in the Bourdieusian sense, have shaped the current discourse on ethics. This is done primarily 
in relation to current practices of war-making in counterinsurgency warfare as well as overcoming 
confrontational tension.  
 
Chapter 7: Core Values and Symbolic Capital 
This chapter will examine two consequences of the arguments developed through chapters 4 and 6 
with respect to a selection of interview data with serving soldiers derived from two research visits to 
an infantry regiment in the British Army; as well as theoretical argument drawn from relevant 
literature . Chapter 4 argued that the emergence of a discourse on an ethics of violence can be 
understood as a process of symbolic violence, which aims at shaping understandings of state and 
military violence with implications for broader understandings of what constitutes legitimate forms 
of violence by society. The military considered as a field is closely related to the meta-field of the 
state in this process of symbolic classification and state-making. Chapter 6 considered how this 
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discourse on an ethics of violence is also symbolically directed at soldiers themselves in relation to 
the problem of violence; and how transformations in modern warfare have shaped responses to 
questions concerning the ethics of violence at the level of the military field. This chapter takes both 
these claims and examines them in relation to the military field and its relative structure of forms of 
capital and the relation of these ‘species of power’ to the soldiers themselves. It attempts to answer 
the second research question which is concerned with how soldiers have experienced this discourse 
of ethics by looking at Bourdieu’s concepts of field and capital. 
As introduced in the theoretical framework, Bourdieu defines a field as a network of objective 
relations between objectively defined positions which impose determinations on their occupants or 
institutions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97). These determinations are shaped by the structure of 
how different species of power are distributed across a field. These species of power can be 
understood as forms of capital such as economic, cultural and symbolic, the value of each one is 
relational to the field itself. The possession of a specific form of capital arises from competition 
between individuals over these limited resources, and the possession of which gives access to the 
profits at stake in a field. The possession of these different forms of capital also determines an 
individual’s “objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.)” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97). The last 30 years has seen the British Army engage in a process 
of codification of this ethics of violence through the emergence of an institutional ethics in the form 
of Core Values. This process has been defined by both the wider ongoing symbolic classification of 
legitimate forms of state-violence and its relation to state making; as well as the problem of violence 
in respect to contemporaneous transformations in warfare and the associated ethical ‘problems’ 
surrounding violence that are associated with these transformations. 
The distribution of capital structures the military field and the relations of competition and position 
between individuals within that field. The codification of an ethics of violence through the Army’s 
institutional Core Values, represents a response to a poorly defined institutional ethics; and an 
attempt to banish the hazard and indeterminacy implied in ethical complexities of the modern 
operational environment. These institutional Core Values also represent an attempt to codify an 
ethics of violence at an institutional level within the military field. This process of codification is an 
attempt to restrain state-violence at the level of the individual soldier, and by doing so make that 
violence legitimate and also make the state itself. It codifies an ethics of violence so as to address 
the ethical complexities of force versus restraint that marks counter-insurgency warfare and 
‘humanitarian intervention’; and codifies a set of normative values which strengthen interpersonal 
relations with respect to the primary group- an answer to the problem of combat motivation. 
Through analysis of data derived from in-depth interviews with combat soldiers from a British 
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infantry regiment this chapter will argue that this process of codification which has led to the 
emergence of institutional Core Values sees them as important referent points for soldiers in terms 
of the practices which may afford them symbolic capital understood as honour. This represents the 
predominant form of capital whose possession determines objective positions in the military field. 
The drive to accumulate this form of symbolic capital is underpinned by processes of recognition 
seeking shaped in early childhood, as well as common features in these soldiers backgrounds, which 
make them “practically compatible” and “capable of being converted” (Bourdieu, 2006:100) into the 
eidos of the military field and attuned to the particular symbolic profits at stake.   
 
Chapter 8: Between an Ethics of Violence and an Ethics of Restraint 
The overall aim of this chapter is to examine the themes and arguments developed through the 
preceding chapters with respect to the experiences of the soldiers themselves in the context of the 
operational setting and addresses itself to the second of the main research questions; that being 
how have soldiers experienced this ‘turn’ towards ethics? This chapter starts from Bourdieu’s 
account of habitus as being a set of durable dispositions, tacit competence and practical ability, 
which constitute how individuals adapt to the needs of specific social structures (Callinicos, 
2007:296) or fields. This chapter examines how an individual soldier’s habitus is adapted to and 
shaped by the military field and the specific profits at stake in the game, primarily forms of symbolic 
capital which approximate to institutional Core Values. The soldier’s habitus can be considered to 
also include ethical dispositions, which come to be shaped through social practices which emerge in 
relation to the military field and its relative capital forms.  
As previously argued, the codification of these institutional Core Values is an attempt to impose 
boundaries and fix understandings surrounding questions of ethics in relation to both institutional 
and combat ethics, with the associated aim of shaping ethical conduct at the level of combat soldier. 
The emphasis by the military on the conduct of junior soldiers can be understood in relation to the 
notion of the ‘strategic corporal’ which claims that the actions of junior soldiers can have strategic 
effects in the conduct of warfare, particularly within a counterinsurgency operational environment 
where the ethical terrain is as important as the material, in that the ‘hearts and minds’ of both a 
domestic audience and occupied population are at stake. This connects the actions of junior soldiers 
to the wider attempts to impose symbolic classifications on state violence such that it is 
(mis)recognised as legitimate.  
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The claim that ethical conduct also has a dispositional quality in relation to an individual’s habitus is 
the starting point to understand ethical conduct beyond mainstream accounts in military ethics- 
which takes it as being understood as a deliberative process with respect to moral principles. The 
non-deliberative dimension to ethical conduct accompanies this reflective process through stages of 
development from reflective to intuitive conduct- the claim that ethical expertise is marked both by 
the deliberative and intuitive. Ethical competency or expertise cannot be understood without taking 
seriously the non-reflective dispositional dimension of an individual’s habitus. This feature of a 
soldier’s habitus, or ethical comportment, is shaped significantly though a soldier’s orientation to 
Core Values as a means of accumulating symbolic capital. This notion of an intuitive account of 
ethics, considered as a practical ability, draws on the work of Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1992:193), 
who attempt to move beyond the restricted account of ethics as only judgements. They argue that: 
“Expert deliberation is not inferior to intuition, but neither is it a self-sufficient mental activity 
that can dispense with intuition. It is based upon intuition…in familiar but problematic 
situations, rather than standing back and applying abstract principles, the expert deliberates 
about the appropriateness of his intuitions…” 
Through interview data with soldiers on their experiences in combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
this chapter attempts to shed light on this intuitive dimension to ethical conduct in combat in 
relation to state violence deployed at the level of individual soldiers. It argues ethical conduct 
emerges from both deliberative judgements and acts of spontaneous coping consisting of 
unreflective, egoless responses (Dreyfus, Dreyfus; 1992:185). It then looks at how the possibility of 
violence is constituted by both ethics, considered as a form of symbolic capital and through 
constructions of the enemy as a distinct Other existing outside the political community.  
This phenomenological account of ethical conduct, or comportment, when considered in relation to 
an individual’s habitus and the military field with its relative capital forms builds on Atkinson’s 
Bourdieusian ‘relational phenomenology’ which attempts to understand how “relations of fields and 
social spaces shape and are shaped by the people, places, timings and objects of the lifeworld” 
(Atkinson, 2016:28). By considering habitus in this sense, it brings to light potential understandings 
of how the primary field of the family and the military field both relationally shape a soldier’s habitus 






Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The conclusion will provide a brief overview of the argument with respect to its limitations and the 
hurdles that it encountered. It will go on to look at some of the implications that have arisen from 
the research through developing possible further research questions and from these outline 
























Chapter 2: Problem Definition  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Military ethics as a sub-discipline of military sociology, is a field which has emerged from the 
assumption that state organised violence can be potentially founded on a legitimate moral claim. It 
is from this starting point that an ethics of violence inevitably emerges. Military ethics functions as a 
discourse which aims to continuously legitimise that possible moral claim, and connectedly attempts 
to legitimise various forms of violence as well as attempting to restrain that violence. It broadly 
focuses on two areas, that of the normative problem of developing an appropriate and reasoned 
ethics of violence- which includes implicitly and explicitly notions of legitimation and restraint; and 
the applied aspect which focuses on questions of ethical conduct in war and how ethics may be 
‘taught’ or inculcated in those responsible for prosecuting war.  
Questions of legitimation and restraint of violence in warfare have predominantly shaped the 
discipline due in part to the greater frequency and depth of public exposure to war through media 
reporting, war memoirs, film and more recently computer games. The military as a career, still 
predominantly remains the choice for young, working-class males, with the British Army actively 
targeting and recruiting from “among young people with low educational attainment and living in 
poor communities” (Gee, 2007:15). Military violence is both highly visible and at the same time 
invisible. In the UK at least there are fewer people with a direct experience of the military, or indirect 
experience through social relations, than at any time in the history of state-organised violence. This 
creates a discordance between the presentation of military violence via the various forms of media 
and the reality of that violence as a lived experience, whether as a combatant or non-combatant 
victim.  The legitimation problem of military violence has been partially overcome in the context of 
the Army as a closed institution, through training and patterns of military socialisation. Military 
combatants face a dual discourse. That which is presented though the course of their military 
experience, and that which is presented to them through media representations of those 
experiences- the two quite often being incongruent. Thus, there are two main audiences or targets 
for the legitimation discourse that military ethics engages in, the public which observes violence and 
those which undertake that violence.  
In the context of the UK the recent prosecution of Marine A, Sgt Alexander Blackman, brought to the 
forefront questions concerning ethics in the context of military violence. This research will at later 
points examine some of the particular questions that Sgt Blackman’s case raises; however its 
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significance in the broader sense is in the way it sheds light on the overarching tension concerning 
violence and restraint which runs through work on military ethics. The tension exists therefore 
between the notion of a ‘warrior creed’ or ethics of violence, which embraces broadly speaking 
virtues surrounding violence and connectedly hyper-masculinities, and the notion of an ethics of 
restraint of violence, or ‘minimum force’. Military ethics is often an attempt to reconcile these two 
distinct ethical accounts.  
Military ethics is then predominantly a normative endeavour which attempts to develop a 
legitimising discourse on state violence as well as to attempt to restrain that violence- or at the very 
least construct a discourse of violence as restrained. It is also an applied field in the sense that it is 
concerned with how an appropriate ethics of violence can be institutionally and individually 
inculcated. If these two characterisations are correct, it is unsurprising that military ethics as an 
academic endeavour has failed to ask the question, in the brute sociological sense- what an ethics of 
violence is to those that encounter it institutionally and in terms ethical conduct?  
This chapter will examine selected contributions to the field of military sociology and military ethics 
in order to argue that the discipline has failed to provide a substantive sociological account of it. This 
is characterised by an absence of analysis of ethics in relation to its sociological relationship to 
military institutions, individuals and ethical conduct itself. Ethics passes by an analysis of this type 
due to its ordinariness which brings with it through “its vocabulary and syntax a petrified philosophy 
of the social” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, Passeron, 1991:21). This prenotional framing of ethics casts 
it predominantly as a Kantian, deliberative process whereby ethical conduct arises from the 
conscious application of rules. If we take ethics in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, as focussed 
on organisational norms and principles (Lucas, Jr, 2009:13), military ethics has failed to examine 
what exactly ethics are, in this institutional context and has also failed to examine the sociological 
relationship between ethics and individuals and their conduct. These omissions will be examined in 
relation to the overarching research questions which have developed with these problems in mind 
through the examination of the empirical context of the British Army. 
  
2.2 Legitimising and Restraining Violence 
There is a fundamental cleavage concerning whether one in principle accepts that violence can be 
founded upon a legitimate moral claim. This cleavage runs through the large body of academic 
scholarship on the military and military-civil relations. For those that accept this in principle, the 
state has the sole authority in making the claim that violence can be morally legitimised in the 
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context of warfare and non-state actors are by definition excluded. This contributes to bringing 
violence of this form within the normal social order, simultaneously pushing it outside analysis 
(Collins, 2008:2). According to one side of this cleavage, the quality of being a state is a necessary 
condition for the legitimate use of force. As Barkawi notes (2006:34), analysis of armed conflict 
works from the assumption of the nation-state system of international politics; in this context 
military force is exclusively an instrument of state policy- Clausewitzian politics by other mean. 
Enquiry across international relations, military history and strategic studies implicitly assumes this 
model, “Organised violence is monopolised by the state domestically and projected outward to 
secure national interests.” (Barkawi, 2006:34).  
Non-state groups which utilise violence under this reading are usually the recipients of ‘war as 
policy’ rather than legitimately entitled to the same analytical treatment. Any moral claims 
concerning its use in the context of non-state actors deploying violence, largely fall outside academic 
scholarship on the military and organised violence. More often, analysis of these groups takes place 
in international relations (IR) scholarship or elsewhere. Whether it is work focusing on military 
socialisation, militarism or gender-informed approaches, non-state groups fall outside analysis due 
to an implicit exclusion through predication. Non-state fighting groups are according to this 
definition, unable to make a possible legitimate moral claim concerning the use of violence.  
One manner of categorising military sociology and its associated sub-disciplines such as military 
ethics, are studies upon the social and material relations which bring about and are associated to the 
legitimate use of violence. Violence which is the main material condition for the conduct of war, 
rarely enters analysis explicitly though is always present in some form. Randall Collins (2008) is 
among the few authors who have attempted to shed light on the social characteristics of violence, 
offering a micro-sociological theory of violence across all contexts. He understands it as being 
primarily interactional in terms of an individual’s attempts to find pathways to overcome 
confrontational tension. Others have examined violence from a variety of perspectives such as the 
psychological dynamics and costs involved in the act of killing (Grossman, 1995); to the battlefield 
and testimonial studies of soldier’s tendency to resist killing in the context of war (S.L.A Marshall, 
1947; Holmes, 1985). These works are however, rare in the sense that violence is in the centre of 
analysis.  
For this research and the range of questions it is attempting to examine concerning military ethics, it 
is no surprise then that the field of military ethics is itself is defined by this cleavage in that questions 
concerning military ethics are only directed at the state, rather than non-state actors. Military ethics 
also tends to implicitly claim that the state is the only group which can make legitimate moral claims 
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concerning the use of violence. Once a moral basis for violence exists in principle it then follows that 
an ethics of violence arises. If one holds a position that violence by the state can never be morally 
legitimised, then the question of an ethics of violence would never come about as it must require 
the possibility of it being founded on a moral claim.  
Once it is accepted that an ethics of violence is possible, this ethics then becomes the very means by 
which the moral claim concerning the legitimate use of force is continuously sustained. If we think 
for a moment about some conflict which in principle satisfies jus ad bellum principles, where all 
peaceful alternatives have been exhausted and force is the last resort to ameliorate or prevent a 
greater harm then jus in bello must be continuously sustained through the conduct of the violence. 
One cannot prosecute a just war through unjust means; as such an ethics of violence is a necessity in 
terms of sustaining the principle of a moral basis for war and state violence. It also potentially 
provides a continuous means of moral justification for those that are participants to the violence. 
These processes bear a complex relationship to questions surrounding how to organise soldiers 
socially in order that they overcome confrontational fear and tension (Collins, 2008:51) and engage 
effectively in the act of violence.  
The various questions and problems which surround the formation of a possible ethics of violence 
are themselves defined by the form of the violence itself. Interpersonal violence at the level of street 
brawls implies a completely different ethics to organised violence between states and non-state 
groups. Violence between states and non-state groups also implies different sets of ethical problems 
and questions, and these have changed as the quality and structure of violence between these 
groups have. What overarches the use of violence through the first half of the 20th century has been 
the ever-increasing inclusion of civilians as targets of violence in warfare. These various 
transformations in warfare have shaped the development of scholarship and the wider treatment of 
an ethics of violence or military ethics. As violence has changed it has necessitated that the ethics 
surrounding it keep up with the constant requirement of morally legitimising the violence itself. It is 
from this starting point that military ethics has developed as a field of scholarship and also an 
applied practice.  
 
2.3 The Research Questions 
Working from the titular definition, the thesis will unpack the two main research questions: 1. Why 
has an institutional discourse surrounding ethics emerged in the British Military over the last 30 
years; and 2. How have soldiers experienced this institutional discourse of ethics? Both questions 
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connect closely to one another in that to understand the way in which the institution of the British 
Army as a central institution within the Military has developed and responded to both internal and 
external phenomena which have contributed to shaping the institutional responses to questions of 
ethics, one must also examine how the soldiers themselves have experienced these changes. In 
order to be able to address this problem one must not only refer to the formal responses of senior 
individuals within the institution, who have played significant roles in shaping the formal discourse 
of ethics that has emerged, but also examine the experiences of rank-and-file soldiers. Soldiers at 
this level in the institution of the Army often play a crucial role in terms of the ethical conduct in 
warfare. A further problem connected to this is the question of ethics in respect to military service. 
Military service refers to the broad spectrum of soldierly conduct in absence of explicit reference to 
the moral and ethical component of combat. The Army’s engagement with ethics in its explicit and 
formal sense has largely been concerned with an ethics of military service, and until recently has 
largely failed to engage with explicit questions concerning the ethical or moral component of 
combat (Mileham, 2008:46).  
The challenge then for this research is to try to bring together these two perspectives concerning 
military ethics, as well as demonstrating the link between the institutional response and how it has 
been experienced by soldiers. Through a problematisation of the formal distinction which has been 
implied by the Army itself between an ethics of military service and combat ethics, this research will 
attempt to bridge the gap between the institutional discourse of ethics and the experiences of 
soldiers themselves in relation to ethics. This implies that the experiences of individual soldiers at 
the level of junior soldier ranging up through the ranks has in some way contributed to shaping the 
Army’s institutional response to ethics. This is not to say that this is the primary causal factor, only 
that there has been an absence of attention paid to the experiences of soldiers at lower tactical 
levels (Catignani, 2012) in terms of questions of ethics. Recent attempts by the Army to implement 
certain adaptations due to the operational requirements of counter-insurgency operations (COIN) 
has meant that questions concerning the success of these top-down adaptations have been poorly 
understood. They have failed to engage with the junior soldiers which are on the front line of ethical 
decision making in combat. Similarly, questions concerning how the actions of soldiers at these 
lower tactical levels relate to further institutional responses to combat ethics has also not been 
examined.  
The highly public case of Sgt Alexander Blackman who was charged and subsequently released for 
the unlawful killing of a Taliban prisoner of war, represented a rare case in which a failure of ethical 
conduct at this tactical level precipitated some formal institutional response by the military. This 
example draws attention to the significance of the question of ethical conduct at this level not only 
33 
 
from a purely moral standpoint, but also in terms of the potential effects that the actions of 
individual soldiers can have in terms of the conduct of war. Something captured through the notion 
of the ‘strategic corporal’ (Krulak, 1999)- the idea that the actions and decisions of junior soldiers at 
the tactical level can have wide and significant effects at the strategic level.  
This brief example illustrates an important point in the process of developing one heuristic which 
will frame aspects of the various questions that this research will proceed to develop; that being, 1. 
An attention to questions of ethics and ethical conduct as they relate to individuals at lower levels 
within the institution of the British Army. The second heuristic will be, 2. Attention to the problematic 
distinction between ethics as relating to military service (institutional ethics) and combat ethics 
(operational ethics) (Mileham, 2008). The following section of this chapter will aim to set out clusters 
of questions which have been derived from the overarching research question through employing 
these two heuristic devices. The thesis itself through the subsequent chapters will then address 
these problems often individually in one chapter, and at times across different chapters.  
 
2.4 Some Background Concerning Military Studies and Critical Military Studies 
A suitable starting point for the consideration of the problems this thesis will tackle can be found in 
the two main disciplinary fields which attempt to deal with the military. The differences between the 
two can be characterised in relation to two distinctly different normative starting points which have 
subsequently shaped their ontological and conceptual framing of the military and the associated 
problems that defined and answered. These two approaches can be understood within a typology 
which takes sociology as a critical, professional or public (Burawoy, 2005). Military sociology can be 
understood with reference to this typology as either a critical or professional sociological discipline.  
This research is concerned with the question of military ethics and how they relate to corporate 
values, one source which concerns itself with this question is the Journal of Military Ethics. Taken 
from a short introductory piece by the editors, a very clear picture of its normative commitments 
emerges; “military ethics is at its core practical and professional. It is meant to be the handmaid of 
the profession of arms. It exists to assist thoughtful professionals to think through their real-world 
problems and issues” (Cook & Syse, 2010:121). The authors go on to cover what they see to be the 
main academic fields which find a place within the field- principally, philosophy, legal scholarship, 
history, religion and a final mention of disciplinary plurality, and they offer the possibility of:  
“criticism of certain forms of discourse that sometimes go under the name of military ethics, 
this statement is not meant to be overly restrictive. We do admit that the field of military 
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ethics, like all complex fields of study and practice, constitutes a large jigsaw puzzle where 
many different and unequally-shaped pieces make up the whole” (Cook & Syse, 2010:122). 
Contributions to this journal and in other professional sociological publications on the subject tend 
to, though not exclusively, fall inside the previously mentioned disciplinary boundaries. A brief 
review of Ethics Education in the Military (2008), one of the few collections focussing on this area of 
applied military ethics, sees contributions from serving and retired military professionals, political 
philosophers, ethicists, war studies scholars and one sociologist. As a sub-field of military studies in 
contrast to critical military studies, military ethics represents a multi-disciplinary approach 
concerned with normative questions surrounding the use of force which interprets “critique solely as 
a means through which to offer recommendations for the improvement of military policy” (Basham 
et al, 2015:1). This critique certainly corresponding to their self-identification as a ‘handmaid of the 
profession of arms’. Though multi-disciplinary in a sense, what is conspicuous is the lack of 
sociologists working on the question of military ethics. This is in distinction to the years during and 
proceeding WW2 which witnessed an explosion in sociological work within the developing field of 
military studies and military sociology. Both of which stand as clear examples of Burawoy’s 
professional sociology.  
Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils (1948), much like Samuel Stouffer and his seminal work, ‘The 
American Soldier’ (1949), were among a number of sociologists working within this emergent field 
and contributed implicitly to the development of a focus on the question of ethics through their 
attention to the function of group cohesion in relation to combat motivation.  The social and 
behavioural sciences have had a fraught history in terms of direct engagement with the military and 
Joanna Bourke’s comments that these instances do “not mark a proud moment in the history of the 
profession and it is not a particularly marketable skill” (Bourke, 1999:81-82) are not unique in terms 
of sociology’s broader consensus concerning its relationship with the military when engaged in 
problem-solving orientated approaches.  
Sociologists are predominantly found applying their conceptual toolbox within critically orientated 
approaches to studying the military and militarism. Critical Military Studies, a leading journal within 
this approach defines its aims and scope as follows; “It encourages the interrogation and 
destabilization of often taken-for-granted categories related to the military, militarism and 
militarization” (Critical Military Studies, 2017). In their short editorial piece which attempts to define 
Critical Military Studies with greater precision, the authors see it as being a non-static and non-
precise field of study, necessarily interdisciplinary which is ‘sceptically curious’ about the “character, 
representation, application, and effects” (Basham et al, 2015:1) of military power. It isn’t surprising 
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that scholars from within sociology and politics/IR would find a more comfortable home in this 
critically orientated approach to the study of the military given the Frankfurt school theoretical 
toolbox many approach the subject with. Additionally, the dominance of poststructuralist, discourse 
analytic and gender approaches, all self-evidently provide ample lines of destabilisation and critique 
of the military. The adoption of one approach over another will inevitably illuminate certain things 
and foreclose others. This is no doubt an appropriate starting point and is essential in addressing 
longstanding and emerging issues related to the military, militarism and militarization. Ideological 
leanings in academic departments have certainly contributed to viewing collaborations of any form 
with the military in a negative light to say the least. This hasn’t always been exclusively the case. 
Anthropologists for example have been contributing to espionage and warfare at least since the end 
of WW1 up to the recent conflict in Afghanistan (McFate, 2005) through their involvement in US 
Army’s Human Terrain Systems (HTS) programme which saw them deployed in an advisory capacity 
alongside combat soldiers (Zehfuss, 2012). This decision did however prompt huge controversy and 
soul searching within the field of anthropology.  
This all demonstrates something of a difficult relationship between academics and the military. 
Identification with critically orientated approaches or more ‘military friendly’ branches of study 
relates directly to the type of theory and methodology applied to it and the choice of phenomena 
studied. The fact that military ethics has emerged recently as a distinct sub-branch of military studies 
and has been largely ignored by critical military studies is notable for this reason. The further 
problem which emerges when considering the question of how ethics have been treated within the 
military ethics literature relates closely to the identities of the scholars engaged in studying it. In 
order to provide something of a groundwork to the methodology chapter the following will provide 
different examples of current scholarship on military ethics. This will attempt to highlight the salient 
role academic identity with its associated ontological commitments plays in terms of the application 
of theory, methodology and problem definition. 
Military ethics as a field of study distinct from critical military ethics often treats its subject matter in 
its applied sense. It asks questions concerning how the study of military ethics may be applied within 
the military itself in order “to assist thoughtful professionals to think through their real-world 
problems and issues” (Cook & Syse, 2010:121). This is the first and most primary distinction between 
the two academic treatments of the military and the question of ethics. Military ethics can be 
defined as a problem-solving approach as it treats ethics in relation to its role in terms of the 
military’s objectives. The sub-branch of military ethics which looks at ethics education in the military 
concerns itself primarily with the question of two accounts of ethics in relation to the individual 
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soldier within the military. This dichotomy of these accounts concerning ethics education is referred 
to as ‘functional’ and ‘aspirational’:  
“Is the point of military ethics education primarily functional – does it aim to produce military 
personnel who will carry out their duties efficiently and within the bounds of law? Or is it 
primarily aspirational – does is aim to produce military personnel who are virtuous people as 
well as effective fighters?” (Wolfendale, 2008:161) 
The functional view see’s the ethical constitution of the soldier as primarily a means of enhancing 
military effectiveness, “the sole criterion for preferring one kind of character, motivation, or 
intention over another is simply whether or not it effectively promotes the desired forms of 
behaviour” (Wolfendale, 2008:163). The aspirational view whilst not neglecting the necessary role of 
ethical education in producing a combat effective soldier also sees also the constitution of a soldier 
with specific ethical norms as a morally desirable end in itself (Wolfendale, 2008:164). Work within 
critical military studies would never treat ethics in this manner as ethics considered as functional or 
aspirational within the context of state violence has no possibility of being treated as a true ethics by 
a sub-discipline which is ‘sceptically curious’ about the “character, representation, application, and 
effects” (Basham, Belkin & Gifkins, 2015:1) of military power. If ethics act as a legitimising discourse 
for state violence it is unsurprising that military ethics as a disciplinary endeavour excludes work by 
those seeking challenge the use and form of that violence, and that those critiques have failed to 
examine ethics in a sociologically substantive way. 
The rare occasion that it has been examined from a disciplinary vantage point outside of the field of 
military ethics itself, ethics is superficially treated as means of restraint on violence. Eastwood’s 
(2015) article on pedagogy in Israeli pre-military academies is a predictable outcome of the 
application of this type of critically informed approach which fails to treat this particular form of an 
ethics of violence as both a legitimising discourse as well as a possible means of restraint of that 
violence. His core argument seeks to challenge the general assumption that ethics in relation to the 
military acts as a restraint on violence2. He sees ethical education within Israeli pre-military 
academies as a practice, in the Foucauldian sense of subject fashioning; “ethics can quite easily 
become part of a powerful militarist process that binds individual subjectivities and self-experience 
to military participation” (Eastwood, 2015:2). One of the most notable features of his argument is 
that he examines the role of military ethics with some sociological scrutiny- which makes his work 
 
2 This assumption that ethics acts as a restraint on violence is problematic given the role ethics can play in 
terms of its relation to primary group cohesion and affective relationships between combat soldiers- arguably 
playing a significant role in combat motivation and consequently military violence. This point will be discussed 
further within Chapters 6 and 7.  
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stand out amongst the dearth of serious scholarship on military ethics in fields such as critical 
military studies, critical security studies and International Relations. Perhaps this relates to 
Eastwood’s own assumption that ethics is taken uncomplicatedly to act as a restraint on violence, as 
such foreclosing more substantive analysis of it. What Eastwood misses is the way in which ethics 
have been mobilised to both enable and constrain violence, as well as the possible positive role they 
play in the lifeworld’s of the soldiers themselves. Inevitably perhaps Eastwood’s use of Foucauldian 
theory generates predictable outcomes in terms of his account of ethics, in particular through his 
diminishing of the individual subjectivities of the soldiers themselves such that they are merely 
subjects to this militarist process of subject fashioning. The challenge then for any substantive 
sociological analysis of military ethics is to sensitise the use of theory to pick out the range of 
possible interpretations of the role ethics can play in relation to the military, rather than prioritising 
one interpretation at the expense of another.  
 
2.5 Understanding Ethics in Relation to the Institution of the British Army 
Military ethics as a disciplinary subfield has in the last 10 years become firmly established as 
evidenced through the existence of journals such as ‘Military Ethics’; the International Society for 
Military Ethics (ISME); various books dedicated to the subject and a plethora of research centres 
based in both universities, state defence colleges and military academies. The following is 
representative of some of the broad aims of this field: “Fostering ethical awareness and moral 
decision-making in military personnel is a proven way of reducing unnecessary harm and suffering in 
conflict situations. However, as yet there is no agreed way to do this effectively” (Kings College 
Centre for Military Ethics, 2017). Military ethics is problem-solving orientated and closely aligned 
and shaped through formal and informal associations with state militaries, which in turn influences 
how they come to approach the subject of ethics.  
This recent explosion of academic scholarship on military ethics is itself an interesting phenomenon, 
and explanations for this will share similarities with why state militaries themselves have begun to 
address the question of ethics in an increasing, if uneven manner. Due to the intersections between 
the academic and military that exist in this field, both share similarities in terms of how they define 
‘problems’ associated to the study of military ethics. What is common to all work in this area is its 
focus on state militaries and Private Security Contractors (PMCs), rather than a broadened effort to 
understand the role of ethics in non-state fighting groups3. What is also evident is that a large 
 
3 This theme will be predominantly discussed through the conclusion of this thesis. Briefly though, this 
foreclosure of the question of combat ethics as it relates to non-state fighting groups, likely arises from the 
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proportion of work seeks to examine questions surrounding ethics from the specific perspectives of 
state militaries with their own unique institutional cultures. This has been the case in relation to 
studies being conducted on ethics in the British Military, with notable contributions made with 
direct reference to how its particular institutional history and culture have shaped the engagement 
with the myriad of questions concerning ethics (see Deakin, 2008, 2009; Mileham, 2008). These 
contributions have provided important insights into the development of an institutional or corporate 
ethics within the British Army. A question which has perhaps been only alluded to at best, is why this 
institutional engagement and discourse upon ethics occurred when it did; why it has asked the 
particular type of questions it has and why those questions arose at certain moments in its recent 
history.  
The British Army has faced ethical dilemmas throughout the course of the 20th century, with the first 
likely engagement with the tactical and strategic problems involved with the application of the 
‘minimum force’ principle developing through the Army’s experience of COIN in the Northern Irish 
War from the early 1970s. What is distinct is that during the 1980’s the Army began a process of 
formal institutional engagement with the question of ethics. It did not recognise this initial process 
as being directly connected to ethics in the operational context, rather it engaged in a process of 
formally codifying its institutional Core Values. This moment represented the institution’s first 
formal ‘turn’ towards ethics. If this is taken as a possible starting point in the history of the British 
Army’s formal engagement with ethical questions and the relationship of ethics to the institution 
itself, why did it occur at this moment in its long history? This first ‘turn’ has been followed by 
further key moments- the challenge then is to pick out these particular and distinct processes of 
engagement with ethical questions, describe them and account for why they developed in the way 
they did and what external factors and factors internal to the institution have shaped and 
constituted the particular forms of engagement with the question of ethics that have defined its 
development as an institutional discourse.  
By addressing these questions, this will provide a foundation for a sociologically grounded account of 
ethics and also contribute to a broader understanding of the type of phenomenon both external and 
internal to state military institutions which have shaped the field of military ethics and the manner 
by which it has defined its problem field. Whilst the case of the British Army is one amongst many, 
some of the processes and institutional experiences which have shaped their engagement with the 
questions surrounding ethics share similarities with other state militaries. The British Army’s own 
 
implicit tendency by many within this field to view the use of force by any non-state actor as lacking legitimacy 
or a basis in international law- as such, if violence is delegitimised it cannot becomes almost impossible to ask 
the type of questions that military ethics broadly attempts to answer.   
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engagement with ethics has not occurred within a vacuum, often being informed and shaped 
through the shared operational experiences and ongoing coordination with other Western militaries. 
Military Ethics itself has also drawn in a diverse range of professional military personal and 
academics into shared spaces which has also contributed to how questions of military ethics are 
approached.  
This research will examine significant processes of institutional change and engagement with the 
question of ethics. Six distinct dynamics of change will be examined in relation to how a discourse of 
ethics has developed within the British Army and further how these changes have been experienced 
by soldiers themselves, these are:  
1. How a ‘minimum force’ principle can be applied in a COIN operational context (arising from 
the Army’s experiences in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s). 
2. Perceptions internal to the institution concerning a ‘deterioration’ in recruit background. 
3.  The response to perceived government interference in the Army’s institutional culture. 
4.  Increasing external ‘moral’ scrutiny concerning operational and peacetime actions. 
5.  The inherent ethical complexities implied through recent COIN operational experiences.  
6. The broader development of the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ which developed 
from the early 1990s onwards.  
 
Each dynamic of interaction which has shaped the institution’s engagement with ethics will provide 
a means of contextualising the soldiers’ experiences of these processes of change. This will allow the 
overarching research question to be approached in relation to these differing moments of 
institutional change. For the purposes of the wider objectives of this research and relating to the 
type of empirical data that was available through the course of conducting this research, the 
predominant focus will be on examining No. 4 and 5. The Army’s most recent and arguably 
significant processes of engagement with questions concerning ethics have been shaped in relation 
to its experiences fighting irregular wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. These operational experiences 
have been significantly defined by attempts by the Army to adapt its operational objectives to the 
requirements of a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. This effort at adaptation to the 
underlying principles of COIN, in particular that of restraint in the use of force can better contribute 
to operational success than attrition of the enemy, represents one of the overarching themes this 
research will touch upon through the course of each of its chapters. Its primary focus will be on the 
tension between the Army’s institutionally embedded, culturally and historically constituted ethics 
of violence, in distinction to this emergent ethics of restraint. This developing ethics of restraint is a 
defining requirement of the future operational environment- as understood through the tenets of 
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COIN and notions of ‘Courageous Restraint’. This implied tension between an ethics of violence and 
an ethics of restraint will be the conceptual frame through which the various points in the 
development of an institutional discourse of ethics can be understood, as well as soldiers’ 
experiences of it.  
The question of how the experiences of the British Army in both Afghanistan and Iraq have fed into 
the institutional engagement with ethics, and the degree to which those experiences have 
precipitated significant change throughout different levels of the institution is not a clear process to 
pick out and can itself be framed in relation to wider debates concerning the so-called Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA). Cohen (2004:395) observes that “(F)or nearly 20 years military analysts have 
talked, alternatively, of a ‘military technical revolution’, a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) and, 
most recently, ‘military transformation’”. In relation to COIN, advocates of RMA posit that, “military 
operations now aim at defined effects rather than attrition of enemy forces or occupation of 
ground.” (Cohen, 2004:395). Whether this is the case or not is partially a problem which relates to 
the question of operational combat ethics and how deeply imbedded in the institutional culture is a 
so-called ethics of restraint as this is implied in a movement away from the focus on ‘attrition of 
enemy forces’ as being the key determinant of military success.  
Whilst not explicitly raising this as a question of ethics, Catignani in an interview conducted with a 
battlefield commander deployed on the British Army’s Herrick XI tour in Afghanistan draws out this 
tension between the Army’s traditional ethics of violence and the emergent ethics of restraint 
implied in the COIN operational environment:  
“trying to seek alternative ways of operating beyond offensively oriented conventional ways is 
difficult when such practice is seen as contrary to the culture and the self-identity of soldiers 
and, to what is perceived by many within the military, what it fundamentally means to be a 
combat officer” (Catignani, 2012:531).  
This aptly captures the tension between two fundamentally different pictures of combat ethics, and 
it is the attempt to understand this through a sociologically grounded account of ethics which will be 
the broad ‘problem’ that research will attempt to ‘answer’, or perhaps more appropriately 
‘understand’.  
Theories of top-down change (Cohen, 2004; Grissom, 2006) within the military have focussed on 
how it is possible to shift operational behaviours to the specific requirements of the COIN 
environment, with its emphasis on less kinetic, more population-centric approaches. This theory of 
‘top-down’ military innovation (which implicitly concerns questions of ethics) is broadly shared by all 
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the major schools of military innovation4. Grissom states that “senior officers and/or civilians are the 
agents of innovation” (Grissom, 2006:920)- this attention to top-down processes of institutional 
change, has subsequently received significant challenges (Cohen 2004; Grissom, 2006, Farrell, 2010; 
Catignani, 2012). What all these challenges share is an attention to bottom-up processes of 
adaptation. The question could also be asked as to where is the ‘bottom’ of ‘bottom-up’? In the 
context of the COIN operational environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ‘bottom’ is still taken by 
much research to exist at the brigade level, rather than at the level of the battlegroup comprised of 
junior officers, NCO’s and soldiers within a battlegroup.  
Farrell’s (2010) study on the British Army’s ‘successful’ attempts at adaption to a more population-
centric approach explains this process of bottom-up adaption as a response to the Army’s poor 
institutional memory; “organisational memory prevented the British Army from recovering core 
competencies. At the same time, as the case of 52 Brigade illustrates, it gave impetus to the search 
for new ideas.” (Farrell, 2010:583-4). However, the evidence that Farrell focuses on to support this 
claim omits lower level tactical reports from junior officers, NCOs and rank and file soldiers, Farrell:  
“does not fully examine bottom-up adaptation. Rather [he] focuses predominantly on 
brigade/Task Force Helmand (TFH) level post-operational interviews and reports that mostly 
relate to plans drawn up at task force level as well as on brigade postoperational reports 
(PORs), which do contain material from lower level tactical reports” (Catignani, 2012:517).  
Catignani, through his own interviews, questions some of the claims Farrell makes concerning the 
degree of success in implementing a more population centric approach. Focussing on interviews at 
the battlegroup level, he argues the tactical implementation of the COIN operational objectives were 
potentially not as effective as Farrell claimed due to “the inability of lower-ranking officers and NCOs 
to have fully assimilated the population-centric COIN approach as enthusiastically as can be deduced 
from TFH/brigade level PORs and post-operational interviews (POIs)” (Catignani, 2012:519). This 
reflects the same type of problems the British Army encountered in the Northern Irish War in the 
early 1970s when trying to apply the ‘minimum force’ principle (Burke, 2018).  
Catignani’s study offers an important set of insights through his attention to the battle group level 
and concludes by arguing for the need for more research to be conducted at lower tactical levels to:  
“determine how widespread or exceptional bottom-up innovation is and whether or not 
instances of such innovation can be correlated to cases in which specific personnel or units 
 
4 This field of scholarship is defined by four distinct schools of thought on the subject of military innovation, 
those being, respectively, focussed on civil-military relations, interservice politics, intraservice politics, and 
organizational culture (Grissom, 2006:908). 
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have adapted on the basis of having developed a better understanding of the nature of the 
campaign they have been challenged with or on the basis of other explanatory factors” (ibid).  
Interestingly for Catignani, the ‘bottom’ of ‘bottom-up’ adaption exists apparently at the level of 
junior officer upwards as his interview data refers to battlegroup commanders, platoon 
commanders, Second in Commands (2Ics), with a conspicuous absence of any interviews with NCOs 
or junior soldiers. Addressing itself to this, this research will attempt to provide an important 
contribution in the sense that it will attempt to understand junior soldiers’ experiences of this 
developing institutional discourse of ethics in the context of the COIN operational environment. It 
will examine possible bottom-up adaptions with reference to the tension between an ethics of 
violence and an ethics of restraint at the lower tactical level through data derived from interviewing 
junior officers, NCO’s and junior soldiers. This will provide a further account of how the ‘bottom’ in 
‘bottom-up’ adaption may be understood; whilst also arguing against mainstream accounts of RMA, 
which sees military change and adaptation as being driven from top-down processes.   
 
2.6 Institutional Ethics and the Individual 
The existence of a so-called ‘turn’ towards ethics can be partially identified by the emergence of a 
codified corporate ethics which represented a significant outcome of the Army’s first point of formal 
institutional engagement with ethics. This was expressed through their attempt to codify a form of 
ethics relative to the institution, resulting in the emergence of corporate Core Values5. The formal 
starting point for this process was the Army’s perception of a deterioration in recruit background 
which necessitated some institutional level response; whilst it also can be understood as an outcome 
of questions that the Army had been grappling with through their experiences of attempting to 
apply the ‘minimum force’ principle in the Northern Irish War. Further questions can be identified in 
terms of attempting to account for the various processes underpinning this codification, at the level 
of both the individual and institution.  
Firstly, is possible to provide a sociologically grounded account of the relationship between these 
formalised ethics (and the informal ethical terrain of the institution) and the soldiers themselves. As 
mentioned in the first section of this chapter, there has been a notable absence of literature of a non 
‘critical’ nature undertaken by sociologists on the military.  Connectedly military ethics has received 
 
5 Relating to perceptions internal to the institution concerning a ‘deterioration’ in recruit background- one of 





minimal attention from military sociologists. This has perhaps resulted from implicit and 
unacknowledged assumptions and value positions concerning the military which exclude the 
recognition that an ethics of violence is even possible. Often work on ethics in the military is a field 
of study undertaken by military and security scholars who approach the subject from more 
identifiably political, philosophical and IR disciplinary perspectives. Some of the questions normally 
tackled by military studies (rather than ‘critical’ military studies) such as group cohesion in combat, 
have been taken up by sociologists such as Anthony King who have contributed significantly by 
bringing a range of sociological insights to bear on the study of the military (King, 2006; 2013). 
Hockey’s contribution in his work ‘Squaddies’ (1986) is also notable in that it represents one of the 
few ethnographic and sociologically grounded studies of a serving infantry unit and arguably sits 
somewhere outside critically informed approaches to studying the military. Hockey himself draws 
heavily on the work of Goffman in describing aspects of the barrack as resembling a ‘total institution’ 
(Goffman, 1961), something which Goffman himself briefly examined in his seminal work. These 
examples, along with the earlier post-war contributions of American sociologists such as Stouffer 
(1949) and Shils and Janowitz (1948) represent a type of sociological analysis of the military which 
takes its purpose to be to:  
“understand those organisations and sub-cultures more completely, as objects of scientific 
study…The results of such study might simply satisfy scientific curiosity, help the military 
service better understand (and perhaps improve) their own organisations, or even help 
societies better understand the nature and role of the military organisations with whom they 
co-exist” (Lucas, 2009:6).  
It is important to note that this approach to studying the military with its distinct characterisation of 
its aims is not an attempt to exclude ‘critical’ approaches as being in some way constrained or 
limited. Both approaches due to their differing value assumptions concerning the military itself, start 
from differing ontological foundations which inevitably lead to the examination of different 
phenomena, utilising differing conceptual lenses. At the very least, using the above as a broad aim 
for this research, it hopefully allows an initial opening up of ethics within the army as an object of 
investigation in a way it has perhaps not been treated before by sociological analysis. Returning to 
the overarching question, 2. How have soldiers experienced this ‘turn’ towards ethics? There is the 
direct implication that in order to understand how the individual soldier has experienced these 
institutional responses surrounding ethics, one must provide a means of sociologically 
operationalising the relationship between the individual and the institution itself. Further one also 
needs to be able to explain the relationship between the soldier and ethics in its broadest sense, 
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beyond the confines of the institutions, bringing in understandings concerning the lifeworlds of 
soldiers in their entirety as much as that is possible.  
Throughout current scholarship on military ethics there is a muddled understanding of these 
questions, where often those writing on associated areas such as ethical education in the military fall 
into the trap of performing a ‘spontaneous sociology’ (Bourdieu et al, 1991:13). That being when 
questions concerning the sociological status of ethics, and their relationship to the institution and 
individual are rarely discussed or implicit assumptions are deployed without examination. The 
following brief survey of current literature in military ethics will attempt to demonstrate that at best 
they only provide a partial account of what ethics are in relation to the individual, and this partiality 
inevitably forecloses other more substantive accounts of the relation of ethics to the individual 
soldier and institution.  
Academic attention to what ethics is in relation to the individual often passes by serious scrutiny in 
military ethics literature. Whilst authors often provide philosophical explanation and argument 
forwarding particular normative ethical accounts, couched in the traditional language of 
deontological and virtue ethics, little to no time is spent analysing how individual actors experience 
ethics, considered as meaningful objects in relation to individuals; how and why ethics come to play 
such a fundamental part in the lifeworlds of individuals; why individuals orientate themselves 
towards particular ethical systems; and the relationship between normative ethical systems and 
ethical conduct itself. Paul Robinson does however, identify the absence of any systematic ethical 
theory and the ad hoc nature by which ethical education programmes have traditionally been 
undertaken within state militaries (Robinson, 2008:1). Jessica Wolfendale is also notable in the sense 
that she attempts to provide some account of the broad range of representations of ethics in 
military ethics education literature and programmes (Wolfendale, 2008). Wolfendale argues that 
largely military ethics education6 literature falls into broadly ‘functional’ and ‘aspirational’ accounts, 
i.e. those seeing teaching ethics a functional means of achieving military efficiency, in that they 
promote behaviour essential for effective military functions (Wolfendale, 2008:164) and those which 
aim to:  
“cultivate (emphasis added) good behaviour (emphasis added) through the cultivation of good 
moral character (emphasis added). But the justification for cultivating good moral character is 
not purely instrumental; it is taken to be a morally desirable end in and of itself” (Wolfendale, 
2008:164).  
 
6 As mentioned previously, the field of Military Ethics is predominantly a problem-solving field, closely tied to 
questions of ethics education as it relate to improving military behaviour.  
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This discussion represents one example of a wider pattern of taking concepts for granted in 
discussions of ethics in the military. Without negating the relevance of discussing ethics in the 
military in terms of deontological versus virtue approaches, which broadly characterises a large 
proportion of the debate, what is missed relates to that which passes without question or 
interrogation. Whether or not one sees the more appropriate ethical system as being based within 
either of the two ethical schools, one must necessarily address questions as to what it is in the brute 
sociological sense to cultivate good behaviour; and what constitutes moral character? Given that 
“most of today’s militaries put their money on character building in trying to make their soldiers, 
airmen, sailors, and marines virtuous” (Olsthoorn, 2011:4), it is remarkable that there has been little 
attempt to employ the vast range of conceptual tools at sociology’s disposal in trying to provide a 
coherent account of what constitutes moral ‘character’. Specifically, what sociological processes may 
be significant in its formation? Given the predominant emphasis on virtue-based ethics in both 
military ethics literature, and amongst state militaries themselves in their approaches to ethics 
education (Olsthoorn, 2011:5), the absence of a sociological based understanding of moral character 
presents a significant shortcoming in understanding ethics in relation to the military.  
Contrastingly, where deontological approaches gain a foothold in military ethics literature, the 
predominant account of moral character and moral development finds its roots in the work of Rawls 
and Kohlburg (ibid). Whilst reserving substantive critique of these types of approaches for later 
chapters, it is useful to briefly examine the impact of the work of Lawrence Kohlburg on implicit and 
explicit assumptions in military ethics literature and understandings adopted by state militaries 
themselves concerning notions of moral character and development. The purpose of this is to 
illustrate both the poverty of substantive theories of moral and ethical development in military 
ethics literature, as well as their dependence on one dominant account to the possible exclusion of 
others. 
Kohlburg (1971) developed an account of moral development which saw the individual as situated 
somewhere within three levels, subdivided into six stages, of moral development. At the first Pre-
Conventional Level, individuals conduct their moral actions according to principles such as 
punishment and the instrumental satisfaction of needs. The second, Conventional Level, sees factors 
such as peer pressure, social norms and reputation shape moral character; and at the third and 
highest level of moral development, the Post-Conventional, Autonomous, Principled Level, the 
individual “makes a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and 
application apart from the authority of the groups of persons holding them” (Kohlberg, 1971:1). 
What characterises Kohlberg’s approach is “the ability to stand outside the situation and justify 
one’s actions in terms of universal moral principles” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1992:183). It is an 
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account of moral character and development (which necessarily associates itself with questions of 
cultivation of that character) which restricts ethics to a matter of judgements- implicitly this seems 
to locate an account of ethical or moral character at the level of conscious reflection (as opposed to 
accounts which see it also as a dispositional quality of the individual). This is reflected implicitly and 
explicitly throughout the literature on military ethics and amongst approaches to ethical education 
in the military, regardless of whether one is forwarding a virtue based or deontological account. 
Coleman’s (2013) work on military ethics is emblematic of the tacit appeal to this deliberative notion 
of moral and ethical character, referring to the aims of the book he states it is:  
“to aid military personnel in understanding the ethical decisions that they will have to make; 
to help them to clarify their thinking; to enable them to get a better grasp of the issues 
involved in making ethical decisions; and ultimately, to help them make better ethical 
decisions when they are in positions of authority” (Coleman, 2013:1) 
Further, he is explicit in committing to this reflective or deliberative notion of moral character: “A lot 
of thought is required for a person to make consistently good decisions, and ethical decisions are no 
different in this respect” (Coleman, 2013:9). This account seems to see moral development in similar 
ways to Kohlberg, where a moral maturity of the Principled Level is the deliberative application of 
moral principles. Whilst this is arguably a partial account of what constitutes moral character and its 
development, it certainly doesn’t stand as a substantive reflection on it. It potentially forecloses 
other accounts, specifically the dispositional, non-reflective dimension to moral character and 
connectedly conduct. Coleman mentions little beyond this in terms of theoretically grounding his 
account of moral character (or development), and his work isn’t unique in this respect. Coleman is 
far from alone in adopting this narrow account of deliberative morality. Martinelli-Fernandez (2006), 
writing in The Journal of Military Ethics argues that a “Kantian conception of autonomy, will help 
these men and women to achieve a level of practical reasoning” (Martinelli-Fernandez, 2006:55) in 
relation to ethical conduct. This deontological account sees individuals as autonomous agents that 
act upon morally choice worthy principles that subsequently guide one’s actions (Martinelli-
Fernandez, 2006:56). Again, an account which sees moral character as being exclusively a matter of 
deliberative, conscious reflection, and in this case reference to moral principles. Whilst it is 
encouraging to see a substantive treatment of how moral character develops, albeit from an 
exclusively philosophical perspective, it again fails to broach even a rudimentary treatment of 
contrasting accounts of moral character, whether from within or without philosophy. These 
accounts which take ethical conduct as equivalent to deliberation stand as clear examples of the 
scholastic fallacy (Aune, 2011:429) that Bourdieu described, that being the tendency to erroneously 
generalise the academic’s specific condition and disposition i.e. reflective deliberation born of 
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scholarly life, to everybody with the resultant affect that the mind becomes divorced from the body. 
This deliberative ethics grounds a strict mind-body distinction which excludes the possibility of 
considering ethics as an embodied, dispositional process as well as deliberative.  
Kohlberg’s theories are also directly and often unproblematically employed in assessing questions 
surrounding moral judgement, conduct, character and development. Verweij et al (2007) employ 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development to support their study on the moral judgement of Dutch 
soldiers, officer cadets and university students, on the basis of its continued influence (Verweij et al, 
2007:21) and that it successfully demonstrates a “relationship between the level of moral reasoning 
and moral action and showed the predominant trend that persons at each higher level of moral 
reasoning acted more consistently on the basis of rights and responsibilities” (ibid). Again, leaving 
aside substantive critical engagement with Kohlberg’s theory to later chapters, it is worth noting a 
couple of points of interest concerning the language used within this study and how it evidences 
taken for granted assumptions. It works from the unexplored assumption that moral action 
necessarily follows moral reasoning, and further limits the whole discussion to questions of 
judgement which is also necessarily reflective in nature. This again may well be an important part of 
the picture concerning what constitutes the processes surrounding the development of moral 
character and ethical conduct, but it forecloses without critical engagement any further discussion of 
other dispositional and non-deliberative aspects of the moral dimension of individual’s subjectivities. 
Given Kohlberg’s explicit adoption in a broad range of work on military ethics (see Toner 2000:57; 
Carrick, 2008:196-7; Olsthoorn, 2008:124; Parker & Greener, 2010:26; Weber & Gerde, 2011:596), it 
is unsurprising that it has been adopted as the primary model for understanding the moral 
development of soldiers (Williams, 2010: 43), through their testing using the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT), by the US Army Research Institute (ARI).  
Peter Olsthoorn (2011) comes closer than most in drawing out some of the confusion and 
contradictions which have developed within the field of military ethics, due to the sparsity of critical 
development of theories of moral character and development. He begins by questioning the 
relationship between educating soldiers in virtues and resultant ‘moral’ behaviour, raising whether it 
might just be a matter of social conditioning (2011:134), challenging the assumption made by those 
that advocate training in virtue ethics that it can be taught at all. If as he goes on to argue, virtues 
are developed through practice, how much space is there for practicing these virtues in the standard 
training that soldiers go through? He then passes briefly over what seems to be a fundamental 
feature of moral development- the relationship that others have in shaping our moral character 
(ibid). Olsthoorn ought to be commended for even raising these problems and highlighting some of 
the confusion surrounding contrasting, and often poorly articulated accounts of moral character and 
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development. He summarises the problem facing military ethics education- the practical outcome of 
work on military ethics, in the following: 
“to what extent elaborate ethics education for military personnel has any tangible beneficial 
effects is not entirely clear, as there is at best circumstantial evidence that it does. There is, 
consequently, hardly any evidence of best practices, as it has never been properly established 
what works and what does not.” (Olsthoorn, 2011:135) 
Finally, he argues that the products of social science, and not only philosophical texts should have a 
place in military ethics education (Olsthoorn, 2011:134). That this even needs to be argued 
evidences the stark absence of substantive and disciplinarily diverse work on questions surrounding 
moral character and development in military ethics literature and its applied counterparts. It is this 
absence that this research intends to redress.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has intended to sketch out a broad overview of the state of play in the academic field of 
military sociology made up of its professional and critical sub-disciplines in order to examine how it 
has treated the question of ethics in relation to the military. It argued that ethics in this context has 
not received a substantive sociological treatment due to it either being examined through a limited 
set of theoretical framings or foreclosed as a significant line of analysis. It went on to argue that over 
the last 30 years a discourse surrounding ethics has emerged in the British military which has 
recently been defined as a corporate ethics in the form of Army Core Values. The emergence of and 
connection between, these codified, corporate ethics and soldiers’ values in everyday life and 
combat situations is poorly understood. It suggested that the emergent requirements of 
contemporary operational contexts, specifically the COIN environment, have brought with them 
unique ethical problems. One of which exists in the tension between an ethics of killing or violence 
and an ethics of restraint and represents an area of military ethics that has yet to be examined. It 
has argued that ethics is closely tied-up with processes of legitimation of violence and that in order 
to understand soldiers’ responses and experiences of ethics considered along these lines, and in the 
context of combat one needs to look at the ‘bottom’ of ‘bottom-up’ through the examination of the 
experiences of junior soldiers.  Finally it argued that the treatment of ethics up to now has 
represented a scholastic fallacy through its singular emphasis on the deliberative dimension of 
ethical conduct to the exclusion of embodied and dispositional accounts of ethical conduct which 
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aim to bring the body back into discussions of ethics. It is from these definitions of the problem of 


























Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed through the preceding chapter, military ethics can be characterised as a sub-discipline 
of military sociology, concerned with providing a legitimising discourse on an ethics of violence and 
an applied field focused on questions surrounding how an ethics of violence may be instantiated at 
an institutional and individual level. For this very reason it has omitted the treatment of this ethics as 
an object of sociological curiosity, failing to ask the most basic of questions concerning the 
sociological form and relationship of this ethics between the institution, individual and how a 
particular ethical system shapes and constrains ethical conduct. For the very reason that military 
ethics is predominantly framed in this way, it has bypassed almost all scrutiny by critical military 
studies, as to study an ethics of violence, is to tacitly accept the possibility of that ethics. An 
understandably unusual move for a field which seeks to problematise and critique state violence.  
For this research and its focus on the question of ethics in the British Army, there are three main 
questions which will shape how it progresses in addressing this omission. The first to provide a 
theoretical framing which will open-up understandings of how the Army has over time sought to 
institutionally incubate this ethics of violence. Secondly, it must be able to provide an account of the 
relationship between the Army’s institutional framing of this ethics of violence and individual 
practices. Thirdly, how does this institutional ethics of violence, potentially constitute ethical 
conduct? In addition the theoretical lens by which ethics in this context may come to be understood, 
must be able to account for the distinct processes of military socialisation. Finally, the aim is to move 
beyond focusing exclusively on discourses of critique or legitimisation and bring the social back into 
the picture. Ethics and ethical conduct, even one which is of violence is still a negotiated practice, 
between and amongst people- this is the starting point from which to understand it. 
This chapter will argue that the ideas of Pierre Bourdieu provide a unique means of shedding light on 
ethics at an institutional level, considered through a focus on cooperate Core Values; and ethics at 
the individual level in terms of orientation towards these Core Values, and also how this potentially 
shapes ethical conduct. It will claim that Bourdieu’s account of Field, Capital and Habitus offer a 
unique conceptual framing which allows ethics in this context to be operationalised, tying together 
the institution to the individual, and also moving beyond accounts of ethical conduct which frame it 
as a predominantly Kantian, reflective process. Bourdieu’s sensitivity to the phenomenological 
dimension of social practice also affords a means of developing an account of ethical conduct and 
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expertise which speaks to the non-reflective side which presents itself in everyday action of which 
ethical conduct is a part. Through picking out the phenomenological content to Bourdieu’s account 
of Field and Habitus, this chapter will conclude by presenting the phenomenology Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus as a means of potentially understanding the practical dimension of ethical conduct.  
 
3.2 Military Socialisation and the Neglect of Ethics 
In attempting to tackle the problem of understanding ethics, both in the sense of a codified, 
corporate ethics in the form of the Army’s core values, and the relationship, if any between these 
Core Values and ethical conduct in the context of the British Army, we necessarily address ourselves 
to questions of military socialisation and military subjectivities. The connection between an 
institutional ethics and the individual is mediated and constituted by that institution’s culture and 
processes of socialisation of individuals into that culture. Various scholarship within military 
sociology has examined the institutional regimes which provide the structures which socialise 
recruits into the military culture (Janowitz & Shils, 1948; Hockey, 1986; King, 2006 Siebold, 2007); 
the role of entrenched (hegemonic) masculinities and how they intersect with military culture and 
subjectivities (Hockey, 1986; Higate, 2003; Woodward, 2003; Holmes, 2006; Hale, 2012);  and the 
notion of how the body of the soldier itself is a site of significant social constitution, employing 
phenomenologically informed accounts of embodiment (Higate, 2000; 2013; Hockey, 2013; 
Woodward & Jenkins, 2013; Dyvik, 2016).  
Broader sociological frames of understanding have been brought to bear on the institution of the 
Army, and the question of military socialisation. Goffman’s (1961) account of the army barracks as a 
form of ‘total institution’ significantly furthered understandings of how processes of ‘self-
mortification’ shaped the socialisation of recruits into the military identity, also taken up by a 
number of military sociologists and historians in their own work (Hockey, 1986; Wilson, 2008; 
Cooper et al, 2016:3-4). They occasionally look at the role of values within the institutional culture 
but fail to take this analysis further to examine the ethical systems which underpin these values and 
the role these play in shaping military subjectivities. Other authors (Bergman et al, 2014:62) have 
attempted to develop a model of ‘culture shock’ to explain how recruits are socialised into the 
British Army’s culture with reference to the institutional values of courage, determination, loyalty, 
integrity and commitment to duty. Whilst this is a step in the right direction, it still remains a partial 
account and theoretically underdeveloped.  
52 
 
The work of Foucault has been deployed as a means of understanding the relationship between the 
individual and the military, taking the body as the starting point and a site through which 
institutional and agential relations of power and domination are expressed. Individual subjectivities 
are produced which enable the body of the soldier to be mobilised to fulfil the institutional aims- the 
deployment of violent force. Foucault employs his notion of the ‘Docile Body’ (1977:136); the body 
which is subjected, used, transformed and improved, as understood through the conception of the 
body as an object and target of power. A process articulated through a techno-political register, 
constituted through a vast set of calculated, empirical methods found in the Army’s training regimes, 
which aim to control and correct the operations of the body (ibid). In this vein and drawing further 
on Foucault’s account of ‘technologies of the self’ (1988), Newlands (2013:42) takes the military 
body as a site of power relations and social constitution, arguing that the British Army’s training 
regime for new recruits during World War 2 (WW2), “sought to engage the men in their own 
physical transformation rather than simply imposing designs upon them”. Whilst not directly 
referring to institutional ethics the subject of institutional values is considered through her claim 
that these ‘bodily cultures also played a role in socialising soldiers into army values, such as ‘team 
spirit’ (Newlands, 2013:42), or for the purposes of this research, enabling primary group cohesion. 
Other authors have also taken the military subjectivity as a site of anatomo-political power relations, 
which sees the agent subject to strict regimes of control (Higate 2013:114; Eastwood, 2015). These 
processes are part of the wider biopolitical administration of life, which partially through the 
conduct of war weeks to secure life or put another way, “mak[e] life live” (Dillion & Neal, 2008:7-8), 
a logic which insists that in order to secure life some life must die (ibid).  
These insights have been applied to the question of military socialisation with reference to ethics. 
Eastwood (2015) in his study of Israeli Mechinots (pre-military academies), argues that ethics in this 
context ought to be understood as an extension of militarism, that being broadly the “penetration of 
social relations by military relations” (Shaw, 2013 quoted in Eastwood, 2015:4). These academies, 
which act as preliminary venues of preparation for military service, are part of a “regime of 
governmentality” (Eastwood, 2015:20) where individuals engage in processes of self-directed 
subject formation and self-fashioning with the aim being the “formation of soldiers as ethical 
subjects who monitor and strive to enhance their conduct and who believe strongly in the 
righteousness of the army for which they fight” (ibid). Thus, these academies seek to fuse this 
process of ethical self-improvement with overarching military aims, which “become mutually 
reinforcing objectives” (Eastwood, 2015:9) which simultaneously legitimise the use of military force. 
Whilst these Foucauldian inspired readings of military socialisation capture interesting aspects of the 
relationship between the body and the military institution and the self-directed processes of 
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socialisation into institutional ethical systems, and also go some way in explaining how ethics 
reinforces the various ideologies underpinning state violence, they are limited in that they fail to 
capture how soldiers and military personal see these systems of military ethics as a crucial element 
in their formation of self and are not only discreetly constituted within the confines of the institution 
of the military. They also fail to account for how ethics constitutes violence at a level deeper than 
ideology with respect to the role it plays in the formation of the primary group. Further, it fails to ask 
questions regarding the backgrounds of the soldiers themselves in relation to ethics. Soldiers will 
enter the barracks as recruits with pre-formed ethical understandings, shaped through the myriad 
experiences of family and the other social terrains within which their lifeworlds have come to be 
formed. The process of ethical ‘self-fashioning’ which Eastwood refers to cannot be explained 
without reference to individuals’ prior ethical socialisation.  
Eastwood’s analysis and over-emphasis on the ‘docility’ of the soldier’s ‘body’ and by extension 
subjectivity, forecloses the salient question of why soldiers choose to engage at all in this process of 
ethical self-fashioning. Further, the type of analysis Eastwood engages in also risks doing an act of 
symbolic violence to the testimony of soldiers themselves who see the values and ethics that 
compose their military identities as having intrinsic value. Soldiers most likely orientate themselves 
to the distinct set of military values and ethics for a range of reasons, some identifiable to the 
soldiers themselves and some not readily clear. Any sociologically grounded account of ethics in this 
context must at the very least attempt to account for the various reasons why soldiers do or do not 
orientate themselves towards these systems of institutional ethics.  
There are functional outputs which explain why the military has engaged in the institutional 
processes of codifying ethics and which structure the formation of ethical subjectivities at the level 
of the soldier. However, the theoretical closure of ethics to being primarily a form of militarism, 
connected to the biopolitical administration of life neglects potentially revealing lines of enquiry. For 
example, by potentially opening-up analysis to the question of recruit background in relation to 
ethics, factors such as social class may potentially provide a way of understanding why soldiers may 
orientate themselves towards these systems of institutional ethics. The military as a profession with 
its associated identities, fills a space which particular professions used to occupy, in terms of 
providing a physical and masculinised source of the identity for working-class men. The retreat of 
traditional manufacturing jobs as possible life choices for working class males, and the crucial role 
these jobs played in terms of the formation of working-class male identities, has further solidified 
the potential that military occupations have in terms of providing a powerful source of identity for 
working class men. Where pride, masculine identity, purpose and feelings of self-worth used to be 
found in traditional working-class jobs, a military career may offer an explicit resource for the 
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achievement of these things, and the ethical systems which exist in the military come to underpin 
aspects of this identity. Exploitation of this pull factor seems to implicitly underpin the January 2017 
advertising campaign undertaken by the British Army (MOD, 2017) with the tag, “This is Belonging”. 
The Army deliberately targeted this advertising campaign at 16-24-year-olds from economically 
depressed areas with household incomes of less than £10,000 (Dee, 2017:6). Connectedly, when 
soldiers end military service and return to civilian life, broadening an understanding of class 
background and its’ intersection with processes of military socialisation in this way can help to 
explain the psycho-social impacts experienced by former soldiers engaging in this process of re-
integration (Cooper et al, 2016; 2017)7.  
Excluding Eastwood’s account, what previous studies broadly share is their neglect of ethics (and its 
associated intersection with codified institutional values) as a subject of investigation within the 
broader question of military socialisation and identity formation. This represents a clear absence in 
the current literature on military socialisation and a related problem within the overall field of 
military ethics. In absence of a comprehensive attempt at accounting for ethics and its relationship 
to processes of socialisation, as well as a sensitivity to the role of recruit background and its possible 
intersection with these processes of socialisation into an institutional ethics, both fields offer 
incomplete accounts. Socialisation into the military culture cannot be understood without reference 
to ethics and values. Ethics and values in the context of the institution of the military cannot be 
understood in absence of a developed theory of military socialisation; both must be able to integrate 
some theorisation of how recruit background intersects with these processes.  
A sub-field of military studies which has gone some way in attempting to reconcile this problem is 
within the field of veterans’ studies and its associated focus on themes related to the transition from 
military to civilian life. Transition, defined as “the period of reintegration into civilian life from the 
military and encapsulates the process of change that a service person necessarily undertakes when 
her or his military career comes to an end” (Cooper et al, 2016:2) has recently received increased 
attention both within academic scholarship and beyond (Higate, 2000; Ashcroft 2014; Ahern et al, 
2015; Cooper et al, 2016, 2017). One particular problem area that scholars working on the notion of 
transition have attempted to address is the influence of military culture on the soldier with respect 
to understanding its effects when examining soldier’s experiences of social dislocation when exiting 
the military and returning to what is potentially experienced as the unfamiliar social setting of 
civilian life (Cooper et al, 2016, 2017). Given that problem definition directly relates to the 
theoretical frameworks that are brought on it, a number of authors (Lande, 2007; Maringira et al, 
 
7 This theme will be explored in the conclusion as a possible avenue for further research. 
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2015; Cooper et al, 2016, 2017) have turned towards the work of Pierre Bourdieu as a means of 
accounting for the effect of military culture and socialisation beyond the confines of the institution 
into post-military life. Higate (2000:100) in his work on homelessness amongst ex-servicemen makes 
a brief reference to how they make exhibit a ‘behavioural residue’ due to their ‘emersion into Army 
habitus’. Whilst only a brief reference to this identifiably Bourdieusian concept, his later work also 
shares similarities with Bourdeusian accounts through its attention to “pre-reflective and habitual 
social practice” (Higate, 2013:111-2) in accounting for the embodied dimension of military practices. 
What this brief review demonstrates is a potential theoretical frame found in the work of Bourdieu 
for accounting for the distinct processes of socialisation found within the military.  
 
3.3 Habitus, Field and Capital 
Bourdieu arguably provides a unique means of linking processes of social habituation, including 
bodily dispositions, between different social milieus. It is this feature which primarily suits it to 
questions surrounding military-civilian transition and also to the wider questions concerning military 
socialisation and potentially ethics. One can in part characterise Bourdieu’s body of work as an 
attempt to develop an account of how social formations or structures reproduce themselves and it 
represents an attempt to “reintroduce(s) agency into social theory” (Callinicos, 2007:291). A concept 
primary to his theory is habitus, this being “a particular set of dispositions, consisting especially in 
the practical abilities required to apply categories that are means of perceiving and of appreciating 
the world” (Callinicos, 2007:295). These dispositions and practical abilities can be conceived of as 
generative schemes which constitute the self, as well as produce and reproduce social structures. 
The linkage between an individual’s habitus and the durable quality of social structures is conceived 
of by Bourdieu in the following manner: 
“The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, 
produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective 
conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting to the 
demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation” (Bourdieu, 1977:78) 
Note that Bourdieu speaks to a tendency on behalf of a person’s habitus to ‘reproduce regularities’- 
regularities are those features which constitute the apparent durability of social structures. This 
notion of a tendency towards reproduction of regularities is a crucial claim as it leaves space for the 
possibility of practices which are capable of transforming social structures, whilst limiting the notion 
that people are completely free to do as they please. This is the necessary opening-up off individual 
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subjectivity to its role in constituting social structures both through the reproduction of those 
structures, and also the possibility of their transformation. The habitus constitutes how individuals 
adapt to the needs of specific social structures (Callinicos, 2007:296) whilst not claiming to be a set 
of consciously held beliefs. Bourdieu sees it as something far more embodied; a “tacit competence 
implicit in actors’ practical ability to cope with a wide range of situations in ways that are predictable 
without being reduced to the conscious observance of a set of rules” (Callinicos, 2007:296).  
These dispositions may (or may not) often be adjusted or partially synchronised with the dispositions 
of the field being entered, which may arise through processes of occupational self-selection- going 
into the family trade for example (Bourdieu, 2006:165). The demands of a field, to be discussed 
shortly, expressed either explicitly or implicitly, are orientated to the achievement of ‘recognition’ 
(Bourdieu, 2006:165). Recognition is simply the approval of others, the sense that one experiences 
when others see one as having intrinsic worth as a person. Sensitivity to signs of this recognition, 
that being the orientation towards possible sources of recognition and the associated conferring of 
the recognition of the symbolic order of the field which grants them, may or may not reflect 
dispositions structured previously in the context of the family. The process by which these primary 
dispositions may become transformed into the specific dispositions of the field, occurs through; “a 
whole series of imperceptible transactions, half-conscious compromises and psychological 
operations (projection, identification, transference, sublimation, etc.), socially encouraged, 
supported, channelled and even organised” (Bourdieu, 2006:165). Importantly for the question of 
ethical conduct of combat soldiers, Bourdieu takes habitus to also incorporate moral dispositions, a 
“permanent disposition, embedded in the agents' very bodies in the form of mental dispositions, 
schemes of perception and thought” (Bourdieu, 1977:15). Bourdieu, across a number of works, 
provides slightly different interpretations of how ethics can be understood in terms of their function 
beyond their role within the dispositional qualities of habitus. In Distinction (1984) he makes the 
claim that they provide a resource by which to accumulate legitimate power- derived and reinforced 
from authority, what he also refers to as ‘symbolic power’. This symbolic power is partially derived 
through acts of recognition, as it relates to the assignation of “name, renown, prestige, honour, 
glory, authority, everything which constitutes symbolic power as recognized power” (Bourdieu, 
1984: 251). These dimensions of symbolic power are inter-subjectively constituted through acts of 
recognition by others. The accumulation of symbolic power goes hand in glove with symbolic 
violence, which represents the imposition of categories of thought and perception, (mis)recognised 
as legitimate by others represent a form of domination (Bourdieu, 1984).  
Bourdieu develops alongside this account of habitus the concepts of field and capital (1977). Fields 
are the situated, structured social contexts within which a person’s habitus generates action, “each 
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field is semi-autonomous, characterised by its own determinate agents (for example, students, 
novelists, scientists), its own accumulation of history, its own logic of action, and its own form of 
capital” (Calhoun et al, 1993:5). Bourdieu identified different forms of capital (economic, social, 
cultural and symbolic) which are distributed unequally across different social classes (Swartz, 
2002:655). The introduction of the concept of field and capital allows Bourdieu to account for the 
competitive struggles that occur over different forms of capital, relative to the structured social 
space of the field; a person’s habitus is mediated by the field they are in, and the field is mediated 
through the dispositions of a person’s habitus (ibid).  
The field for Bourdieu is a description of the objective reality of social relations, as opposed to an 
emphasis on the quality of the interactions between individuals- “the real is relational” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992:97). A field is defined as a network of objective relations between their occupants- 
agents or institutions occupying specific positions within a given field (Ibid). The positions 
themselves are objectively defined and impose objective determinations upon the occupants of 
those positions. The position an occupant has in a field is located within an objective distribution of 
different species of power. These species of power refer to different capital forms (economic, 
cultural, symbolic), the possession of which provides access to the particular profits at stake in a 
field. Economic capital refers to resources such as money, material goods, property etc; Cultural 
capital refers to knowledge, education and taste in music for example, all of which are valued in 
specific ways in different fields; and as mentioned, symbolic capital refers to concepts such as 
honour or prestige which also have relative value depending on the social field one occupies.  
The relative importance of the forms of capital is determined by the logic of the field- economic 
capital may confer greater profits than cultural capital in a certain field, whilst symbolic capital may 
be the primary capital form in another. An individual’s position within a field also determines a set of 
objective relations to other positions in terms of domination, subordination and homology (ibid).  
All fields follow their own underlying logic, and this logic determines the importance of particular 
capital forms. Differentiated societies have produced multiple social fields with their own logics 
which are irreducible to other fields. The logic of, for example, the artistic field places a premium on 
cultural capital as a species of power; whilst the economic field the individual also occupies will 
emphasise economic capital. The particular capital forms an individual possess, are objectively 
defined in relation to the position in the field(s) which they occupy. In its broadest sense, Bourdieu 
develops a typology of power which is positional and relational.   
Importantly, for the purpose of this research, Bourdieu views the selection of a specific field as a 
possible means of expressing and satisfying drives and desires. As well as this, fields also utilise these 
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drives through processes of subjection and sublimation to the structures of the field and the ends 
and aims which are immanent within them (Bourdieu, 2006:165). One immanent aspect of the 
structure of a field is the nomos, or ‘fundamental law’ (Bourdieu, 2006:96), a component of doxa 
(Bourdieu, 1977:164) that which is taken as natural or self-evident in the social world, it an accepted 
viewpoint which is constitutive of the field, and once accepted, one can no longer take an external 
viewpoint on it; “(T)he nomos, a ‘thesis’ which, because it is never put forward as such, cannot be 
contradicted, has no antithesis” (Bourdieu, 2006:97). The tacit adherence to nomos, often ridiculed 
or viewed as derisory from the vantage point of other fields, is a particular form of belief which 
Bourdieu terms illusio (Bourdieu, 2006:101). To articulate these terms in relation to potentially 
understanding the military as a field in the Bourdieusian sense, the illusio can be considered as the 
accepted belief in the nomos of the use of violent force, by all those who make up that field. A 
voluntary soldier may be a conscientious objector but cannot be a pacifist.  
The specific habitus demanded as a condition of entry into a field, is an eidos understood as a mode 
of thought reflecting a specific construction of reality; “a pre-reflexive belief in the undisputed value 
of the instruments of construction and the objects thus constructed (an ethos)” (Bourdieu, 2006:99-
100). An entrant to this field must bring with them a pre-existing habitus which is “practically 
compatible” with and “capable of being converted” into this eidos (Bourdieu, 2006:100). 
Recruitment into a particular field becomes attuned to this possibility of habitus conversion, through 
attentiveness to signs of possible competence in the form of dress, bearing, or manners (Bourdieu, 
2006:100). Illusio arises initially as a form of investment in the domestic space of the family 
(Bourdieu, 2006:166), the child who is “absorbed in the love of others” begins to develop a sense of 
themselves as a subject of this love, who realise that others are objects which also take them as 
being objects themselves. The formation of this initial illusio represents the development of an initial 
desire which plays out for the rest of one’s life in the form of the “search for recognition” (Bourdieu, 
2006:166). Symbolic capital in the form of honour, glory, credit, reputation, fame, etc; all represent 
the search for the approval of others, according to Bourdieu (ibid). The child in the site of the 
universe of the family, possesses accompanying dispositions orientated towards the illusio present 
there. The child makes sacrifices and renunciations in order to achieve testimonies of recognition in 
the form of positive admiration (Bourdieu, 2006:167). These testimonies of recognition are symbolic 
prizes which an individual orientates their practices toward in such a way that they might achieve 
this recognition, the type of practices which achieve recognition in this sense will vary relative to 
different families. Certain families will offer recognition for particular actions based on what they 
believe to be praiseworthy, which will reflect the dispositional states of the parents, partially 
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determined by the fields which they occupy and have occupied, subsequently shaping their own 
habitus.  
The drive to accumulate symbolic capital, is thus a “highly emotive search for a reason for being, 
generally available in the form of worth and value in the eyes of others” (Atkinson, 2016:3). This 
drive to seek the approval of others is one that is formed through early childhood experiences in the 
context of the family (Bourdieu, 2006:167). Children’s primary habitus is shaped by these 
testimonies of recognition, from family members and they develop a “sharpening of their sensitivity 
to these prizes” (Bourdieu, 2006:167) via recognition through praise. As such their primary habitus is 
formed to be attuned to social games, or fields which offer the potential of yielding these rewards of 
recognition. The family, in terms of it shaping the primary habitus of children, thus makes this 
primary habitus “practically compatible” with certain fields. In working class families, where those 
who supply the testimonies of recognition, tend to occupy fields where symbolic capital in the form 
of recognition for ability in manual tasks is the social game at play, reproduce in their children 
certain symbolic features of the habitus of the field which they occupy. Children will be rewarded for 
particular behaviours which favour certain forms of symbolic capital- rough, masculinised behaviours 
may be treated as more praiseworthy in families where the parent works in highly masculinised jobs. 
Considering these observations in relation to this research, it may go some way in explaining the 
predominance of individuals from low socio-economic groups in the infantry; as well as the 
significance of NCO’s as conferrers of recognition, and connectedly the gatekeepers of symbolic 
capital. The depth and significance of the primary group within the military to individuals in terms of 
processes of recognition means that those individuals such as NCOs who partially determine the 
degree to which a recruit meats the soldierly ideal, most likely play a significant role in the processes 
of recognition seeking which a primary to Bourdieu’s social theory.  
It is important to note that ethics are not wholly reductive to strategies of accumulation of symbolic 
capital for individual advancement in the military field; they are also as will be shown, reported by 
soldiers themselves as meaningful objects in terms of their own construction of a worthwhile sense 
of self. The aim then is to provide a coherent picture of ethics which sees them as both 
understandable in terms of, in the case of this research power struggles over the accumulation of 
symbolic capital, as well as being strived towards as an end itself- an end explained as an expression 
of the search for recognition of one’s intrinsic worth. Values are crucial to us also as objects which 
allow us to become meaningful human beings. Lay normativity is important, precisely because it is 
important to people as they go about living their lives; it impacts directly on their well-being (Sayer, 
2004:4). Sayer outlines the possibility of a heterodox position regarding values in the following: “The 
struggles of the social field, between different groups, classes, genders and ethnicities certainly 
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involve habitual action and the pursuit of power, but they also have a range of normative rationales, 
which matter greatly to actors” (ibid). These ‘normative rationales’ are the basis of the 
meaningfulness of those values to soldiers themselves. We generally feel a strong sense of emotive 
connection to the values and ethical systems which we adopt and adhere to within our lives, which is 
a crucial layer of experience beyond a purely reductive account of ethics.  
 
3.4 Symbolic Capital and the Drive for Recognition  
“The social world gives what is rarest, recognition, consideration, in other words, quite simply, 
reasons for being. It is capable of giving meaning to life . . . One of the most unequal of all 
distributions, and probably, in any case, the most cruel, is the distribution of symbolic capital, 
that is of social importance and of reasons for living... if the losers in the symbolic struggle for 
recognition, for access to a socially recognized social being, in a word, to humanity. (Bourdieu, 
2000: 240–241-pascallian meditations)” 
Bourdieu in this quote expresses in similar terms to both Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth what 
remains after philosophy or sociology has done their work on explaining human action. The 
centrality of recognition seeking practices is perhaps more recognisable in the work of Taylor and 
Honneth. Whilst present in Bourdieu’s own work, he has however often suffered from critiques that 
his corpus on social fields and the strategies individuals employ in their attempts to accumulate 
different capital forms was merely an extension of homo economicus into the domain of social-
symbolic forms. Honneth’s own work on the Hegelian “struggle for recognition’ was an attempt at 
reinterpreting its significance in explaining the dynamics and root causes of social conflicts through a 
non-utilitarian moral-sociological account. This denial of recognition represents a “breakdown of the 
system of reciprocal expectations of behaviour based on values anchored in intersubjective 
structures of mutual recognition that underlie individual identity development.” (Basaure, 
2011:204). Honneth, who articulated one of the key critiques of Bourdieu’s work in this respect 
argued that the concepts Bourdieu developed in his critique of structuralism and subsequent work 
on habitus, field and capitals represented “the application of a form of utilitarianism to symbolic 
practices” (Honneth, 1995:187). This “economy of practices” conceived social practices as directed 
towards the maximisation of both material and symbolic gain (Bourdieu 1972, p. 235 quoted in 
Honneth, 1995:187). Bourdieu utilised categories such as capital, traditionally applied to economic 
theory, within the domain of symbolic practices- symbolic capital was understood by Honneth as 
“metaphorically the sum of cultural recognition or prestige which an individual or social group could 
acquire through a skilful manipulation of the system of social symbols” (Honneth, 1995:187). 
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Honneth goes further in his critique as seeing Bourdieu as applying his own ‘skillful manipulation’ in 
that whilst the form of utility maximisation as conceived in economic theory suffers as an 
explanatory model as it is demonstrably not always empirically detectable. He argues that Bourdieu 
introduces this form of rational utilitarianism in relation to symbolic practices unconsciously with 
relation to habitus (Honneth, 1995:187:  
Bourdieu’s account of ‘interest’, developed through his analysis of social rituals, matrimonial choices 
and ‘mundane’ social practices; was a rejection of an ‘objectivism of action’ (Bourdieu, P & 
Wacquant, L, 1992:121) which saw it as a form of mechanical action with the social agent shrunk 
from view, no doubt a continuation of his own critique of structuralism. Nor did he see interest in 
terms of an unfettered subjectivism where the social agent is imbued with free and conscious 
choice, maximising utility through the application of rational choices (ibid). This middle approach 
speaks to his own positioning in relation to questions of structure and agency as reflected so clearly 
in his own account of habitus as an answer to the thorny issue of the relationship between choice 
and social constraint. Interest for Bourdieu can only be understood when also taking into account his 
ideas concerning the field as a site of particular forms of social practices, considered akin to a game. 
Interest is understood in relation to the illusio of a particular field, for interest is the attribution of 
importance to a social game. Interest is to: 
"be there," to participate, to admit that the game is worth playing and that the stakes created 
in and through the fact of playing are worth pursuing; it is to recognize the game and to 
recognize its stake… In other words, social games are games that are forgotten qua games, 
and the illusio is the enchanted relation to a game that is the product of a relation of 
ontological complicity between mental structures and the objective structures of social space” 
(Bourdieu, 1998:77). 
Interest is then to ‘be there’ through a complicity between the form of one’s habitus and the 
structure of a specific field. It is to be moved in some way to take part in the mosaic of practices 
which make up the social space one is engaged with through this ‘complicity’. The choice of the 
word ‘interest’ to describe this unique account of the social agent’s relationship to social practices 
was perhaps an unfortunate but unavoidable choice on behalf of Bourdieu, which inevitably opened 
him up to the type of critiques raised by Honneth. Honneth’s claim that the unconscious 
dispositional qualities of habitus mask some hidden utilitarian drive still has some weight unless 
interest as Bourdieu takes it even at the level of commitment and engagement with the social game, 
is more precisely defined as it seems that the unconscious drive to accumulate capital forms, being a 
primary part of the social game, is a utilitarianism by another description. Whilst Bourdieu excludes 
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the type of conscious, rational calculation which would be identifiable in the type of rational choice 
theory in economics, he still sees action clearly within these terms, albeit non-conscious, ‘all actions, 
even those understood as disinterested or non-purposive, and thus freed from economic motives, 
are to be conceived economically’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 235)”. This is not, as Pellandini-Simányi argues, a 
claim concerning an ontology of human action, rather Bourdieu’s claims are always tied to analysis 
of specific empirical instances (2014:662). Where Bourdieu does seem to make a claim as to an 
ontology of human action, and connectedly his clearest stance on ethics is in relation again to the 
motive or driving force behind interest and the accumulation of symbolic power. This motive is the 
symbolic struggle for recognition. 
 
3.5 Recognition and the Primacy of Emotions 
Much contemporary social theory has tended to foreclose considerations of the ethical and moral 
dimension of human life, preferring to frame it in relation to concepts such as discourse, power, and 
habit. The treatment of ethics as understood as a meaningful end in itself, crucial to our self-
understandings as humans, is one however which a number of authors have attempted to articulate 
(Sayer, 2004; Taylor, 1989). Sayer argues that sociological theory has tended towards treating morals 
and ethics in this manner through the gradual separation of positive thought from normative 
reasoning that has occurred in social science over the last 200 years (Sayer, 2004:3). In parallel it has 
made the incomplete attempt to expunge values from reason and science, and reason and science 
from explanations of values: “values appear to be mere primitive, a-rational subjective beliefs, lying 
beyond the scope of reason” (ibid). Under this account, reason does not matter in itself, nor 
motivate; values matter and motivate but for no apparent reason (ibid). This point is crucial to this 
research as if we are to treat values in the context of the military as something more than functions 
of discourse or solely means to the accumulation of capitals, and if people do orientate themselves 
towards these things as meaningful ends then we must be able to provide an explanation beyond 
the account that the choice of one value over the other is merely incidental or a matter of rational 
calculus targeting the most effective accumulation of capital forms.  
We must also be able to answer the more general question and provide a compelling account of why 
values matter to people at all, and for the purpose of this research, the soldiers that commit 
themselves so strongly towards the institutional Core Values that the Army espouses. This research 
would omit something very important were it not to account for the ways in which these values can 
come to define soldier’s sense of self. The aim then is to provide a coherent picture of ethics which 
sees them as both understandable in terms of both power struggles over the accumulation of 
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symbolic capital and strived-towards ends in themselves. This end is one which expresses both the 
desire for recognition and a valorisation of the ethics that Core Values express, as a good in itself. 
The reductive standpoint on ethics which is often taken within philosophy and sociology runs the risk 
of being “unable to identify not only its own normative standpoints but the normative concerns, 
distinctions and valuations that figure so prominently in the lives of the people it studies” (Sayer, 
2004:3). The constant habit of assigning alienating and totalising descriptions of actions in terms of 
discourse, power and the like, which for those who act bears little relation to their self-referential 
understandings their own actions risks doing significant symbolic violence to their own agency. 
Drawing on Bourdieu’s own observations on the space of the interview, Schostak understands this 
notion of symbolic violence in the following manner;  
“It would be a violence for the interviewer as listener to disabuse what is confided in those 
spaces by selective interpretation, by imposing desired meanings that suit a particular case, by 
omitting aspects of what is told and privileging others” (Schostak, 2006:60)  
Whilst a degree of symbolic violence is always inevitable, as researchers come to the social world 
socially positioned with particular conceptual means of framing the world, this concern should at the 
very least guide the manner by which we interpret empirical data and also make ontological claims, 
as these cannot be divorced from our implicit and ingrained understandings as subjects inhabiting 
the world which we study. In the case of values and connectedly ethics, we feel most directly and 
intuitively that these operate in ways which cannot be totally reduced to understanding framed in 
terms of power struggles over symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2010) or subject-fashioning in the 
Foucauldian sense (Eastwood, 2015). Sayer outlines the possibility of a heterodox position regarding 
values in the following; “The struggles of the social field, between different groups, classes, genders 
and ethnicities certainly involve habitual action and the pursuit of power, but they also have a range 
of normative rationales, which matter greatly to actors” (ibid).  
In “Sources of the Self” (1989), Taylor sets out to develop a moral ontology concerning what he 
refers to as the “background picture” lying behind our moral intuitions (Taylor, 1989:8). Rather than 
falling back on a reductive account of morals as being functions or expressive of something else, 
Taylor identifies the main problem in trying to articulate the moral ontology implicit in people’s 
explanations.  
Taylor defines ethics, or normative evaluations as ‘strong evaluations’ (Taylor, 1989:74), the ‘strong’ 
which defines these evaluations is in an experience of being “moved” by them (Ibid). The following 
provides the core to the moral ontology Taylor proposes by seeing the motivating or action 
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orientating object as resting within the value itself, considered as a good in itself, as experienced 
through the sensation of being “moved” towards it; “We sense in the very experience of being 
moved by some higher good that we are moved by what is good in it rather than that it is valuable 
because of our reaction” (ibid). He acknowledges the possible accusation from reductionists, that, 
the experience of being ‘moved’ by this supposed good inhering in the value, might merely be the 
projection of some more ordinary desire (a struggle for symbolic power or desire taken as a complex 
function of discourse), given a “halo of the higher” (ibid). However, Taylor asks that it is at least 
possible that he is right; if one broaches the possibility of him being right one has already opened up, 
pre-theorisation, the possibility of a moral ontology.  
There still remains a problem with Taylor’s account of the experience of being ‘moved’ towards 
some ‘good’. Though we “experience our love for it as a well-founded love” (Taylor, 1989:74), 
Bourdieu might explain this as a dispositional quality of habitus which expresses an individual’s 
struggle for symbolic capital in the sense that we act in morally praiseworthy ways in order to 
achieve that symbolic capital? Reductionists of any description might provide some similar 
explanation of how the emotion in this case may be reduced to some other set of reductive 
conceptual terms. Peter Goldie attempts to recover emotions as an important domain of 
philosophical enquiry, and as a means to understanding action (Goldie, 2000). Following in the same 
vein as Aristotle, Goldie argues that emotions are intentional, that is they are always directed to 
some object, real or imaginary; they are formed out of individual elements (thought, feeling, bodily 
change, expression etc), which derive intelligibility from a narrative structure (Goldie, 2000:4). 
Goldie is positioned against philosophers who have tended to characterise the intentionality of 
emotions in terms of beliefs, or beliefs and desires (Goldie, 2000:18); the problem being that these 
accounts tend to leave feelings out of emotional experience. When we see in our worlds some 
injustice or conversely see the overcoming of some injustice, it makes perfect sense to us to talk 
about our feelings towards these things- the feelings I experienced upon witnessing some injustice 
might prompt some action- donating to charity, taking part in a protest etc. Goldie acknowledges the 
possible role played by beliefs and desires within the emotional experience, making intelligible 
emotion and what is done out of emotion, however:  
“the mistake is to think that these feelingless beliefs and desires, perhaps characterised 
impersonally, exhaust the intentionality of emotional experience, and that they are therefore 
sufficient to make sense of emotion and action out of emotion (emphasis added). What I want 
to do is emphasise an intentional element which is neither belief nor desire, and which is, in 
many respects, more fundamental to experience than either of these” (Goldie, 2000:18-19).  
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He combines the recognition that emotions are always intentional with the claim that feelings are 
fundamental to understanding action out of emotion in the idea of feeling towards. This is the 
directed intentionality of thinking of something combined with feeling, such that; “your emotional 
feelings are directed towards the object of your thought” (Goldie, 2000:19). Returning once again to 
Taylor’s characterisation of ethics as “strong evaluations” (Taylor, 1989:74), which we are ‘moved 
towards’ or experience “well-founded love” for; here there is a clear characterisation of Goldie’s 
notion of ‘feeling towards’.  There is a phenomenological dimension to these feelings which prevent 
them from being analysed in simpler terms. Emotional proportionality and appropriateness are for 
Goldie, culturally determined (Goldie, 2000:23) and in terms of the work of Bourdieu they are a 
dispositional quality of habitus.  
Our orientation towards particular ethical systems is intelligible precisely because of the feelings 
that we have towards these objects, though beliefs and desires are present as well. The 
phenomenological distinctness of an action undertaken out of the experiential state of feeling 
something is relevant to both the agent undertaking the action as well as those surrounding that 
agent (Goldie, 2000:40). We are able to usually distinguish very quickly when emotion is absent in 
situations where a particular emotion is expected to accompany an action- making love without 
feeling for example. In the case of the Army, an orientation towards its Core Values and the ethics 
that underpin them, expressed by someone in terms only of beliefs and desires, framed as strategies 
for personal and professional advancement, would most likely elicit a negative response from peers. 
Crucially, for the purposes of this research, an emotional thought or feeling in the context of action 
orientation towards the adoption of particular set of values or ethical system is “primitively 
intelligible” (Goldie, 2000:43) and “cannot be better explained by anything else other than the 
emotion of which it is a part” (ibid). Beliefs and desires may or may not play a role in explaining 
action which follows an emotional state, but the presence of the emotional state cannot be reduced 
to only beliefs and desires. As such we have a way of both accommodating the possibility of 
providing explanations of orientation towards ethical systems with respect to the observations 
developed by Bourdieu concerning struggles for symbolic capital as a means of achieving 
recognition, expressed in dispositional desires towards ethical objects, whilst simultaneously 
foreclosing the claim that emotions are always reducible to these. In essence this commitment to 
institutional Core Values by soldiers expresses both the emotional volition towards these goods as 
well as the desire for recognition that this good will potentially afford through the associated 




3.6 Bourdieu and the Military 
Bourdieu has not gone completely unnoticed in military sociology, in particular his sensitivity to the 
embodied qualities of habitus explored through the examination of the relationships between social 
class and taste (1984), have provided a resource for exploring this embodied dimension of social 
practice in relation to military socialisation. Lande (2007) emphasises Bourdieu’s account of bodily 
practices as an aspect of one’s habitus, shaped within the social context of the military as a means of 
foregrounding the role of breathing as “exemplary of how cadets inhabit their world through the 
ways that they are possessed by the practices of the military world” (Lande, 2007:106). In essence, 
soldiers learn how to breathe in a pre-reflective, embodied sense; this form of learning “is the 
incorporation of new competencies and dispositions that modify the habitus.” (ibid). Marinigira et al 
(2015) utilise a Bourdieusian inspired analysis to account for how ‘military being’ (2015:27) or 
‘military identity’ (ibid) is constituted within the military and can be understood as a type of military 
habitus. They go on to relate this form of habitus implicitly to features of the military field, though 
not mentioned as such through accounting for how symbolic resources such as “the ability to use a 
gun, do surveillance, survive, and endure” (ibid) act as markers of military identity. They then 
examine how military being and these markers of military identity, or what Bourdieu would 
understand as forms of symbolic capital, are “understood and reinforced in a particular ‘‘field,’’ in 
our case that of exile characterized by social, economic, and political contestations” (Maringira et al, 
2015:29). Both works broadly represent good examples of the possible purchase a Bourdieusian 
account of military and post-military socialisation may have. Whilst Lande utilises Bourdieu 
successfully as a means of drawing attention to the notion of embodiment in relation to the bodily 
practices of military socialisation, and Maringira et al allude to a consideration of the military as a 
field, with associated capitals; both are, however, limited in that they offer incomplete articulations 
of his core concepts of field, capital, and habitus.  
Cooper et al (2016, 2017) offer a more coherent and developed application of Bourdieusian theory 
as a means of explaining the effects of military culture on individuals in terms of their post-military 
transition into civilian life. Their work sheds light on the notion of the soldierly habitus in relation to 
its transition from the military field and represents the most comprehensive application of these 
concepts to the military so far. They address the question of the problematic nature of military 
veterans’ transition into civilian life and the need to find strategies to assist them in this process of 
re-socialisation (Cooper et al, 2017:2). Remarking on the current paucity of theoretical and empirical 
work on how individuals come to understand and experience this process of transition into non-
military life (ibid), they go on to theorize the military as a field, distinct from the multitude of other 
fields which comprise civilian life (Cooper et al, 2016, 2017). This military field is composed of 
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various forms of cultural (and symbolic) capital specific to it. The military field is defined through the 
existence of specific forms of cultural capital such as subordination to rank; symbolism of uniform 
(Cooper et al, 2017:2); forms of technical proficiency unique to the military, such as weapons 
handling; physical capital manifest through bodily proficiency (2016:10) as applied to military 
activities; and symbolic capital in the form of prestige and recognition gained through combat 
experience for example (2016:7). These capital forms, specific to the military field often do not 
translate well to other fields found in civilian life which leads to experiences of social dislocation, 
when transitioning from the military into civilian life (Cooper et al, 2016:10). Additionally, they 
employ the notion of a military habitus attuned to the military field and shaped through the capital 
forms specific to that field- in the sense that individuals have a particular ‘feel-for-the-game’ (Cooper 
et al, 2016:8) and learn how to ‘play-the-game’. This habituated and often pre-reflective sense of the 
things at stake and implicit rules associated with a particular social field explains the valuation and 
orientation towards these specific capital forms. This conceptual framework is applied in order to 
account for the experience of “collision or rupture” (Cooper et al, 2016:9) that veterans with habitus 
attuned to the military field may experience when transitioning to civilian life. They utilise the 
Bourdieusian notion of ‘hysteriesis’ (ibid), which describes “discord occurring when the new field 
encountered is too different from the field to which one’s habitus is previously adjusted. Hysteresis 
may manifest in certain ‘‘negative sanctions’’ such as fear, anxiety, or resistance to change” (ibid)).  
The paucity of work attempting to apply the concepts developed by Pierre Bourdieu to the 
phenomena of the military and military socialisation generates an opportunity for further research. 
The aforementioned examples, though few, demonstrate the potential analytical purchase of 
concepts such as field, capital and habitus as a means of accounting for individual experiences of the 
processes of military socialisation within the confines of the military and also the transition into 
civilian life. Cooper’s initial work on sketching out the various forms of capital suggests also an area 
which would benefit from further elaboration. Specifically, for the purposes of this research whether 
the embodiment of ‘Core Values’, and connectedly their counterparts in the form of conduct ethics, 
provide a means to achieve symbolic capital? In terms of this research this underdeveloped 
application of Bourdieu to the military along with its reading of the concepts of field, capital, and 
habitus presents itself both as a problem and opportunity in terms of its use as a means to 
understand and answer questions surrounding military socialisation into particular institutional 
values and ethics.  
In picking out this underdeveloped application of Bourdieusian theory to the military as a problem, it 
potentially offers the opportunity to broaden accounts for how recruit background may intersect 
with this process of socialisation in that hysteresis also may occur upon entry into the military field, 
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and the relation to habitus formation in fields occupied previous to military service. This relates 
closely to socialisation into military values and potentially provides a means of sketching out the 
sociological relationship between these values and ethical conduct which is implied through the 
institutional codification of Core Values and explicit reference to their relationship to ethical conduct 
(Army Doctrine Publication Volume 5-Soldiering: The Military Covenant, 2000:1-3). The moral or 
ethical component of habitus is also an area within Bourdieusian theory which deserves greater 
attention. Bourdieu takes habitus to also incorporate moral dispositions, a “permanent disposition, 
embedded in the agents' very bodies in the form of mental dispositions, schemes of perception and 
thought” (Bourdieu, 1977:15), given the habituated and pre-reflective quality to habitus the ethical 
aspect may also be expressed in this non-deliberative and embodied way. This connects to the 
previous comments on the predominant view that ethical conduct is Kohlbergian in nature, falling 
back onto accounts of ethical conduct as synonymous with conscious, deliberative reflection. 
Working from the previous assumption that Core Values in some way contribute to shaping ethical 
conduct, any study on ethics in the military must go some way in accounting for relationships 
between institutional ethics and ethical conduct. A Bourdieusian informed account which takes the 
embodiment of Core Values as a means to the accumulation of symbolic capital in the form of 
honour, allows us to potentially bridge the gap between institution and individual in terms of the 
problem of understanding ethics in this context.  
 
3.7 The Individual and Ethical Conduct 
As argued earlier in this chapter, arising in part from the lack of theoretical diversity within the field 
of Military Ethics, there has been little attention paid to the notion that ethical conduct and relatedly 
ethical expertise has a non-deliberative character and cannot only be accounted for through an 
emphasis on critical moral judgements. This line of analysis locates itself also within the 
Moralitat/Sittlichkeit debate and challenges the Kohlbergian account of moral maturity being 
equivalent to the critical application of moral rules. This restriction of ethics to judgements, 
evidenced through the emphasis on the idea that ethical conduct casually follows from sound ethical 
reasoning- in other words, ‘think ethically, do ethically’- represents an emphasis on one side of the 
Moralitat/Sittlichkeit debate. This debate initially referred to the tension between Hegelian accounts 
of customary morality or ethical life, Sittlichkeit (Wood, 1990:216); and Kantian deontological rule-
based ethics, Moralitat being a perfect correspondence between action and duty. Wood draws the 
distinction between the two clearly in the following: “The ethical disposition is Hegel's response to 
the Kantian duality of duty and inclination. In ethical life, the "universal" aspect of the self (the 
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aspect represented by law and duty) is in perfect harmony with the "particular" side (the individual's 
drives and desires)” (Wood, 1990:209). This harmony between the universal Moralitat, and the 
messiness of the individual’s particularity, unifies matter (humanness) and form (duty or universal 
ethics). The Moralitat/Sittlichkeit debate in essence is a “confrontation between those who demand 
a detached critical morality based on principles that tell us what is right and those who defend an 
ethics based on an involvement in a tradition that defines what is good” (Dreyfus, H.L. & Dreyfus, 
S.E. 1992:183). The current analysis and implicit understanding of ethics in the military finds itself 
often, though not exclusively within the Moralitat tradition. Ethics understood in this sense is a 
matter of sound moral judgement with reference to principles such as the Rules of Engagement 
(ROEs); Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC); deontological moral principles, whether communitarian or 
universalist. The desired form of ethical conduct is the rational application of these principles 
through a particular action. A well-trained soldier applies these principles in the context of combat- 
judgement is what matters. A soldier who can apply these principles through a developed moral 
judgement is taken to be the principle aim when considering the role of military ethics. In a situation 
where a soldier’s ethical conduct is considered in line with those various moral principles the 
assumption is that sound moral judgement accompanied the act; conversely in a situation where 
ethical conduct has broken down in some way it follows (for those in the Moralitat tradition) that 
moral judgement has also broken down in some way. Poor ethical conduct is synonymous with the 
absence of developed moral reasoning or some fault in the application of that moral reasoning.  
This line of institutional thinking is clearly apparent in the British Navy, as recently evidenced 
through their response to the case of Sgt Alexander Blackman, who killed a Taliban prisoner of war. 
In a redacted report (Navy Command Headquarters, 2014) produced by the Navy Command 
Headquarters, Brig Huntley, the head of the Centre for Defence Leadership and Management, 
comments on context and specifics of Blackman’s case. In particular, he refers specifically to 
Blackman’s capacity to morally reason: “moral disengagement on the part of Sgt Blackman and 
members of his Multiple were a significant contributory factor in the handling and the shooting of 
the insurgent” (Navy Command Headquarters, 2014:6). Whilst the term ‘moral disengagement’ is 
loose in its reference to an account of reflective moral judgement, he becomes far more precise in 
reference to this in that: “(t)he difficulty experienced by Sgt Blackman in changing from a mindset 
that required him to kill the enemy to one that accepted having to administer first-aid to an enemy 
in order to save his life, was a contributory factor to his treatment of the insurgent” (ibid). 
Through problematising this Moralitat account, one which takes ethics and moral action as being 
predominantly underpinned by a detached, deliberative critical process, this research potentially 
opens itself up to a more broadened understanding of the nature of ethical conduct. As argued 
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previously through the possibility of developing of an understanding of ethical conduct as being 
shaped and constituted by an individual’s habitus, with the associated attention to the non-
reflective aspects of habituated social action, it becomes possible to potentially account for this 
Sittlichkeit notion of ethics. By applying Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s (1992) notion of a phenomenology of 
ethical expertise, with its emphasis on ethical conduct as a form of comportment or practical coping, 
to a Bourdeusian account of military socialisation into an institutional ethics, this work contributes to 
an emerging literature (Atkinson, 2016) which attempts to both ground Bourdieu’s concepts of field, 
capital and habitus along phenomenological lines as well as account for the role multiple social 
structures play in shaping individuals lives. In the case of this research it has the potential to draw 
attention to the various social structures which may intersect in the development of the ethical 
dimension of an individual’s habitus. 
This broadened notion of ethical conduct to potentially include the non-reflective dimension, has 
further implications for understanding questions surrounding ethical education in the military and its 
relationship to military training. This connects closely to the emphasis on the distinction between 
military training and ethical education which plays out in the academic treatment of the subject as 
mentioned previously within Chapter 2. Through developing a focus on the non-deliberative aspect 
of ethical conduct it challenges this dichotomy and potentially opens up a new range of everyday 
experiences of individual soldiers as being crucial in understanding the development of their ethical 
conduct. Whilst there have been some empirical studies undertaken with junior soldiers concerning 
the question of conduct ethics in combat (Warner et al, 2011; Catignani, 2012) there is still a dearth 
of literature taking their individual biographies as evidence. This work will address this absence by 
listening to the voices and experiences of junior soldiers in relation to the question of ethics in 
combat.  
 
3.8 Phenomenology and its Core Assumptions 
This section of the chapter will elaborate the phenomenological insights that Bourdieu drew upon to 
develop his main theoretical concepts and will subsequently be used as a basis to understand 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s phenomenology of skill acquisition which attempts to understand the 
experiences of soldiers in combat with reference to the deliberative quality of ethical conduct. The 
purpose of this is not to offer a comprehensive survey of phenomenology or the development of the 
work of Bourdieu in relation to it, but to endeavour to introduce as a partner, a phenomenological 
vocabulary to that work. The purpose of undertaking a reading of Bourdieu in this way is too make 
sense and locate recent contributions to Bourdieusian theory which have attempted to push forward 
71 
 
this phenomenological reading. Through contributing to this type of phenomenologically informed 
exposition of habitus, it will then be possible to begin to understand how ethical conduct as a 
fundamental dimension of human experience, and connectedly ethical expertise can be accounted 
for through this type of framing of habitus. The contention is that without reference to the 
phenomenological ontology which Bourdieu draws on to develop his account it becomes impossible 
to see ethical conduct as anything more than a reflective, deliberative process. In order to account 
for the practical and often non-reflexive, and often anonymous dimension to ethical conduct, one 
requires a sensitivity to that domain of human experience which phenomenology is uniquely able to 
provide access too.  
As a student in the 1950s, Bourdieu was exposed to the work of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger (Bourdieu, 1990:3), and he acknowledges their influence on his own attempts to analyse 
the ordinary experiences of the social (Bourdieu, 1990:5). Most tellingly, he acknowledges the 
presence of the notion of habitus in their work;  
“there too, certain phenomenologists, including Husserl himself who gives a role to the notion 
of habitus in the analysis of antipredicative experience, or Merleau Ponty, and also Heidegger, 
opened the way for a non-intellectualist, non-mechanistic analysis of the relations between 
agent and world” (Bourdieu, 1990:10).  
This relationship between the works of these phenomenologists and Bourdieu, one that he himself 
recognised has been explored by a number of authors (Dreyfus and Rainbow, 1993; Marcoulatos, J, 
2001; Myles, J.F, 2004), and others have pushed this phenomenological understanding of habitus 
further in an attempt to account for how an individual’s position and habitus in one field can affect 
the position and habitus they occupy in another field (Atkinson, 2016). The phenomenological 
approach is grounded in an ontology that can be understood to provide us the “general structures of 
human being (emphasis added)” (Dreyfus and Rainbow, 1993:36)- a phenomenological ontology 
which fits with the Bourdieusian account we have described previously, will offer a study of the 
“structure of skills (perception and motility) and the way in which they give access to various modes 
of being and constitute us as the kinds of being that we are” (ibid).  
The emergence of phenomenology as a distinct movement in continental philosophy can be 
attributed to the work of Edmond Husserl. The word phenomenology itself predated Husserl’s own 
work and can be first found in Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Mind” (2001), it denoted a descriptive 
approach to philosophical problems, rather than an analytical/theoretical/hypothetical approach. 
The etymology of the word phenomenology reflects Husserl’s own claim as to the development of a 
new science concerned with the study of phenomena (Husserl, 1983:xvii). The primary claim of 
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Husserl’s new movement is that philosophy must re-focus itself towards its fundamental task of 
describing the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness. This invited 
one to adopt a unique attitude towards the world in that it attempted to bracket off experience in 
the sense that the description of those structures must be undertaken with respect to them in 
themselves rather than “assuming or adopting the theoretical frameworks, assumptions, or 
vocabularies developed in the study of other domains (such as nature)” (Wrathall and Dreyfus, 
2006:2).  
For the purpose of clarity, and as a means to draw upon as this research intends to contextualise this 
phenomenological ontology within the question of ethical conduct, it is possible to identify four 
fundamental approaches that all strands of phenomenological thought share. Firstly, the effort to 
provide an account of human existence with attention to the potential distortion of scientific 
presuppositions. Secondly, and leading from this, a sensitivity to the often anonymous, non-rational 
component of human existence- such as, non-conscious practices, habits, passions, moods and 
emotions. Thirdly, a focus on the manner by which the experience of the world is constituted by the 
concepts we bring to bear upon it, and the limitations of those conceptual categories in capturing 
that world as it presents itself to us. Fourthly, the assertion that human being is fundamentally 
irreducible to any conceptual framing, whether sociological, biological, psychological etc, In essence: 
“to be human is to transcend facticity” (Wrathall and Dreyfus, 2006:5).  
Drawing on Husserl’s first directive to phenomenology that it be a descriptive psychology (1983) 
which should return to things to themselves, Merleau-Ponty’s work sought to extend Heidegger’s 
emphasis on being-in-the-world, studying the bodily experience of the world in perception (Merleau-
Ponty, 2008). The notion of embodiment which forms a central concern for Merleau-Ponty’s work 
builds on the concept first developed by Husserl, that through phenomenological analysis, vison 
alone, conceived of as a mental act, is not sufficient for the constitution of the perceptual world- 
that vision is grounded upon an embodied subject (Crowell, 2006:25). This notion of embodiment 
forms one horizon of the transcendental subject, that being a subjectivity which pays attention to its 
form of being a subject to experience and also an object in the world (Deutscher, 1980:22), the other 
two horizons which Husserl identifies the transcendental subject as being part of is the social and 
historical (Crowell, 2006:25). Returning to this notion of embodiment, the noema of the perception 
of an object provides not only what is given in the visual sense, but also the aspects of that object 
that are not seen at that instance, i.e. the back of the object, its base. This is the claim that these 
unseen aspects of the object are there in some sense, that is, were I to walk around the object or 
pick it up, I could make those unseen features seen to myself. The unseen facets of the object 
appear in a specific order constituted by the type of movements one can make in relation to the 
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object. This feature of perceptual experience, the “I can” (in the sense that “I can walk around the 
chair and look at the back of the chair”) and its relation to the unseen facets of an object, is a 
normative, conditional symbiosis with the perceptual environment (Crowell, 2006:26). When 
touching an object, it confirms a feature which has already been disclosed through the noema of 
perception, whether a visible or non-visible facet; this occurs according to Husserl through a process 
of ‘synaesthesia’, the “original combination of sensory modalities – that characterizes my bodily 
engagement with the world” (ibid). Thus, the perception of the world is grounded in one’s physical 
motility, or embodiment, in order for a subject to see a real world they must be embodied in it. 
These phenomenological concepts developed by Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau Ponty will form 
the basis of the phenomenologically informed account of ethical expertise, developed initially in the 
work of Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1992). The final section will examine the broad claims they make 
regarding this phenomenology of skill acquisition with reference to Atkinson’s Bourdieusian 
relational phenomenology.  
 
3.9 Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s Phenomenology of Skill Acquisition 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s work begins by suggesting a number of methodological precautions which 
ought to be kept in mind when undertaking a phenomenological investigation into ethical expertise: 
 “1. We should begin by describing our everyday, ongoing ethical coping. 2. We should 
determine under which conditions deliberation and choice appear. 3. We should beware of 
making the typical philosophical mistake of reading the structure of deliberation and choice 
back into our account of everyday coping.” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:251). 
Fundamental to their objective is the attempt to correct what they claim has characterised and lead 
to confusion in previous work undertaken academically to understand ethical conduct. That 
deliberation in the Kantian sense finds its way back into ethical action when that action is examined 
post-hoc. This represents a fundamental error in terms of the broad body of academic thought 
concerning combat ethics and connectedly attempts to improve ethical training in the Army. What 
follows, is a heuristic which describes a phenomenology of skill acquisition in its broadest sense.  
Stage 1, describes the Novice who is initially provided through instruction a decomposition of the 
environment (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:251) through a set of rules and interpretation-free features 
which provide the basis for action. In the case of the learner driver, they deliberatively and 
consciously apply rules such as, change gears on the basis of speed, which without the benefit of 
experience tend to fail in novel situations.  
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Stage 2, refers to the Advanced Beginner (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004: 251-2) which represents the 
first stage of coping. The Advanced Beginner begins to notice or have pointed out further 
perspicuous examples, these then come to be noticed and these novel situational features are 
constituted as maxims. They differentiate maxims from the first stage of instruction which provided 
rules to respond to context-free situations. For example, “the advanced beginner driver uses 
(situational) engine sounds as well as (nonsituational) speed. He learns the following maxim: Shift up 
when the motor sounds like it is racing and down when it sounds like it is straining” (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 2004:252). This marks the first aspect of coping in that the response to situational stimuli 
tends towards the non-reflective mode of action- coping in this sense is essentially spontaneity of 
action.  
Stage 3, describes Competence (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:252), at this level of skill acquisition the 
learner is faced with an increasing number of features and aspects to a situation which risks 
becoming overwhelming. The learner begins by choosing a plan or perspective which organises the 
features of the situation, this then filters out those features that are deemed, through prior 
experience unnecessary to that plan in favour of the relevant ones. This then allows the learner to 
simplify and improve their performance. The Competent driver when leaving the motorway on a 
curved exit road will select the relevant features of the situation such as speed, road conditions, 
time etc, to determine the safest method for exiting. This selection of features according to a plan 
excludes the extraneous in a manner in which the novice is unable to and often becomes 
overwhelmed.  
Stage 4, marks Proficiency, at this stage of expertise is defined by the absence of reflection upon 
problematic situations. This progression is marked by being struck by a particular plan, goal or 
perspective (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:252)- less a searching out for a solution, the Proficient 
performer no longer stands as a detached observer of the situation whose actions are guided by 
rules or principles which are consciously reflected upon. The holistic, emotion and memory laden 
experiences of prior encountering with like situations provide the basis upon which there exists a 
‘spell of involvement’ (ibid) in the situation. Conscious thought still exists but many features which at 
lower levels of proficiency were consciously reflected on, now become salient features which strike 
experience. Rather than consciously assessing speed on a rainy day, the Proficient driver will sense, 
intuitively that she is driving too fast and adjust her speed accordingly. The strategy for this may still 
be consciously arrived at through a consideration that one ought not to drive fast on raining days, 
however the Proficient driver will reactively embody many responses to features of the situation 
which at previously levels of expertise would have had to have been consciously reflected upon.  
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Stage 5 outlines Expertise- this level of skill acquisition sees a performer who is experientially 
immersed in a world of skilful competency, “the proficient performer seems gradually to decompose 
this class of situations into subclasses, each of which shares the same decision, single action, or 
tactic. This allows an immediate intuitive response to each situation.” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 
2004:253). In distinction to the absolute beginner driver who must consciously reflect on every 
action- when to slow, change gear, etc- Expertise is marked by coping. In this sense coping reflects 
the feeling of familiarity with a situation, the expert driver no longer has to consider from a range of 
options when approaching a roundabout, nor focuses attention towards the sound of the engine 
when changing gear- the wealth of all her prior experiences are brought into the moment and she 
then engages with the appropriate action without any thought to it. Because these everyday coping 
skills function so smoothly (ibid) we tend to be largely unaware of them. Whilst this form of 
expertise or knowledge passes us by most of the time, it represents a form of knowledge all the 
same- a habit-based expertise and mastery of the everyday which is a ‘knowing how’ (Dewey quoted 
in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:253).  
This habitual quality to the form of expertise that Dreyfus and Dreyfus outline bears similarities in its 
exposition to habitus considered as a set of durable dispositions. The refinement through experience 
of the set of dispositions which build into a person’s habitus can be considered alongside this 
account of skill acquisition. To return to something first introduced in Chapter 3, Bourdieu sees 
habitus as essentially embodied, a “tacit competence implicit in actors’ practical ability to cope with 
a wide range of situations in ways that are predictable without being reduced to the conscious 
observance of a set of rules” (Callinicos, 2007:296). This tacit competence that Bourdieu refers to is a 
competence within the milieu of social relations that we are embedded but also provides a frame for 
understanding practical competence of the type Dreyfus and Dreyfus refer to as well as competence 
in the complex ethical situations which are the focus of this research.  
This phenomenological dimension and its implications to Bourdieu’s work, is explored in some depth 
in Atkinson’s book ‘Beyond Bourdieu’ (2016). His work is an attempt to outline a relational 
phenomenology which when applied to Bourdieu’s own work attempts to understand how his 
concepts of multiple fields and social spaces are “shaped and are shaped by the people, places, 
timings and objects of the lifeworld” (Atkinson, 2016:28). This notion of a relational phenomenology 
brings social structure into phenomenology whilst also answering salient questions concerning how 
different social fields interact when mediated via an individual’s habitus. Atkinson describes this 
broadening of phenomenology and Bourdieu’s own work in the following: 
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“(T)he individuals lifeworld as the centre point of multiple, interacting social forces bearing 
down on experience can become the focal point of analysis, not as a replacement for field 
analysis- which remains essential- but as a complement to it. Moreover, the 
phenomenological constitution of habitus is, to fit this switch of perspective, pushed a little 
further than Bourdieu himself went” (Atkinson, 2016:10) 
For this research it is his use of phenomenological concepts to describe habitus and field which 
prove the most useful in terms of attempting to understand habitus in respect to considering a 
phenomenology of ethical expertise. Atkinson brings the language and concepts of phenomenology 
to bear upon habitus- taking it to comprise the ‘horizons of perception’ (Atkinson, 2016:5). This 
account describes experience as structurally divided into ‘theme’ which is that which conscious 
attention is directed towards- either the ‘core’ being the predominant focus of attention and 
‘periphery’ (background sensory information such as sound, bodily posture etc) (ibid); and horizon, 
which is simultaneously present in perception but is not presented in sensory output: 
“an intuition of aspects of a percept not seen (e.g. an objects posterior), or qualities not 
experienced (e.g. its weight), but also, more importantly, its simultaneous exemplification of 
multiple classes or ‘types’ of object, of varying generality, with typical properties, patterns of 
activity and relations with other objects” (Atkinson, 2016:5) 
Considering this, the horizon of experience which is co-present with the sensory output of the 
theme, that which is given to perception through the intentional direction of consciousness, can be 
understood in relation to the outline of skill acquisition that Dreyfus and Dreyfus give. Their account 
which describes the ‘transparent dealing’ (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:253) with everyday 
experience, mirrors Heidegger’s notion of ‘circumspection’ (Heidegger, 1962) which considers this 
coping with as being our basic experiential attitude towards the world. This view takes experience to 
be largely comprised of the non-reflective know-how which enables us to drive a car, manipulate 
door handles, write letters and undertake almost every social activity and how a small part of our 
lives is spent in the “deliberate, effortful, subject-object mode of activity” (ibid). It is because 
circumspection passes generally without notice that we pay more attention to deliberative, 
reflective action as being the primary mode in which we engage with the world. Taking that 
circumspection, the skilful manipulation of things in the world, is built upon prior experience, it 
demands the co-presence of that prior experience of the object-at-hand.  
The horizon of experience brings with it to consciousness, previous experience of that object in the 
way Atkinson describes as the sense of its generality or type. Considered in relation to driving a car 
around a corner, the expert performer experiences the turn both as unique in that it is given to the 
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theme of consciousness as such, but also it is provided to consciousness by the horizon of perception 
as being a member of a class. Prior experience has determined various rules and conditions of how 
to drive safely through corners. This set of experiences and relations between experiences are 
present within the horizon of perception such that the expert driver can without conscious reflection 
draw upon them and engage the car safely through the corner. In this sense ethical conduct in 
combat for the proficient performer when reflected upon post hoc, draws out multiple content 
within the horizon of perception which informs and shapes the use of force and connectedly, ethical 
conduct itself. 
A further dimension to the horizons of experience which is present under the account just 
mentioned is what Husserl described as ‘protention’- that being the sense of likely or possible 
futures (Atkinson, 2016:5). This is the sense of being able to do something, for example in terms of 
motor-ability, a particular tree is experienced as climbable whereas another is not. Further to this is 
the experience of ‘I must’, which portends and calls forth a response to a situation ‘quasi-
automatically (ibid). Taking habitus to comprise the horizon of experience which includes present 
perception, past experience and the sense of future potentialities, Atkinson bridges the relations 
between different social fields as “that perception and practice in relation to one field necessarily 
has in its horizons the present and potential state of play in other fields” (Atkinson, 2016:26). This 
arguably must be the case as individuals occupy positions in multiple fields through the course of 
their lives and habitus brings with it through it being comprised of the horizons of perception, the 
past experiences and possible futures of other fields into the present experience of an individual 
within whichever social field they are situated within at that time.  
This relational phenomenology which goes some way in accounting for how different fields are 
mediated through an individual’s habitus has consequences for the question of ethical conduct as 
shows that ethical conduct considered partially as a dispositional quality to habitus, and a skilful 
form of coping, is shaped by the influences of the multiple social fields experienced within an 
individual’s lifeworld. This opens up the question of what shapes an individual soldiers ethical 
conduct in combat to not only the influences of formal and informal ethics that the soldier 
experiences in relation to the military field, but also to the influences that other fields such as family 
may have on shaping the ethical comportment of habitus. 
This brief overview of their work has attempted to provide the theoretical foundation which will 
assist in understanding the question of the intuitive dimension of ethical expertise which will be 
taken up in Chapter 8. These general observations that Dreyfus and Dreyfus make concerning the 
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phenomenological dimension to skill acquisition will be applied to ethical conduct and discussed 
with relation to habitus as well as the experiences of the soldiers themselves. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
Theory in the context of research should provide the lens through which to observe the 
phenomenon which is being studied. Any theoretical framing is a choice and that choice has 
profound consequences for the type of analysis that follows. This chapter has attempted to outline 
some of the key theoretical frameworks and associated concepts that it intends to employ through 
the proceeding chapters. It attempted to provide justifications for the choice of these theoretical 
tools in terms of their suitability to the study of those phenomena as well as how their use may 
address identified gaps in the current literature. It looked at academic contributions made to 
understand processes of military socialisation and identified the persistent neglect of ethics as a 
significant feature of these processes. The concepts of Field, Capital and Habitus were introduced as 
a potential means of conceptualising the military as a distinct social field and site of interested 
practices. Habitus was presented as a means of understanding processes of military socialisation 
considered in a relational sense with the military considered as a field comprised of different capital 
forms. Bourdieu’s account of symbolic capital was suggested as a possible way of understanding and 
sociologically operationalising Army Institutional ethics. Underpinning the individual drive to 
accumulate different capital forms, this chapter discussed how Bourdieu argues that processes of 
recognition seeking fundamentally drive all interested action. The chapter also argued that emotions 
are also fundamental to understanding why individuals orientate themselves to morally 
praiseworthy acts. It then discussed the relationship between Bourdieu and phenomenology and 
went on to introduce some of the key concepts and vocabulary which will be used in subsequent 
chapters, providing the theoretical basis for a phenomenology of ethical expertise which is grounded 
in the Bourdieusian concept of habitus. It ended with an overview of Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s 
phenomenology of skill acquisition which will provide the foundation for the development of the 
final observations this research will make concerning the claim that ethical conduct is as much and 







Chapter 4: State ‘Making’ and the Military Field 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The question of why a discourse of ethics has emerged in the British Army is one which seeks to also 
shed light on similar patterns of emergence which have occurred across all state militaries and in 
some way also marked the experiences and histories of non-state military actors. This research takes 
this question as its starting point to interrogate two distinct processes. The first sees the emergence 
of a discourse of ethics surrounding the military as being directly concerned with processes which 
attempt to make specific forms of state violence legitimate and more recently elide with an 
emergent perspective on the use of military force in the context of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The 
second examines this discourse of ethics in relation to Western militaries, with a particular focus on 
the British Military from the late 1980’s onwards; with reference to the ongoing engagement with 
the ‘problem of violence’, transformations in operational environments, and situational factors 
particular to the British Military and specifically their experiences in the context of COIN operations 
in Northern Ireland. It is the former process which will be the subject of this chapter whilst the latter 
will be discussed in greater detail through Chapter 6.  
Any ethical discourse which concerns violence and moves beyond an absolute pacifist ethics is one 
which seeks to make violence morally legitimate and permissible under certain defined conditions. 
Given the focus of this research is concerned with ethics as surrounding military and connectedly 
state violence, this brings into view the relationship between discourses surrounding the ethics of 
state violence and definitions of the state as having the monopoly over legitimate violence or 
physical force. The way in which ethics has been mobilised as a discourse which seeks to ‘make’ 
violence ethical has sought an audience far wider than the soldiers which enact that violence. 
Society itself is also the audience of this discourse around an ethics of violence, in that the military 
and by extension the state also seeks to legitimise certain forms (limited forms of war being the 
primary instance) of state sanctioned violence to society.  As such this chapter will attempt to 
provide insight into one question which emerges from these observations: why has a discourse of 
ethics emerged in relation to state violence and wider society and what does this tell us about 
historical processes of state formation and the ongoing process of state ‘making’?  
This chapter will first examine how the formation of the idea of the modern ‘liberal state’ is closely 
tied up with the emergence of the military as a distinct social organisation within society. It will then 
go on to discuss the various ways in which the military has been defined arguing that the Bourdieu’s 
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insights concerning field and capital introduced in chapter 3 offer a novel way of accounting for the 
situated social practices which define how soldiers have encountered this emergent discourse of 
ethics. It will examine the British Army Infantry as a specific socially and historically situated site 
within a military field. Finally, it will attempt to bring into focus this unique relationship between 
ethics and legitimisation of state violence and how these symbolic processes of legitimisation 
directly connect state violence to the making of the state itself. 
 
4.2 A Brief Sociological History of the State via the Military 
The Enlightenment project which promised the possibility of universal truth and freedom (Calinicos, 
2013:3), based not on principles derived from the past, but on its own foundations of self-
justification (Callinicos, 2013:13). Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism- the idea that the only 
valid form of human knowledge is that derived from modern sciences- represented one of the first 
generation of thinkers who responded to the inherent tensions that had developed within and led to 
the collapse of the Enlightenment project (Callinicos, 2013:65). He is also regarded as one of the first 
writers in the emergent discipline of sociology to comment on the significant transformations that 
were taking place in relation to the military in the context of modernity (Caforio, 2006:9).  
In attempting to resist processes of scientific fragmentation and integrate social theory and 
historical enquiry (Callinicos, 2013:65), Comte claimed to have discovered a fundamental law which 
the human mind is subject to- that intelligence or every branch of knowledge passes through three 
theoretical states, that of the fictitious, the abstract and the positive (Comte quoted in Callinicos, 
2013:65). He made the further historical claim that these three laws of intellectual progress 
corresponded perfectly to his three modes of practical activity, that of conquest, defence and 
industry (Pickering, 2009:255). Comte’s overall assertion was that warlike activity encouraged 
progress (Pickering, 2009:255) in that it helped develop constant and durable associations, 
stimulated the mind and generated a sense of veneration for one’s leader amongst other things. He 
also observed how transformations in military activity affected entities like the family (Pickering, 
2009:213). Working clearly as a response to the wide transformations which were occurring at the 
time, he also sought to account for how economic activity linked to war, arguing that the growth of 
industry was a counter force to militarism, ending wars and violence (Pickering, 2009:255). 
Establishing himself firmly within this new tradition of thinkers he sought to account for how the 
emergence of the modern nation-state, with its increasing forms of bureaucratic organisation, had 
led to a reduction in the power of military leaders. A phenomenon running parallel to the shift from 
the feudal system of militias to standing armies, which brought military leaders under civilian control 
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and with it the problem of political control of the military (Caforio, 2006:9). Comte was certainly 
prescient in foregrounding, however imprecisely, the emergent relationship between war, economic 
‘progress’ and state formation. One can see in Comte through his account of these transformations 
in the military and their relation to the emergence of the modern state. Tilly argued that this was the 
central theme to modern European state formation, that the central paradox was that the modern 
state was formed as a by-product of the pursuit of war (Tilly, 1992:206).  
Tilly’s thesis is useful as it provides a frame through which to position the type of claims and 
observations this early generation of sociologists were making on the military within a broader 
historical process. His central argument is that the state was produced inadvertently through war-
making and the necessary development of military capacity (ibid). This led to an associated process 
of civilianisation of government and domestic politics. He suggests a number of reasons why this 
occurred; the maintenance of military forces necessitated the creation of extractive apparatuses 
maintained by civilians which contained and constrained military forces. This was because the agents 
of the state had to bargain with civilian groups which controlled these resources and as a result 
these bargaining process gave these civilian groups enforceable claims on the state. In addition, the 
expanded capacities of wartime, contingent on the state not having suffered massive losses, took on 
new activities once hostilities had ceased. During feudal times ordinary men had access to weaponry 
and local and regional powers assembling forces from these local populations could often match or 
overwhelm the state (Tilly, 1992:69). Through the formation of standing military entities, the state 
wrestled this capacity from the civilian population and brought into being the military as a significant 
social structure. A further key moment which Tilly identifies and is useful as a means of 
contextualising the work of writers such as Comte, De Tocqueville (1835) and later Weber (1978), 
was the dramatic expansion of non-military state activity which began in parallel with the age of 
military specialization in around 1850 (Tilly, 1992:115). This process which has extended to the 
recent past sees military organisation as “moved from a dominant, partly autonomous segment of 
state structure to a more subordinated position as the largest of several differentiated departments 
under control of a predominantly civilian administration” (ibid).  
Whilst it may have had some analytical leverage to maintain the civilian-military dichotomy prior to 
this transition, it seems difficult to maintain it once the military became a subordinate entity to 
civilian administrators. One is also able to see Comte’s comments concerning the relation between 
the military and civilian control as directed toward the very phenomena that Tilly marks as a 
significant process in modern European state formation. Looking at the writings of De Tocqueville, 
with this process as a point of reference one can clearly see him struggling with similar questions 
such as the divergence/convergence of military society and civil society (Caforio, 2006:9-10). In the 
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following, De Tocqueville covers questions such as the role of the military during peacetime and 
opens up the relationship between the military profession and civil society, all themes which would 
later become central in military sociology: 
“After a long peace - and in democratic ages the periods of peace are long - the army is always 
inferior to the country itself. In this state it is called into active service; and until war has 
altered it, there is danger for the country as well as for the army... Again, as amongst these 
nations the officer derives his position in the country solely from his position in the army” (De 
Tocqueville, 1835:1159).  
Max Weber in his seminal work on bureaucracy, would influence the development of 
understandings of the military and the state in significant ways. Though referring to the conscripted 
military service, arising after the dissolution of mercenary forces and which was common during the 
period in which he was writing (Weber, 1978:945), Weber saw this relationship between military and 
conscript as one of domination defined as: 
 
“the situation in which the manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to 
influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a 
way as if the ruled made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very 
own sake” (Weber, 1978:946).  
 
His notion of domination is more than just the brute effect of institutional power compelling those 
individuals that comprise it to do something that they wouldn’t have otherwise done- it is a form of 
power, and for our purposes it represents the exercise of symbolic violence which shapes the subject 
such that they make the fulfilment of the command appear to themselves as the realisation of their 
own will. This account of the subject-military relationship is the recurring trope in military sociology, 
an epistemic foreclosure of the possibility of agency. This process of domination in the military is 
realised through a rationally regulated association found in its bureaucratic structure (Weber, 
1978:954). Bureaucracy according to Weber has three elements; the assigning of regular activities as 
official duties; authority of command derived from hierarchy; provision for the regular and 
continuous fulfilment of these duties arising from general rules concerning employment (Weber, 
1978:956). The power of command derived from hierarchal position in a bureaucracy is legitimated 
by rational norms (Weber, 1978:954). The modern state, bureaucracy and the military are seen as 
interrelated developments, bureaucratic structures of the type Weber identifies only arise in the 
modern state (Weber, 1978:956). Further, the type of technicality and military discipline required for 
aggressive state expansion can only occur in a bureaucratic army (Weber, 1978:981). Whilst Tilly 
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would see the state as a by-product of military activity, what can be certainly claimed of Weber is 
that he was responding to the same transformations that Tilly identified (Tilly, 1992). Weber’s 
significance in the history of the sociological treatment of the military (Caforio, 2006:12; Nucari 
2006:62) is in his emphasis on the concepts such as formal norms, formal authority, discipline, 
formal division of roles all comprising his wider account of bureaucracy. If military sociology can be 
framed as a continuous response to transformations in wider society and the conduct of warfare, 
Weber can be positioned along with Comte and De Tocqueville as responding to the parallel 
phenomena of the development of the modern state as a by-product of territorial expansion 
through war and the institutional forms which developed in order to facilitate its conduct (Tilly, 
1992). This initial survey of how early writers which might be broadly characterised as working 
within what would later come to be referred to as sociology came to understand the military, can be 
seen as answering questions largely focussed on the military as an institution within society. Through 
their emphasis on the material and economic dimensions to state formation, these observations 
perhaps foreclosed the fundamental semiotic dimension to state power- and with it the relationship 
between state power and the monopoly over legitimate physical force or violence. Significantly, 
these writers drew attention to the central role the military played with relation to civil society and 
also the state itself in terms of its emergence.  
 
4.3 Defining the Military: The Military Field 
This research is limited to analysis of the British Army with a specific focus on the infantry. It does 
however go further in drawing comparisons with other militaries found in Western states. As will be 
discussed in the following, there are defining features which capture a general specificity to the 
military field as a category of field, with specific capital compositions and doxa. However, each 
concrete example of situated social practices within a military field, based in a specific empirical 
setting is unique and defined by the social conditions of its production. This work will examine the 
military field in the context of western states, rather than ‘liberal democratic’ states- a term itself 
which is ideologically loaded and in has been discursively remade through the practice of war. Whilst 
not a comparative analysis, this will allow this work to capture similarities between these different 
military fields with respect to the role military force plays in the context of the constitution of 
particular narratives of liberalism and democracy which have  been central to the projection of 
military force, through humanitarian violence since the early 90s at least. 
 The military itself as a significant social structure can be defined in various ways and the choice of 
definition impacts directly on the further observations that are drawn. The British Army, and other 
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Army’s found in Western states can be defined broadly as one of a number of institutions which 
comprise state militaries including other branches of the armed forces such as the navy and the air 
force as well as well as any other institutional-organisational entities which are responsive to the 
political leaders of the nation-state concerning the use of physical force for both offence and 
defence in the furtherance of its policies in relation to other states, individuals or collectives 
(Seibold, 2001:140). Further expanding on the primary orientation of the military, it is an institution 
whose aim is to take “raw ‘materials’ such as recruits, weapons systems, and doctrine and work with 
them to produce capable combat units (land, sea, and aerospace) ready to engage the enemy on the 
battlefield (or carry out alternative missions)” (Seibold, 2001:150).  
In defining the military, one must avoid the ontological fixing of the civil-military dichotomy before 
testing its analytical usefulness and correspondence to the actual relations that pertain. The 
following definition provides a useful means of isolating the novelty of the military amongst other 
institutions whilst not committing an epistemic error in the form of a spontaneous sociology, arising 
from the sense of familiarity we all bring to our observations of the social world. It is the 
“epistemological obstacle par excellence, because it continuously produces fictitious conceptions or 
systemizations and, at the same time, the conditions of their credibility” (Bourdieu et al, 1991:13). 
By stripping away the epistemological ‘credibility’ of the civil-military distinction the following 
represents a less constrictive definition; “the military can be understood as a social organisation 
which maintains levels of autonomy while refracting broader societal trends” (Moskos, 1977:41). It is 
a social organisation in that it comprises particular relationships structuring labour, status, hierarchy 
amongst others; as well as a social institution organised around patterns of belief and behaviour 
expressed in the language of values and norms directed towards the provision of a particular social 
‘good’. It is enmeshed within the social relations which when totalised, make up society, whilst also 
maintaining a degree of autonomy and peculiarity in respect to the nature of its enmeshment in 
those relations when compared to other institutions.  
It is essential to develop as a starting point for any investigation into the military, conventions in 
terms of the language used to describe the military. The military is referred to often 
interchangeably, as an institution, organisation, occupation, and establishment. For the purposes of 
this research, the distinction between the military as an institution and the military as an occupation 
will be used as a starting point for developing a stable vocabulary. Looking at the significant changes 
the US military undertook during the post-war period, sociologists applied institutional 
developmental analysis concerned with developing models to explain possible future social forms 
(Moskos, 1977:41) to the study of the military. They claimed that the military was in a process of 
moving towards a more occupational rather than institutional form (Moskos, 1977; Seibold, 2001), 
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representing what Seibold identifies as one of the only major theoretical debates in military 
sociology (2001:142).  An institution being defined as “legitimated in terms of values and norms” 
(Moskos, 1977:42) whilst an occupation is marketised and monetarily rewards competencies 
(Moskos, 1977:43) more attuned to a rational, economic account of the individual within the 
military.  
In response to this claim, Janowitz argued that this process of transition was unlikely to be fully 
realised because of the significant changes it implied concerning what he framed as the distinction 
between a profession (as applied to the military) and occupation (Janowitz, 1977:52). For Janowitz, 
the military ‘profession’, a term he employs and treats as synonymous with the definition of 
institution forwarded by Moskos, is distinct in that it presumes: high-levels of skills; self-regulation; 
strong degree of corporate cohesion; all of which would have to be transformed or weakened 
significantly to mark a completion of a movement from the military profession to occupation. Whilst 
he acknowledges that the military is “undergoing long-term transformation which involves increased 
penetration by other professions and institutions” (Janowitz, 1977:53), he does not see this as a 
‘zero-sum’ game. As will be argued at later points in this research, Moskos and Janowitz both were 
correct in identifying the salience of this process, and whether it is termed as a civilianisation of the 
military (Janowitz, 1977:53) or developmental spectrum between institution, or occupation (Moskos, 
1977). This is crucial to understanding current tensions and institutional processes of change in 
relation to the codification of ethics in the military- considered as a partial, defensive response to 
perceived processes occupationalisation/civilianisation. Rather than suggesting some developmental 
end point to this process, as Moskos implies, this research will argue that this tension as exhibited in 
the type of defensive elements Janowitz identified, amongst the officer corps concerning these 
processes of ‘civilianisation’ are still very much present in the contemporary military. This suggests 
that rather than being a process of change, this tension between the institutional and occupational 
accounts is at core a part of the identity of the military in contemporary society, a tension without 
resolution due to salient features of the military and its overall aims and what they demand in terms 
of the individuals that comprise it.  
This research will largely refer to the Army as a sub-component of the military understood as both 
an institution and social field in the Bourdieusian sense. The unique role values and ethics play in 
terms of the life world of the individuals that comprise the military means it fits closely with the 
definition of an institution as being “legitimated in terms of values and norms” (Moskos, 1977:42). 
This discussion of ways in which the military may be understood conceptually is offered as a 
precursor to the claim that the military functions as a field in the sense that Bourdieu would have us 
take it. This conventional notion of the Army as an institution legitimated in terms of values and 
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norms does not exclude Bourdieu’s potential contribution to our understandings, rather it provides 
the very foundation upon which the military can be conceptualised as a distinct social field in terms 
of its own forms of capital, doxa and stakes of play. Through this tracing out of the evolution of the 
state and military and the various ways in which they have been defined, and the types of questions 
and problems it presented to the emergent field of sociology, it provides a possible entry point to 
consider how the concepts of symbolic capital and symbolic violence might shed light on this 
constitutive relationship between state and military considered as a field in this Bourdieusian sense.  
As introduced in Chapter 3 Bourdieu’s predominant focus throughout his work is to account for the 
processes of cultural socialization at the level of both individuals and groups, as understood through 
their relative positions in “competitive status hierarchies” (Swartz, 1997:6). He locates these 
practices within relatively autonomous social. Whilst a conceptual construction, a field is objectively 
given in this relational sense, a view expressing Bourdieu’s attempt to locate his work as a response 
to and development beyond positivism.  
These social fields see individuals and groups in continuous competition over valued symbolic, 
cultural and economic resources, what Bourdieu refers to as capital- the relative value of these 
resources defined in relation to the structure of the field itself- as such culture becomes an 
expression of the political (Swartz, 1997:7). If culture is for Bourdieu about politics, then it is 
simultaneously concerned with power. Fields are structured social spaces within which social 
practices take place and simultaneously competition over the particular social and material 
resources which are at stake (taken to be of value) in a given field. Bourdieu sees fields as an 
essential metatheoretical concept which mediates “the relationship between social structure and 
cultural practice” (Swartz, 1997:7), and also connects an individual’s habitus, relationally to social 
structures.  
To consider the military as a field is to take it as a distinct entity that is made up of “objective 
relations that are the site of logic and necessity that are specific and irreducible to those that 
regulate other fields” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:97). Bourdieu illustrates this distinction 
between different and irreducible logics of different fields by drawing attention to how, for example, 
the economic field excludes the primary valuation of friendship and love in favour of a logic which 
sees ‘business as business’ (ibid). The military also stands as a distinct field of irreducible relations 
and distinct logic of action where the value of comradeship and commitment to an esprit de corps 
are bound up in one’s social status and comes to define the relations between those within the field. 
In the economic field, one’s status, or social standing is determined primarily by the accumulation of 
economic capital and seniority of position within capitalist organisations. The logic of social status 
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within the military field attributes less premium on the accumulation of wealth and seniority of rank, 
but more to one’s adherence to or embodiment of an intersubjectively defined military virtues or 
values such as integrity, loyalty, physical and moral courage8. 
Bourdieu employs the metaphor of the field as a ‘game’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:98)- there 
are rules or regularities which although non-explicit, shape and constrain action; as players we 
become taken in by the game which Bourdieu terms as illusio (from ludus, the game), that is, by the 
virtue that we take part, we tacitly agree that the game (or the stakes at play in a particular field, the 
profits in the form of different capitals) is worth playing (ibid). This belief which is made up of the 
underlying logics of a given field in the case of the military, is the belief in the underlying virtues and 
values of the military way of life represents what Bourdieu terms the doxa. This doxa and 
commitment to the stakes at play in the military field can be understood in the myriad ways military 
life is described by soldiers in stark contrast to civilian life. The references soldiers make implicitly 
frames an inside and an outside are the spatial metaphors which draw boundaries between different 
doxic spaces, or fields. The act of defining the boundaries between an inside and an outside serve to 
also reinforce the practices, beliefs and specific stakes at play in the military field. This brief 
application of the concept of field to the military has provided the foundation on which the military 
may be considered as one field among the many fields that comprise society, whereby the state 
stands as the primary field. The following section turns its attention to shedding light on the 
relationship military field(s) and the specificity of place considered with respect to the specific 
cultures, institutional histories and operational experiences of western militaries and specifically, the 
British Army.  
 
4.4 War as a Process of Interconnection 
Importantly for this research is the idea that rather than war exclusively being considered as a 
fraying and coming apart of the relations that bind social groupings and political entities, it is also a 
countervailing force which draws people together. This observation is essential for understanding 
the specificity of each historical and socially situated instantiation of a military field and in the case 
of this research, the British Army and specifically Infantry considered a situated point of practices in 
the military field.  
Barkawi sees war not only as involving the drawing and defence of boundaries, but also a 
‘historically pervasive’ (Barkawi,2006:xii) form of interconnection- in essence for him war represents 
 
8 See Chapter 7 and 8 
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a ‘globalising force’. Through war social processes come into play which reconstruct images of self 
and other. Barkawi draws attention to the interconnections that exist with the enemy and how these 
processes and changes ought to be understood under the wider frame of globalisation (Barkawi, 
2006:xiii). War ought to be understood as part of ‘normal’ social existence (Barkawi, 2006:28-29) in 
that is draws into it and is shaped by the economy, society, culture and politics. Transformations in 
warfare affect society and likewise changes in society affect warfare. For the purposes of this 
research this constitutive relationship between society and how wars are fought, provides a means 
of understanding the specificity of the British military field as uniquely produced by the social, 
political and historical context within which it has developed. Whilst the ethical ‘turn’ which has 
been discussed through the course of this work has brought in wider examples of how other 
militaries in Western states experienced and constituted this ethical discourse, the social processes 
which define each will have been constituted by their own specific histories and cultures. As such, 
each military field is distinct and culturally specific, refracting the institutional histories, national 
imaginaries and many other social processes into the defined social practices of that field. The 
specific instantiation of a field defines the habitus of each individual soldier, encompassing a set of 
specific dispositions and habits which are unique to the social setting of that field which has itself 
been constituted by the types of processes that Barkawi refers to. The following engagement with 
Barkawi’s work on war as a significant facet of globalisation will attempt to contextualise how this 
dynamic relationship between war and society can be used to make sense of the specificity of the 
Military field in the context of the British Army Infantry. It will also locate this research’s treatment 
of the military field as being situated in a specific social time and place. 
There are many ways in which to describe the cultural and historical specificity of the military field 
considered in relation to its instantiation in different national settings, British, American or 
otherwise. Each instantiation of a military field allows the observer to recognise them as being 
constituted by similarities between social practices which in the case of the military field as a general 
category, places primary value on symbolic capital over economic. This in much the same way as one 
can pick out instances of academic fields, in different social and historical contexts. They remain 
distinct but still structured according to similar logics which underpin the regularities in the social 
practices and capital compositions which comprise them. They are however also culturally, socially 
and historically specific. The military field in the context of the British military is distinct from the 
military field in the context of the American military. Both draw into them the totality of their own 
institutional histories as well as refract wider social and historical processes. As such they can be 
picked out as distinct examples of the same phenomena. The way in which this research has 
attempted to understand the British military field is at one moment within its history, by picking out 
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a period of study of a particular field, one draws into it its specificity of social processes which have 
shaped it over that given period whilst taking into account, as much as is possible, the social and 
historical processes which have led to its current form. A military field is a distinct social setting with 
specific distributions of capital, and regularities of practice which distinguish it and defines an 
individual’s position within it. This also means, to an extent, the observations drawn throughout this 
work are applicable in a limited sense to the specificity of the empirical social setting of the British 
Army Infantry.  
An individual’s position within the military field is also identified and defined by specific social 
practices and dispositions which are shaped according to the branch (Airforce, Army, Navy) that one 
is a member of, as well as the Corp- in the case of this research, the infantry in the British Army. The 
question of whether each Branch (and potentially Corp), are analytically distinct enough to be 
described as separate fields is not one that this research attempts to answer currently, due to the 
limitations of what it has chosen to focus on. There is certainly ample opportunity for researchers to 
come, to provide a detailed Bourdieusian analysis of the military field(s). This research is limited to 
applying there Bourdieusian concepts with broader strokes as a means of inviting a new way of 
understanding the military and specifically the infantry with respect to the question of ethics. At the 
very least, one can say that this ethical ‘turn’ has been experienced in a distinct way by the British 
Army infantry due to facts regarding their relationship to violence, which makes their social 
practices, and their experience of different symbolic capital distinct from the other Corps and 
branches of the military. This research deals in depth with the unique relationship to violence which 
defines the experiences and social practices of an infantry soldier at length, and the specificities of 
these support the location of the infantry as a particular social milieu within the military field which 
brings to light certain observations regarding the role of this emergent discourse of ethics. This 
discourse was arguably defined, shaped and targeted towards the infantry as it attempts to answer 
problems directly related to how violence is enacted, primarily at a tactical level on the battlefield 
(related to group cohesion, fighting power, and restraint on violence). Although the institutional 
artifacts which allow us to pick out the emergence of this ethical ‘turn’ are evidenced across the 
whole military field- they are experienced in situated ways dependent on ones position within a 
particular branch and Corp of the military.  
The specific social setting of the British military field and by extension the British infantry is one 
which has been shaped by its unique institutional history and wider social processes.  As Barkawi 
mentions, war is a form of social activity of which, as this research argues, the military field is the 
primary structured social space for this activity. The capital compositions and social practices which 
make up this specific site within the military field are made up of wider social, cultural and historical 
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legacies. In particular, the British military field and the infantry in particular ought to be understood 
in the context of its colonial and post-colonial histories as well the cultural legacy of its embrace of a 
muscular Christianity in the Aristotelian Judeo Christian tradition9. These legacies have in no small 
way shaped the specific practices, individual understandings and ways in which this ethical ‘turn’ has 
taken place.  
Ideology and nationalism stand as one possible means of understanding how the military field has 
been shaped with respect to the social practices underpinning ethical conduct. Through the mass 
conscription which European states undertook though the course of World War 1 and 2, both within 
their national and colonial territories, the cost in terms of human lives had to be explained to both 
the soldiers and wider public as to why the sacrifice was necessary (Barkawi, 2006:41). British 
wartime propaganda during the First World War invoked tropes of the Germans as barbarian ‘Huns’, 
“War was becoming total in terms of ideological stakes as well as in terms of the mobilisation of 
human and material resources” (ibid)10. The ideological framings of conflict, along with the majority 
of analysis of it, has taken the social and political context in which militaries operate and war is 
fought as granted (Barkawi, 2006:34). This view is one which sees organised violence as monopolised 
by sovereign states for the purposes of security (ibid); however as Barkawi claims the categories of 
nation state does not accurately capture the reality of the military order and any study of 
transnational military organisations needs to account for the basic themes of globalisation, namely, 
“the circulation of people, goods, and ideas around the globe in constituting military force and using 
it”(Barkawi, 2006:51). Not only does these flows of ideas and people constitute military force and 
connectedly the military field at present, the historical effects of these processes have also 
contributed to the current form of the military field. 
The regimental system of the British Army Infantry stands as a clear example of how military force, 
and in the case of this research, the specificity of one locale within the military field has been 
constituted by the transmissions of peoples and ideas. These globalising processes have a history 
which have shaped and are also contemporaneous with the ethical ‘turn’ which has taken place 
within the British Army. Regimental cultures play no small part in defining an individual soldier’s 
sense of self and place within the Army, and also contribute to the production of combat effective 
soldiers. These ‘invented’ regimental identities were essential also for producing effective soldiers 
recruited from colonial countries such as India (Barkawi, 2006:70). However, the British colonial 
Indian Army was one which was divided along racial lines- ones membership of a regiment was as 
 
9 For discussion of this point, see 7.3 ‘Core Values and Symbolic Capital’  
10 See 6.3 for an extended discussion of how ideological discourses have historically made possible political 
violence, and how this phenomenology of enmity by necessity requires the construction of a phantom ‘Other’.  
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much a matter of race as commitment to the regimental culture, “they carefully maintained ethnic 
differences in the army, keeping it divided by grouping men in companies of their ‘own kind’ and 
catering to their religious, dietary and other customs”.  
These regimental colonial histories still shape how soldiers develop their sense of self within the 
regiment and define intra-regimental competitiveness. For example, colonial battle honours are still 
significant in acts of remembrance in regimental celebrations. The remnants of the ethic ordering 
which developed during the Army’s colonial experiences in India still play out today within regiments 
such as the Gurkas, whose recruits are drawn from a region in Nepal. Whilst overt racism in the form 
racial epithets has likely receded somewhat, black and minority ethnic recruits still report incidents 
of racism such as comments like “people like you” and “you people from the colonies” (Guardian, 
2020). This legacy of racial ordering within the British Army draws a line back to the colonial policies 
of the British government in India, “(T)he Indian army was at once a tool of imperial control, in India 
and abroad, and an object of imperial control- it was divided and ruled just like the rest of India” 
(Barkawi, 2006:82). This logic of imperial control was projected within the organisation of the Army 
itself, “British officers could not stomach serving alongside Indians of equivalent status; indeed, the 
entire colonial enterprise was built on the notion that the colonized were a lesser form of human” 
(Barkawi, 2006:86). This history of racism and the binaries of the colonial enterprise have shaped the 
social practices which make up the site of the infantry within the military field in the context of 
regimental cultures and the continuing incidents of racism. These histories constitute 
understandings of race and place, as well as senses of Self and Other- these being fundamental to 
how individual soldiers make sense of ethics in the context of combat as well as construct the 
concept of the ‘enemy’.  
As mentioned, the ‘turn’ towards ethics in the British Army’s is a one which is an attempt to embed 
in ethical conduct a restraint on militaristic violence. As previously mentioned, this sits in tension 
with the traditional ethics of violence which has been primary embraced by the Army as a means to 
constitute the social practices which have made violence possible. An ethics of violence draws into it 
constructions of an enemy Other which have histories within the colonial racial binaries of 
Occidental civilisation over Oriental barbarity of which regimental histories and cultures play a part 
in reproducing. This ethics of restraint turns on an implicit universalist morality, which challenges 
constructions of enmity along these Orientalist lines, which still arguably contribute to framings of 
enemy in the context of the New Western way of war (Barkawi, 2006:105-6). This tension quite 
obviously plays out in specific ways in each meeting between soldier, ‘enemy’ and civilian in the 
theatre of war and is irreducible to one account. In the context of war however, it represents an 
important example of the social dimension to conflict: 
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“the interaction and interconnection occasioned by war that gives rise to such cultural 
constructions. Paradoxically, even when constructions of war are mobilised to divide and 
separate humanity, as in narratives of the War on Terror as a ‘clash of civilisations’, they can 
do so only through relation and comparison, through connecting constructions of the self to 
those of the other.” (Barkawi, 2006:123) 
The dynamic processes by which self and other are constructed in conflict mediate how this 
emergent ethics of restraint plays out in terms of a soldier’s ethical conduct. These constructions of 
self and other are produced in different contexts, such as the meeting with the ‘enemy’ in combat; 
through contact with the population on patrols and otherwise; though pre-existing institutional 
ideological narratives on the operational setting (the way in which threat is situated and 
constructed); regimental cultures and wider media narratives of the conflict itself. This ‘turn’ 
towards ethics experienced at the level of the individual soldier is constituted not only by the 
situated practices of the military field, but also by wider processes involved in mediating images of 
self and other which have been shaped by the specific institutional history of the British Army as well 
as broader ideological narratives of the conflict itself. As this section has shown, militaristic violence 
plays a significant role in constructing images of self and Other,  the following section will now 
attempt to examine how the this violence, and the ethical discourses which construct it as legitimate 
contribute to ‘making’ the state.  
 
4.5 State ‘Making’ and the State as Field 
Bourdieu makes his central target to explain the constitution of the state, considered as a ‘great 
fetish’; or in clear relation to the central concepts of his work, the state represented as a ‘central 
bank of symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 2014:122-123). This metaphor draws out what Bourdieu claims 
has been largely unexplored or underexplored in previous accounts of state formation. That being 
the role the state plays in producing and guaranteeing the multiple facets of social reality ranging 
from the almost out of view, taken-for-grantedness of the chronological systems that structure the 
patterns of everyday action such as calendars, to borders which define the very boundaries of the 
state itself. In this sense the state is the primary site of symbolic power and doxic production upon 
which all other fields, including the military field, are relationally dependent.  
To understand Bourdieu’s departure from other accounts of state formation, it can be viewed in 
distinction to authors such as Tilly who see state-making or formation as being driven by economic 
forces which leads then to an understanding of the state as being equivalent to institutions and 
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administrative practices which produced it. Bourdieu moves beyond this restricted account and 
defines the state in two distinct ways. The first being the ‘restricted sense’ which is identical to Tilly’s 
view where the state is a set of bureaucratic institutions, administration and a form of government; 
and the second which takes the state in the broad sense, that being some form of national territory 
where citizens share similar relations of recognition. Where Bourdieu turns things on their head and 
his argument becomes something quite different to previous accounts of state formation is that he 
takes the coming into being of the state in the restricted sense as logically prior to the coming into 
being of the state in the wider sense, for Bourdieu: 
“…the construction of the state as a relatively autonomous field exerting a power of 
centralization of physical force and symbolic force, and constituted accordingly as a stake of 
struggle, is inseparably accompanied by the construction of the unified social space that is its 
foundation. (Bourdieu, 2014:23)” 
Bourdieu takes the state to be a bureaucratic field which is defined by its possession of the 
monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence (Bourdieu 2014). This is a radical departure 
from the orthodoxy of previous Weberian definitions of the state as deriving its primary stability 
from its possession of the monopoly over ‘legitimate violence’. For Bourdieu in absence of a semiotic 
dimension, the state simply would be too fragile if it had to rely on material constraint through 
violence or the threat of violence: “(T)he strange logic of human actions means that brute force is 
never only brute force: it exerts a form of seduction, persuasion, which bears on the fact that it 
manages to obtain a certain form of recognition” (Bourdieu, 2014:191). This form of recognition 
which is bound up with the brute material dimensions of violence is key to understand the formation 
and maintenance of the state itself. In attempting to answer Hume’s question as to how the state so 
easily acquires the implicit submission of those it rules such that the few control the many 
(Bourdieu, 2014:162), Bourdieu introduces this symbolic dimension to state power:  
“It seems to me that no real understanding of the fundamental relations of force in the social 
order is possible without introducing the symbolic dimension of these relations. If relations of 
force were simply physical ones, military or even economic, it is likely that they would be 
infinitely more fragile and very easy to overthrow” (Ibid) 
Bourdieu essentially asks us to move beyond a semiotic/materialist dichotomy when attempting to 
understand the state. The monopoly over ‘legitimate’ violence which is itself the accumulation and 
end point of a multitude of material processes cannot be understood in absence of its symbolic 
relations, there is an act of (mis)recognition of this state monopoly over violence which brings the 
‘legitimate’ quality to violence into being. Bourdieu takes the state as being in possession of an 
94 
 
extraordinary power of producing a socially ordered world, without constant coercion. Bourdieu 
argues that Elias and Tilly’s focus on the military and economic aspects of coercion (materialist) are 
secondary to the initial, and logically prior accumulation of symbolic capital (semiotic) (Bourdieu, 
2014:166). As Loyal also summarises, “the monopolisation of symbolic violence is a condition for the 
exercise of a monopoly of physical violence” (Loyal, 2017:68). 
In order to draw out further Bourdieu’s account of this symbolic dimension to state power, and 
connectedly violence, it will be useful to see how his views develop through his engagement with 
the arguments put forward by Weber, Elias, Tilly. Weber’s orthodox and mostly unchallenged 
definition of the state as having the monopoly over legitimate violence serves as the entry point for 
Bourdieu’s main critique of Elias’s work on state constitution, ‘The Civilising Process’. Bourdieu takes 
Elias’s aim as trying to establish how the state was constituted in relation to its ability to successfully 
claim monopoly over the use of force. For Bourdieu, the notion of legitimate violence itself implies a 
symbolic dimension as ‘legitimacy includes the idea of recognition” (Ibid). Whilst Elias fails to 
recognise this dimension of state power, he builds on Weber in developing a double monopoly of 
violence and taxation. He broadly regards Elias as right in this respect and takes Elias as similar to 
Tilly in his emphasis on the processes by which the instruments of violence or coercion as become 
further concentrated in the hands of a single ruler or administration. However, Bourdieu sees Tilly as 
capturing a crucial dimension in his focus on the accumulation over the monopoly of resources 
derived from taxation which makes possible the monopoly over the instruments of violence 
(Bourdieu, 2014:128-129). 
Legitimacy and simultaneously recognition are central to Bourdieu’s interpretation of Elias and it is 
the crucial dimension which makes both monopolies possible- they are simply inconceivable for 
Bourdieu without the symbolic act of (mis)recognition. The symbolic exercise of power is found in 
other aspects of Elias’s work though unexplored by himself. Elias provides an account of the 
transition of the state from dynastic to public monopoly which is essential to understand the 
formation of the modern state (Bourdieu, 2014:128). This process is underpinned the gradual 
“formation of denser networks of interdependence between members of society” (Bourdieu, 
2014:131). This is the key claim to Elias’s ‘civilising process’ and for Bourdieu a “major law in the 
timeframe of history’ (ibid). Bourdieu however see’s processes of legitimation underpinning these 
ever-increasing chains of social interdependence in the context of the transition from dynastic to 
public monopoly within the state, as these chains of legitimation further increase the sole source of 
legitimising symbolic power of the dynastic ruler becomes diminished as his/her dependence relies 
on a greater number of individuals all of which become legitimisers in varying degrees. This is where 
the public monopoly exists within the bureaucracy and various institutions of state. This is also how 
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the state becomes the central bank of symbolic capital, a fiduciary nexus-point for all fields of 
power. As the dynastic ruler diminishes from sight, the ‘dynastic state’ emerges as a “concentration 
of the different species of capital” (Bourdieu, 2014:197).  
The state produces the principles of classification which all other fields draw from (Bourdieu, 
2014:165). As mentioned previously, an example of which is temporal ordering in the form of 
calendar systems adopted or guaranteed by the state. The state produces the ‘structuring 
structures’ which form the ‘principles of construction of social reality’ (ibid). The state is unique in 
the sense that it has a universal ability within its own territorial boundaries to impose ‘principles of 
division’, for example social hierarchies and symbolic categories and the endless script of social 
forms which make social reality possible (ibid). In this sense the state for Bourdieu is ‘meta’ in the 
sense that it is the power above powers. It is the primary field of power as it is where meta-capital 
resides and is the field of competition within which agents (politicians, bureaucrats, etc) struggle and 
compete to possess this primary form of capital from which power over other fields can be derived 
(Bourdieu, 2014:197).  
Returning to Bourdieu’s previous point and development on the arguments of Elias and Tilly, the 
emergence and formation of the state can only be understood as a process of accumulation of 
military, economic and symbolic power (ibid) which leads to the generation of this meta-capital. This 
process of accumulation is interdependent- and this point is crucial to Bourdieu’s unique 
contribution to accounts of state formation- it is a rejection of mono-casual logic which takes one 
the monopolisation over legitimate violence as causing the ability to be able to extract taxes 
legitimately and so on until the state is formed. For Bourdieu there is no accumulation of physical 
force without a simultaneous or prior accumulation of symbolic capital. Bourdieu focusses briefly in 
his lectures on this process of concentration of physical capital into the state and draws out a 
number of points relating to legitimisation of violence and implicitly ethics which are worth 
expanding upon as they serve as underexplored but relevant points to wider question of a discourse 
of ethics and its emergence in relation to the military field and the wider unfinished activity of state-
making.  
 
4.6 Ethics and the Symbolic Ordering of Violence 
This concentration of physical force or capital in relation to the state is the military (comprising all 
the armed forces) and police. This concentration was a process also of separation as the 
establishment of public force required that it be removed from those who do not belong to the state 
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administration such as the wider population, and during feudal competition, other dynastic 
competitors. This is the first process in a symbolic ordering of violence which seeks to determine a 
legitimate grounding for violence itself (Bourdieu, 2014:198). This process of concentration and 
separation lead to the emergence of a specialized grouping, in the form of the military, partially 
separated from the rest of society through uniform and practices, and in this sense it becomes a 
symbolic grouping (Bourdieu, 2014:199). At this point Bourdieu acknowledges the Weberian 
dimension to the military and it is here that notions of constraint on violence, and connectedly 
legitimacy, and implicitly ethics start to be brought out: 
“It is impossible to concentrate physical force without at the same time controlling it, 
otherwise there is a misappropriation of physical violence, and the misappropriation of 
physical violence is to physical violence what the misappropriation of capital is in the 
economic dimension, the equivalent of extortion.” (Bourdieu, 2014:199) 
This statement connects processes of concentration of physical force or violence into the state and 
the control of that violence. That ‘control’ is on the one hand the removal of the right to resort to 
violence from the wider populous (albeit under very limited circumstances circumscribed by law), 
and the conditions and form that that violence takes. It is these two notions of control over violence 
which begin to connect the states’ maintenance over the monopoly of legitimate violence to 
processes of symbolic violence and (mis)recognition. The determination, or control of which forms 
of violence are ‘misappropriated’ (that includes who the violence is directed towards and the quality 
of that violence) and which are not is itself a function of symbolic violence directed by the state. 
Bourdieu very briefly raises the moral question of state violence through its general obscuration 
from view, implicitly connected to the symbolic processes of legitimisation, which create a “doxic 
adhesion” (Bourdieu, 2014:200) to this notion of the state’s claim to the monopoly over legitimate 
physical force. It is this which makes us generally fail to ask questions concerning the state and its 
use of violence. Obviously this doxic adhesion is not completely stable and there are inevitable 
moments when heterodox positions challenge this orthodoxy, and this question comes back into 
view. It is at these moments of challenge to the doxa of ‘legitimate’ violence that the struggle 
between dominant and dominated is exposed (Bourdieu, 2014:174). The taken-for-granted-ness of 
the state’s duel claim over the monopoly of legitimate violence and that the violence it monopolises 
has the quality of legitimacy represents a moment within historical evolution which “dismiss(es) the 
defeated lateral possibilities, not to the realm of the forgotten, but to the unconscious” (ibid). The 
challenge then is to bring back into view these lateral possibilities at moments of doxic creation. 
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A central component of state discourse, and doxic adhesion, is that of violence, in particular the 
proposition that it is self-evident that the state is the only entity that has the legitimate claim over 
the monopoly of legitimate violence and this builds into the very legitimacy that a state. After the 
magnitude and barbarity of the violence which marked the wars of the 20th century, a century 
which also was the making of the modern state, the legitimacy of state violence was brought into 
question and with that the legitimacy of the state itself. These events represented moments where 
physical capital became ‘misappropriated’ by the state in the most tragic and barbaric ways. The 
Nuremburg principles, which marked the first quasi-legal state effort at bringing in a moral and 
ethical dimension to state violence was itself a response to the dilemma the state faced when its 
legitimate claim over the monopoly of physical force itself was challenged. The imposition of an 
ethics of violence initially through this quasi legal discourse was an act of symbolic violence par 
excellence. This moment revealed the secondary connection between violence and state ‘making’ 
which Bourdieu implies by drawing in the symbolic dimension to state formation. As mentioned the 
state is that entity which has the legitimate claim over the monopoly of physical force which 
Bourdieu develops on by including the definition of the state as also holding the monopoly of 
symbolic violence which connects physical force in that “(T)here is no accumulation of physical 
(force) capital, then, without simultaneous or prior accumulation of symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 
2014:201). What is implied but goes unmentioned is the process of maintaining this accumulation of 
physical force with respect to the symbolic dimension of its possession and this is the ongoing 
dimension of state ‘making’.  
The state can only maintain the accumulation and concentration of physical capital through also 
maintaining the legitimacy of its claim over it- as Bourdieu himself claimed- this is the symbolic 
dimension. This legitimacy partially relies on the control and non-misappropriation of violence which 
speaks to questions of how and when violence is used by the state. Whilst the state is ‘meta 
instance’ of symbolic and physical capital it is still a field of power which has moments of challenge 
and instability. This sees a ‘drama’ and ‘struggle’ as Bourdieu would characterise it in the making of 
the doxa of the legitimate claim over the monopoly of violence and this is marked the emergence of 
an ethical discourse surrounding state violence which was undertaken by state jurists who utilised 
ethics as a means to both bring back state violence under ‘control’ and also legitimate that violence. 
This was simultaneously an act of state making in that it sought to reaffirm the states ‘legitimate’ 
claim over the monopoly of legitimate physical force. Their success depended on the cache of 
symbolic power they wielded as agents of the state. This is not to say that the orthodoxy of 
legitimate claim over the monopoly of physical force disappears in these moments of challenge, only 
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that at these critical junctures this orthodoxy faces heterodox challenges to which it necessarily 
must respond.  
In much the same way in which the state through the school system inscribes within people’s 
habitus the doxa of social divisions and hierarchies, the state also through the military legitimises a 
particular form of violence such that that state violence itself becomes self-sustaining. The ongoing 
symbolic struggles within and without the military on the question of the control and form of 
military violence itself, through the discourse of an ethics of violence, brings into being the 
possibility and further constitutes a form of morally legitimate violence which sustains the state 
itself in its barest sense. The state attempts to make the legitimate claim not only over the 
monopoly on violence, but the monopoly over morally legitimate violence. In absence of this ‘moral’ 
dimension to state violence, the state in its current form is itself subject to challenge. This requires 
that violence itself can be legitimate in the first place. This process of legitimizing the very violence 
that the state wields is undertaken by the state through the military.  
Arguably this particular account of what constitutes the various forms of legitimate violence below 
the level of state violence- i.e. moral accounts of when violence may be justified at an inter-personal 
level, derive their legitimating logic partially from these state derived representations of violence 
discovered in literature, film etc. The heroism of the battlefield is the symbolic heir to heroism itself. 
There are moments when the state’s claim to the monopoly over legitimate/moral violence falls 
away completely in situations where the state becomes engaged in an intensifying cycle of primarily 
inwardly directed physical force in order to maintain its autocratic or totalitarian structure, 
(mis)recognition of this legitimate claim over moral violence crumbles and with it the stability of the 
state itself and this leads to further instability and repression as the state seeks to reassert control as 
it is no longer able to derive it via doxic adhesion.   
Returning back to the focus of this research, which is primarily concerned with state violence as 
connected to the modern, post-war Western ‘liberal state’, this process of state (moral) 
legitimisation of violence serves to symbolically constitute the state itself and this ties back in closely 
with Bourdieu’s earlier argument that the state not only has a monopoly over legitimate violence 
but also over legitimate symbolic violence. The (mis)recognition of state derived military violence as 
itself being legitimate is one of the most primary acts of symbolic violence which runs past us 
without notice- that violence deployed by the state within the confines of international law is for the 
most part legitimate- a claim which rarely musters much counter-argument beyond absolute pacifist 
positions. This initial (mis)recognition of the legitimacy of the state to use violence is the primary 
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condition of possessing legitimate violence. The military inscribes legitimacy onto violence partially 
through constituting that violence as legitimate via an ethics of violence.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The military, along with the police, are the two main institutions of the state which incubate and at 
times enact the states claim to the monopoly over legitimate violence. The concept of legitimate 
violence and its connection to how we come to define the state functions as a taken-for-granted 
orthodoxy in that most people accept that legitimate violence is possible in principle- and the state 
as a unitary political object, is the only institution (itself comprised of many sub-institutions) which 
has an enforceable claim over its monopoly. Legitimacy, in this limited Weberian sense and violence 
are then inexorably bound together when we discuss violence in relation to the military. The 
problem of violence for the military and connectedly the state is then twofold. Firstly, and perhaps 
quite obviously the moment we say ‘legitimate violence’ we also allow the notion of non-legitimate 
violence. We then are distinguishing between the application of brute physical force and something 
else. For Bourdieu, the introduction of this notion of legitimacy implies a symbolic dimension 
(Bourdieu, 2014) in that there is some process of (mis)recognition taking place such that people 
accept the claim that state violence is legitimate. This emergent discourse on an ethics of violence 
functions in this regard as an act of symbolic violence, otherwise considered as a legitimising 
discourse.  
This is the twofold dimension to this relatively new discourse of ethics which has emerged in the 
British military and in almost all other state militaries. This emergent and ongoing process of 
(mis)recognition of violence as legitimate, through a discourse of ethics is one which is intimately 
tied up with state ‘making’ and war ‘making’ considered as a form of ‘humanitarian violence’. To 
understand its emergence, it is necessary to understand the sociological history of these two 
processes. Through also taking seriously Bourdieu’s claim as to the symbolic dimension of 
legitimation this invites us to consider state ‘making’ and war ‘making’ in arguably different ways. 
For the purpose of this research this allows us to understand the role of ethics as related to military 
violence as an emergent discourse marked by processes of symbolic violence, enacted by the state. 
For Bourdieu, the state is “the sector of the field of power, or bureaucratic field, which is defined by 
a possession of the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence” (Loyal, 2017:67). From 
this starting point of considering the state as the primary fiduciary guarantor of symbolic capital we 
move on to the necessity of considering the role of the military considered as a field in this process 
of symbolic violence related to the legitimation of state violence. This chapter considered the 
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symbolic relationship between an ethics of violence, war-making and state-making. It attempted to 
locate the specific treatment of the British Army Infantry which is the focus of this research as a 
situated site of socially and historically constituted practices within a military field. Returning to 
Bourdieu’s claim that the state has the monopoly over both legitimate physical and symbolic 
violence and that legitimation has a symbolic dimension, this (mis)recognition of violence as 
legitimate is constitutive of the state itself, and the military field contributes to symbolically 























Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This research broadly represents the attempt to answer a number of questions or problems, related 
to ethics and values, situated within the social context of the military, with a particular focus on the 
British Army Infantry. In order to answer a question, it is necessary to define the problem itself. This 
definition is not neutral and does not arise only from observation of phenomena. As is often the 
case, the reflexive and self-aware researcher will cautiously address themselves to questions 
concerning how their subjectivity implicates itself within their research and attempt to mitigate this 
effect through drawing attention to it.  
Firstly, the act of problem definition is itself a methodological question which is deserving of this 
cautionary approach as the statement of some problem is itself a positioned act. This positioning is 
one which sees the researcher as a participant within the academic field, a site of competition over 
the specific profits available in this field- position, prestige etc. (Bourdieu, 1993:9). This interested 
quality to research, and connectedly to the definition of the problems which research addresses 
itself to may be understood as the desire to:  
“be the first to make a discovery and to appropriate all the associated rights, or in moral 
indignation or revolt against certain forms of domination and against those who defend them 
within the scientific world. In short, there is no immaculate conception” (Bourdieu, 1993:11).  
The possibility of the achievement of the associated profits connected to this interest in the 
academic field shapes the very nature of the problems that are defined. The definition of a lacuna in 
a corpus of research brings with it the positionality of the researcher. By defining an absence in a 
field of study, one necessarily is stating the limitations of what has already been said. The 
incompleteness of an academic body of work is determined by the vantage point a researcher brings 
to it which is underpinned by ontological and normative framings relative to that researcher. In the 
case of this research, the lacuna and problem framing has been shaped and articulated with 
reference to the particular ontological and normative frames of reference this researcher brings to 
bear on the subject of the military- a consideration which will be discussed throughout the rest of 
this chapter 
Secondly, one must be reflexively aware as much as is possible of the danger of performing a 
‘spontaneous sociology’ (Bourdieu et al, 1991:13). That is because of the most mundane fact- that 
one has an everyday familiarity with the social. This familiarity passes often without conscious 
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reflexion and represents, “the epistemological obstacle, par excellence, because it continuously 
produces fictitious conceptions and systematizations and, at the same time, the conditions of their 
credibility” (ibid). What is taken as the everyday, what passes as common sense implicates itself 
directly in the act of problem definition in terms of scoping out what exactly a research project 
determines as its focus. This is in the sense that our familiarity with the world causes us to bypass 
concepts, phenomena, relations which may bear salient importance. An engaged approach to the 
question of problem definition and methodology in relation to this research ought to demand, as 
much as is possible, that we reflexively break this relation of familiarity. The boundaries of any 
lacuna are etched out only in relation to the disruption of relations of familiarity with the social. It is 
only possible to define something as a problem when the connotative chains which binds our 
subjectivity to things in the social world are disrupted in some way.  
It is with these things in mind that this chapter will attempt to introduce themes and considerations 
which have shaped and informed this research. Many have been conscious choices arrived at over 
the 7 years I have been working on this project- others are a result of chance encounters and 
serendipity. The hope is to provide a means of understanding how conscious methodological 
decisions, and moments in my life informed very much by who I am, have led to the approach I have 
taken to this research.  
 
5.2 Autobiography of an Idea 
In order to account for why I have made the particular choices I have in terms of the theory and 
methodology used to examine the role of ethics in relation to the British Army and the soldiers that 
make it up, I have decided to provide a brief autobiography of the development of the research 
question and my approach to answering it as these have been shaped as much by key events in my 
own life as by the prescriptive demands of employing a strict methodological approach to 
sociological research. It is hoped that this will draw out some salient themes which will subsequently 
be explored in relation to questions of my own habitus; and how interests relative to my 
professional position have brought me to study this area in the way that I have. It will also shed 
some light on the choices I have made in relation to the theory I have used to interogate the social 
object. These observations were drawn from field notes taken during my engagement with the 
military reserves and field visits to conduct my interviews.  
In 2014, after having been embarked upon the PhD for a period of 3 years, I found myself in a 
position where I had come to realise that my initial research idea, which was an attempt to combine 
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phenomenological insights into the question of structure and agency in IR theory, had come to 
something of a dead end. I had also recently moved to part-time study due to financial pressures 
and had taken up employment as a market researcher in order to support myself. I was seriously 
questioning whether I would progress with the PhD and decided to embark upon the process of 
joining the Army Reserves as an Intelligence Officer. Through the recruitment process which took 
about a year I attended the Army Reserve centre in Keynsham, Bristol on a weekly basis as well as 
attending a technical selection weekend at the Defence Intelligence Centre in Chicksands, and also 
the main Army physical selection weekend at Pirbright.  
My experiences through the course of this year proved to be crucial in developing my current 
research idea as well as shaping my habitus which have inevitably been brought to bear on how I 
have approached the research question as well as how I have engaged with my research subjects. I 
could speak of numerous experiences within that year which have contributed to how I first came to 
ask questions regarding ethics in the British Army and subsequently how these questions and their 
responses have been framed. However, I have picked out three significant events which have 
contributed to setting the direction of this research both consciously and no doubt unconsciously.  
 
5.3 Encounter with a Field 
As Creswell (2007:102) states, a research problem may be better understood as a ‘need to study’ 
and often arises from personal experience as well as existing gaps in scholarly literature. These two 
understandings were my initial guides in what I hoped my research would be, and I was also 
extremely sensitive that my research would not simply be a derivative act of splitting hairs whereby 
my work, whilst fulfilling the necessary originality requirement for a PhD, would still look 
indistinguishable from another’s. With these guides in mind but little thought to the military as a 
possible research object I attended my first few weeks at the Army Reserves. I was profoundly stuck 
after the first visit that I was stepping across some distinct social boundary which separated the 
military as an organisation (and something else?) from wider society. That sensation of entry was 
subtle yet profound and was marked by the initial experience of distinctly different conventions of 
speech, bodily movements through initial training in drill, and social relations which were uniquely 
defined by their organisational setting in a way I hadn’t experienced in previous social contexts in my 
life.  
One of my first observations was that military rank, whilst important in terms of one’s social 
standing amongst others, was not perhaps the main determinant and other factors seemed to be at 
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play. In particular one’s participation in active duty seemed to be key in relation to perceptions of 
respect and authority. At the time these thoughts were fleeting as my mind was less focussed on the 
Army as a potential object of study and more as a possible career path.  I also think in some way my 
doubts at the time concerning whether I would continue my PhD made me particularly attuned to 
the possible profits that entry into a field such as the military might offer in respect to being a 
possible career route as well as, more profoundly, the sense of purpose and belonging it might 
provide at a moment of uncertainty in my own life. This possibility of belonging was something 
present from the start of my engagement with the Reserves and this no doubt ties in with what 
Bourdieu would see as the primary search for recognition which underpins all human social action. 
The camaraderie and welcome I received from the first day provided a powerful sense of what a 
future in the Army would hold in the sense of belonging in relation to others. These background 
emotions and desires shaped and probably have continued to shape my engagement with the 
military as an object of study. Most significantly they attuned me to the possibility of recognition of 
my own value that military might offer. Whilst these observations were conscious, they were yet to 
be situated in relation to the construction of the social object of the military field which would 
subsequently take place.  
 
5.4 Army Selection 
As part of my selection for the military reserves, I was required to undertake a two-day weekend 
selection course at the Army Training Centre in Pirbright. This is one of the main locations for both 
Basic Selection and Phase 1 training for new recruits. The two day selection covers basic aptitude 
tests around literacy and numeracy and a range of medical and physical tests which are designed to 
ensure recruits meet the basic standard for entry into all career paths within the British Army, 
excluding the Parachute regiment which runs their own 12 week selection course. Beyond the 
explicit purpose of these tests, it attempts to assess recruits’ potential fit for the Army. This is done 
through assessing one’s ability to follow orders- however illogical, which proved to be the case 
regularly; ones commitment to the physical task at hand; and one’s ability to socially mesh with 
fellow recruits. Two experiences in relation to this notion of potential fit struck me profoundly 
through the course of the weekend. Towards the end of the 1.5 mile run I noticed a number of 
people walking the final 100 meters and were subsequently subjected to a barrage of abuse. It 
became abundantly clear at this stage that what was more important was commitment to the task at 
hand and the acknowledgement that fitness and proficiency would follow later. The temporal 
structuring of the two days served as a means of gauging how well one would potentially cope with 
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the time-ordered rhythms of Army life. Eating took place strictly within specified times with food 
often left uneaten and recruits dashing to make the next muster point. These initial ‘tastes’ of 
barracks and army life would later be contextualised theoretically with reference to Goffman’s 
observations on the total institution. No doubt they played some part in me turning towards specific 
theoretical framings for these initial experiences which may have been different had I not 
experienced them.  
Our sleeping arrangements were bunks in a single dormitory, and we very quickly started to bond 
over the brief course of the weekend we spent together. I had presumed that the cohort would be 
predominantly from working-class backgrounds. As much as it is possible in the unique context of 
social class in the UK, with the silent and not so silent signifiers that we are consciously and 
unconsciously attuned to, it certainly felt like this observation was broadly correct11. Along with this 
preconception on the class backgrounds of the young men present (there were no women recruits 
present during the selection), prior to meeting these young men I had presumed that lack of 
opportunity in the job market would feature as a significant push in relation to them choosing a 
military career path. Again these observations are far from systematic as the research idea had yet 
to be fully formed and as such I was not in the process of formal data gathering, however from 
conversations with 5 or so individuals concerning their reasons for attempting to join the Army, I 
found this generally wasn’t a significant motivation. The explanations for their choice of career that 
they provided were about the things that the Army would offer them as individuals in terms themes 
surrounding personal growth and the desire to do something different with their lives. Economics 
rarely featured in explicit reasoning for joining the military. Many of the recruits were on their 
second or third attempts at entry and a number came from military families with brothers and/or 
fathers who had served.  
 
5.5 The Primary Group 
The final day of selection had an early morning timed run and following this a gruelling Physical 
Training (PT) session and ended with a team exercise on the assault course. That this was the last 
test was certainly significant- we were placed in teams of four and had to work together to move 
some equipment across various obstacles without it touching the ground. We managed to 
 
11 Whilst this is no substitute for academic rigour, I drew these observations from conversations I had with the 
five or so individuals who I spoke to in some depth during the weekend. I asked about their family and 
educational backgrounds- with all five coming from families where parents worked in manual professions, 
including the military. Most had not progressed further than GCSEs in terms of educational level.  
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successfully complete the exercise and I was struck by the speed at which we came together as a 
group to achieve this. After being told we had completed the exercise successfully we experienced 
an elated and quite emotional sense of shared achievement, and also a fleeting sense of a closeness 
to the strangers on either side of ourselves. I remember being surprised at how quickly it was 
possible in the context of these types of situations to form bonds with people who had been 
strangers to me the day before, and I got the sense that it was our potential to fit into these nascent 
social relations that was being tested as well as the explicit purpose of the exercise. The potency of 
this experience is something that lingered with me for some time and implicated itself in the 
direction the research took. In particular, the role of primary group relations and how these 
constitute the possibility of violence.  
 
5.6 Ethos 
Tying together these various experiences and themes that have been discussed, was the notion of 
ethos, something recognisable to any soldier were it mentioned to them. I can’t recall the first time 
that Army or Regimental ethos was explained explicitly to me, but it was broadly related in terms of 
the particular character of thee individual soldier, the Army generally and Regiment specifically. It 
was taken to encompass virtues such as loyalty, self-discipline, and self-sacrifice. At the level of the 
regiment ethos was implicitly tied in with certain forms of humour which were crucial as signifiers of 
membership of the social group. When practicing weapon assembly during an evening’s training 
with the reserves, I was struck by the quality of the black humour which was involved when some 
soldiers were discussing killing in the context of a recent deployment. I had the increasing sensation 
that violence underpinned almost everything in the Army whether explicitly acknowledged or not 
and running parallel to this backdrop of violence, which is the broad material product of the Army, 
was a unique form of institutional ethics which was in some way closely related to this violence. 
Picking out again those features of ethos such as loyalty and self-discipline along with a type of 
humour whose purpose was to partially make sense of violence, it became clear that there was a 
significant relationship between ethos as a form of ethics, and the violence that the Army 
undertook. Around the same time that I was sketching out these observations, the court martial of 
Sgt Alexander Blackman was taking place, where as previously mentioned, the Navy were discussing 
the case in relation to questions surrounding his inability to ‘shift moral mindsets’. After reviewing 
military documentation focussed on ethos and ethics it became apparent that across the branches of 
the British Military and Army in particular, ethics had become a central institutional concern.  It was 




5.7 Research Aims 
I had two clear aims in mind when I undertook this research and they have broadly remained the 
same throughout. My first was to shed light on a phenomenon and moment of institutional change 
which had taken place in the British Army and which hadn’t been examined by scholarly work, and 
also bring to bear as much as I was able to, rigorous sociological analysis on the Army in order to 
operationalise this question of ethics in relation to the soldiers themselves. The aim was to do this 
by paying serious scholarly attention to the experiences of junior soldiers in relation to combat 
ethics- which was a group who had been significantly under-researched in this academic area. I also 
felt that much work on the military, at least that which found its theoretical roots in sociology and 
politics, was predominantly critically orientated. Whilst this isn’t to say that I rejected the type of 
analysis and conclusions that were being drawn from this type of work on the military12, it was 
rather that this work seemed to be positioned as the dominant normative framing of the military. 
This framing of the military seemed to see it as exclusively a domain of power inequalities, soldiers 
being subject to these inequalities in different ways and primarily for the purpose of exercising a 
form of state violence that was illegitimate by its very definition. What I strongly felt, and this was of 
course influenced by my experiences up to that point through my contact with the Army Reserves, 
was that the Army seemed to also provide something of real importance to soldiers in terms of their 
sense of self and the things which they would define as most important to them in their lives. This 
struck me as incongruent with the totalising accounts of military which one comes across in critically 
orientated work, where soldiers emerge as dupes to systems and relations of power of which they 
are left with little subjectivity. In contrast, my first observations were that the Army was also a site 
where soldiers could derive meaning and value in relation to their own lives and sense of self.  
The second aim of this research was to hopefully develop a set of insights, and further questions 
which may in some way assist the Army in terms of their own understanding of combat ethics. In 
particular, how they develop their training packages in relation to ‘teaching ethics’; understanding 
ethics in relation to their own institutional history; and realigning questions of ethical conduct and 
ethical education towards the junior ranks- as they represented a group which had been largely 
ignored by the Army in relation to their significance in terms of ethical conduct and ‘instruction’. It is 
important to clearly state my own views on the Army and the use of violent force by the state as 
 
12 Please refer to Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of these themes.  
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these are clearly connected to the aims of this research. I believe that under limited conditions, 
where the principles of just war are fulfilled the state has the moral right to use violence.  
 
5.8 The Research Paradigm and Data Collection 
In defining the overall approach to conducting this research it is necessary to pay some attention to 
ontological questions as how we approach classifying units of analysis within the social. Even at the 
outset of a research project, this has concrete effects in terms of the expectations we bring to our 
analysis, our judgements and the results we draw (Mason, 2002:68). Kurki argues that theory at the 
explanatory meta-level has concrete outcomes for how we come to explain the social world we are 
encountering and it essentially “constrains and enable(s) the kinds of explanations we construct” 
(Kurki, 2006:213). Prior to outlining how the theoretical paradigm this research has used has been 
applied to the process of conducting this research and analysing the data, this section will also 
discuss some themes which are broadly relevant to the work as an example of qualitative research. 
This research relied on three types of data in order to examine the questions it has posed:  a small 
amount of documentary evidence which was sourced from both redacted documents available on-
line as well as from Dr Patrick Mileham a retired Army Officer who has provided invaluable 
assistance throughout the course of this research; interviews with 22 serving and 2 retired soldiers 
of various ranks; and analysis of academic research on military socialisation within military sociology 
and ethics in the nascent field of military ethics. Amongst the serving soldiers I interviewed were 
Brigadier John Donnelly who held the position of head of personnel in the British Army, and also 
Padre Phillip McCormack who had recently taken up the newly created post of Head of Ethics in the 
Army. Both individuals were significant gatekeepers and assisted greatly in facilitating further 
contacts for interviewing. It has also drawn on a corpus of work by Pierre Bourdieu as well as cross-
disciplinary work on the phenomena of violence. Whilst this research has a clear empirical 
component, it is balanced with theoretical and historical analysis which it has attempted to examine 
the questions against.  
Chapter 6 utilises some empirical data, whilst chapter’s 7 and 8  go more deeply into contextualising 
the words of the soldiers with respect to the research questions. Chapter 7 is weighted more 
towards the non-empirical whilst Chapter 8 relies more on interview data, though it begins with a 
theoretical discussion on habitus and the phenomenology of ethical expertise.  This decision to 
integrate theoretical analysis into these chapters might strike the reader as unusual, yet it was a 
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deliberate strategy to explicate the words of the soldiers alongside the culmination of theoretical 
arguments that were developed through the preceding chapters. 
This research has chosen to adopt a qualitative approach to data collection utilising semi-structured 
interviews where a number of thematic areas were used to guide the interview and illicit responses. 
As this research has attempted to understand and shed light on how soldiers have experienced this 
emergent discourse of ethics in the British Army, this approach fit the objective of attempting to 
account for the “knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, experiences, and interactions” 
(Mason, 2002:64) of soldiers with respect to these questions. These range of subjective responses 
are best accounted for with reference to a qualitative methodology (Rubin&Rubin, 1995:51). The 
interview setting is not however only limited to this framing and this research understood the 
relationship (Berg, 2001:68) between the interviewer and subject as constructed, bringing into play a 
performative dimension with respect to both parties to that relationship.  
By continuously keeping in mind this conception of the interview as a form of social performance 
(ibid), it assisted in accounting for the dynamics of how a non-military interviewer interacts with 
serving soldiers in terms of how each party presents their experiences and perspectives to one 
another. By considering the performative dimension of my own identity and actions as a researcher, 
it brought about a conscious consideration of the ways in which I was keen to project a sympathetic 
understanding of the military, as well as downplay particular class signifiers as I thought both would 
in some manner inhibit the process of eliciting the most honest and truthful responses through the 
development of rapport. With respect to the soldiers themselves, there was a performative dynamic 
in recalling ‘war stories’ for a non-military audience, often a number of years after the event such 
that I was acutely aware of the often-time polished quality to the accounts that I heard. This was not 
to say that they were fabrications, as this is perhaps a natural outcome of how people recall the past 
over repeated narrative events. The other crucial stake at play for the soldiers was the constant 
maintenance of the soldierly ideal and presented self-image which is most likely an ongoing 
embodied dimension to all soldier’s everyday lived experiences.  
As mentioned, the methods for data collection this research has chosen to adopt broadly sit within 
the qualitative approach. As Creswell (2009:175-6) describes, this approach is broadly defined by a 
number of characteristics. Firstly, its epistemological basis is interpretivist- the researcher plays a 
part in the construction of the social object which is studied and the researcher’s own conscious and 
non-conscious beliefs, perspectives and standpoints implicate themselves in how the data is 
collected and interpreted. This foundation leads to further commitments in relation to the question 
of how data relating to the social object is collected and analysed. It is preferable where possible to 
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collect data, in the case of this research interviews, within the natural setting of the object being 
studied (Creswell, 2009:175). Qualitative research tends to not limit itself to one source of data and 
will rely on various forms such as interview data, documents, and artefacts; qualitative analysis of 
data tends towards an inductive process whereby patterns, themes and categories are gradually 
refined into more abstract units/concepts; participants own meanings take centre stage in the 
research; the research design is not fixed and tends to be an emergent process; and research is 
framed in relation to a theoretical lens or ‘shorthand’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1997:228). 
The proposed setting for conducting the interviews was within the context of the Army barracks, this 
was both for the purpose of the logistics of organising interviews with serving soldiers as conducting 
them outside the barracks would have been prohibitive and also, more crucially, the natural setting 
of the barracks would be more conducive to eliciting the depth and richness of data in the responses 
from the soldiers themselves. Conducting of interviews within this context acknowledges the 
importance of the social setting in terms of bringing out responses which tie together with the social 
object which is under investigation (Mason, 2002:64) with the responses of those being interviewed. 
The majority of interview data was collected over the course of two research visits in 2016 to the 2nd 
Mercian Battalion at their Chester Barracks where I stayed in the Officer’s Mess for a period of 3 
days each visit, to both conduct the interviews and spend time socialising with the soldiers. The 
interviews themselves were semi-structured interviews which covered the following thematic areas: 
1. Introduction/Brief overview of research. 
2. Respondent Background:  
3. Motivations for joining the military: 
4. Phase One and Phase Two training:  
5. Discussion of Ethos/Values/Ethics 
6. Modern Warfare-Changing Operational Demands 
 
The choice of semi-structured interviews with broad thematic areas provided flexibility in order to 
pick up on novel or unexpected themes which emerged through the course of the interviews 
(Mason, 2002:62). On some occasions when interviewing, not all thematic areas were explored as 
the interview subject was given a great deal of latitude in determining the course of the interview as 
it is acknowledged that unstructured and semi-structured forms of interviewing are often 
implemented simultaneously through the course of conducting qualitative interviews (Denscome, 
1998:113). I made the deliberate decision to separate my two research visits by a number of 
months, which allowed me to develop the thematic areas within the questionnaire in light of the 
observations and analysis derived from the first round of interviewing. During the course of the first 
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visit, I made slight amendments to the questions as new themes emerged in relation to the 
respondent’s answers and my analysis of those answers with respect to the social object.  
 
5.9 Access and the Ethics of Access 
Field research can be classified into two broadly defined events, gaining access and conducting 
analysis (Shaffir et al., 1980 cited in Berg, 2001:67). The boundaries between these two are often 
ambiguous, as was the case with this research, were hard to distinguish (Berg, 2001:67). The process 
of conducting research was constantly aligned with the process of gaining access as each interview 
opened up further possible interview subjects and the act of the interview itself was in some ways 
implicitly a performative request for access to further potential interview subjects. This question of 
access especially in relation to conducting research with the military, brought with it unique ethical 
and associated epistemological concerns. In their critique of functionalist approaches to military 
sociology which tend towards macro-level, quantitative analysis, Jenkings et al (2011) see it as an 
‘engineering’ (Higate quoted in Jenkings et al, 2011:44) approach, similar to Burawoy’s concept of 
professional sociology (2004), which is often positioned as a contributory benefit to the armed 
forces in the form of an ‘academic-military nexus’. For them this brings with it inherent risks involved 
in the collaboration such as:  
“gatekeepers, who by virtue of their role have significant authority and power in shaping 
research trajectories…collaboration requires accepting military institutional definitions of 
acceptable methodologies, conceptualisations of the social world that underpin the 
development of the research questions, and understanding of how the research fits a broader 
‘national interest’…Research based on high levels of access within military forces is more likely 
to accord with conceptual world-views of those forces and their governing institutions” 
(Jenkings et al, 2011:44) 
As mentioned from the outset of this chapter, I hoped that the observations and insights that would 
come out of my research might have some use to the military itself. Yet whilst this work could be 
classified under the umbrella of ‘engineering’ approaches in military sociology, it was a decision 
taken consciously rather than one which was arrived at through a process of bartering away 
academic independence for access. Whilst Jenkings’ observations hold to some degree, and no 
doubt impact on research trajectories for many who attempt to take the military as their object of 
study and require access, my research benefited from a number of fruitful relationships which 
facilitated an exceptional level of un-restricted access which meant I did not need to go through 
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formal MOD ethics committees to approve my research topic. This informal research relationship 
potentially allowed me a far greater latitude in terms of the types of questions and themes I 
discussed with my key informants. Whilst there was never any attempt by the Army to check or 
approve the direction or form of my research approach in terms of its conceptual framing of the 
Army, my increasing proximity to the Army through personal, professional and research 
relationships no doubt shaped the form of the views concerning it. 
Primary to my success in gaining access to conduct my interviews was the relationship I developed 
with Dr Patrick Mileham, who was one of the first military scholars to push for the British Army to 
engage seriously with the question of ethics at an institutional level. Through him facilitating 
contact, I was initially put in touch with and interviewed the Brigadier ranked head of ethics, Padre 
Phillip McCormack. Through this relationship, I contacted the Head of Personnel for the Army, 
Brigadier John Donnelly who I interviewed at Army HQ. Through ongoing support from Patrick, I 
subsequently spoke with Lft Col Ben Wilde, the Commanding Officer of 2nd Mercian who Patrick 
assured me was sympathetic to the questions of ethics in the Army and would likely assist me in 
gaining access to conduct interviews. Over the course of a number of emails and telephone 
conversations where I both described my research, and more than likely projected an attitude to the 
Army which suggested I was not approaching it from an exclusively critical standpoint, I was able to 
secure access for my first research visit. Had I have gone down the formal route for applying for 
access to conduct research, via the MOD, I am inclined to think that I would have encountered 
severe difficulties in achieving the equivalent level of access that I did.  
 
5.10 Participants 
Of the 22 respondents drawn from a number of different companies in 2nd Mercian, I predominantly 
focussed on interviewing junior soldiers (NCO and below) for reasons specifically outlined in chapter 
2 and 3. Soldiers of this rank have rarely been included within academic or military analysis of 
combat ethics. In relation to the overarching questions concerning how soldiers have experienced 
the emergence of a codified ethics in the British Army, I hoped to account for it from the perspective 
of the rank and file soldier. This was due to the observation that they were the main institutional 
targets for these processes of (mis)recognition in relation to ethics as they were the principle actors 
carrying out state violence at a tactical battlefield level. It was their violence that the Army has 
arguably attempted to enable and constrain through this codified ethical schema that has been 
developed through the Army’s institutional history. In addition to junior soldiers I interviewed two 
Platoon Commanders at the rank of Captain and Lieutenant, a Major and a Colonel who commanded 
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the Battalion. I also conducted one group interview with approximately 8 platoon leaders where 
broader questions of Army institutional ethics and combat ethics were discussed.  It was crucial to 
also include accounts from commissioned ranks in order to draw out possible differences between 
their respective accounts as well as discovering salient similarities and differences with respect to 
their positions within the military field. I hoped to draw out how capital compositions were affected 
by rank and the background of soldiers as rank was a relatively consistent proxy for ‘social class’ due 
to most commissioned officers having attended university and public school.  
The other criteria which organised my selection of individuals for interview was their combat roles. 
From my initial research and through discussions and interviews with a friend who was a former 
Major in the Parachute regiment, it became clear that the variable of distance impacted on how 
military violence was enacted by soldiers. For the direct purposes of my own research questions, it 
raised the question of how the spatiality of violence impacted on ethical conduct. Most participants 
were infantry soldiers, however I also interviewed those with specialisms. Namely, two mortar 
operators and two snipers which I hoped would bring out a comparative point whereby, even with 
only three cases to compare, I would be able to suggest some possible ways in which the distance at 
which violence was undertaken impacted on embodied patterns of ethical intuition.  
Finally, every individual I interviewed had been deployed on active duty. Some, as the empirical 
chapters will indicate, had been on one deployment at the end of the UK’s significant military 
involvement in Afghanistan and had not experienced direct engagement with the enemy. The 
remainder had between one and three tours of duty in both Iraq and Afghanistan during periods of 
intense fighting. The spread of interviewees picked up a range of experiences of the British Army’s 
deployment in both Iraq and Afghanistan over more than 10 years. The purpose of this was also to 
engage with themes surrounding how the Rules of Engagement had transformed during this period, 
culminating with the introduction of Courageous Restraint as an attempt to instil restraint of 
violence, or ‘minimum force’ principle as a component of the soldierly identity.  
 
5.11 Evoking Trauma and the Therapeutic Interview 
When conducting interviews of this type with military personnel on themes related to family, 
deployment and combat, there is the real risk that “given the depth of emotional understanding that 
psycho-social research aims to reach, it risks evoking psychological distress in respondents” (Jervis, 
2011:115). I was constantly vigilant to how I broached topic which I believed had the potential to 
evoke traumatic memories. This was driven by concern for my interview subjects and also my own 
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position as a non-military interviewer. I was acutely aware that it was quite different for an 
‘outsider’ to ask questions related to combat and questions surround the ethics of violence than a 
fellow soldier. During the second section of the interviews where I was asking questions concerning 
experiences relating to utilising violent force and at times the experience of killing itself, I always 
attempted to highlight that there was no obligation to answer these questions and that I was deeply 
grateful for the opportunity to hear their responses. What generally followed were exceptionally 
frank accounts of their experiences in relation to these themes. In many ways I think I benefited 
from approaching this topic area as someone unconnected to the military, as a number of soldiers 
after the interview said it was a meaningful experience in the sense that it was an opportunity for 
them to talk about these things in a way they hadn’t been able to before with their colleagues. This 
may have had something to do with constraints that soldiers may feel amongst each other to 
maintain the soldierly ideal, or that the questions I asked with respect to ethics provoked a set of 
insights into their own behaviours which they hadn’t articulated before.  
Almost all the soldiers were keen that I shared the results of my research with them and two soldiers 
stated that the experience of talking through their experiences of violence proved to be cathartic for 
the reason that I was a non-military individual and that they rarely discussed these things in this type 
of detail, particularly in relation to questions of personal ethics. Perhaps most significantly, I think 
they felt valued and empowered that someone was interested and had taken the time to 
understand their own opinions and experiences.   
 
5.12 Data Analysis  
The interview data itself was recorded and stored electronically and I undertook the process of 
transcribing over a number of months after conducting the interviews themselves. This was a 
conscious decision in relation to the further research I intended to conduct with respect to applying 
Bourdieusian concepts. I felt that a firm understanding of the ontological backdrop to the interview 
data would be crucial to its analysis. I also wanted to return to the words of the soldiers at a distance 
from my own emotional experience. Through the course of the interviews I felt incredibly privileged 
in terms of the honesty and depth of the responses I was given to themes, including the act of killing, 
which were obviously very personal to the soldiers. The impact of the experience was profound and 
as important as that was to me as an individual, I wanted to place some distance between the 
transcription, initial analysis and those emotions as I felt this would reflexively improve my 
interpretation of the data.  
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Transcription and coding took place approximately 6 months after interviewing and I decided to 
undertake this activity across two separate sittings. The two rounds of transcription reflected the 
two main areas in relation to soldier’s experience of ethics. Their experiences in context of the 
institution concerning themes surrounding ethics and symbolic capital; and these institutional ethics 
in relation to the role they potentially played in shaping their ethical conduct in the context of 
combat. Through the course of the transcription I began to code the data initially according to the 
thematic areas I had organised the interview questions around. As the process continued, I revised 
these thematic areas into sub-themes which were identified across interviews. The final 
transcription of data was organised by these coded headings which attempted to locate principal 
themes. Through this process of transcription and coding I also attempted to integrate my field 
notes into the appropriate place according to the coded themes, as well as begin my analysis of the 
data by footnoting my initial observations.  
As mentioned previously, two main questions of reliability of the data presented themselves. Firstly, 
many of the experiences that the soldiers related to me in reference to their experiences in combat 
had sometimes taken place more than 10 years ago which brings into question the reliability of their 
recollection of events. There was also the sense that these were well-repeated narratives. However, 
many of the combat situations that were mentioned could be cross-referenced. Specifically, one 
soldier recalled the injury in an IED attack in Afghanistan and subsequent suicide of his friend. In 
order to examine further details regarding this event, I was able to source press reports on it. The 
likelihood of outright fabrication was low as I found the soldiers I interviewed were not hesitant at 
all to discuss themes which may have been considered embarrassing by the Army, such as the 
likelihood that other soldiers had killed prisoners of war. In addition, Walter Mitty type characters 
are generally abhorred in the military and the fact that my research was to be made available to the 
regiment after its completion, all be it with anonymised data, brought with it a public dimension to 
the interview process.  
 
5.13 Theoretical Paradigm 
The theoretical backdrop and frame for this research employs concepts developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu as a means of explaining the relations between individual soldiers and the organization of 
the military with respect to institutional ethics, ethical conduct and violence. The justifications for 
employing Bourdieu with respect to the research questions have already been mentioned in chapter 
3. However, these concepts and orientating principles have an important part to play in relation to 
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the activity of conducting sociological research. The following section will discuss some themes 
which have direct relevance to this research and the methodological choices that have been made. 
David Swartz (2007:46) identifies 4 principles which guide Bourdieu’s sociological work, and it is with 
respect to these that this section will discuss the development of its own research methodology: 
1. Integrating subjective and objective forms of knowledge. 
2. Constructing sociological research objects. 
3. Thinking relationally. 
4. Using reflexivity.  
The following will examine a number of these themes in relation to this research and some of the 
initial observations mentioned. Reflexivity frames all 4 of the principles which guide Bourdieu’s 
sociological work. The notion of integration of both the subjective and objective forms of knowledge 
ought to be understood in relation to his use of reflexivity as a form of epistemic vigilance. Bourdieu 
rejects scientific positivism and sees the production of sociological knowledge as being a 
combination of the subjective positioning of the researcher. This is essentially inescapable but can 
be reined in through the application of reflexive practices and the application of objective 
knowledge.  This unavoidable integration of subjectivity with the analysis of empirical data includes 
the projection onto the object of study, common sense and pre-existing scientific categories; 
interests determined from one’s professional position and one’s attitude towards the object of 
study- all of which represent distinct value orientations. Only by subjecting these interests, value 
positions and research procedures to critical examination is one able mediate against their potential 
distorting effects (Swartz, 1997:294).  
 
5.14 Spontaneous Sociology 
In order not to fall into the trap of performing what Bourdieu terms ‘spontaneous sociology’, the 
production of fictitious conceptions of the social which are brought about through ones familiarity 
with the social world in which they inhabit, requires a process of continuous polemics against the 
self-evident appearances which mark this familiarity with the social (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, 
Passeron, 1991:13). This call for epistemological vigilance is ever the more necessary as the 
researcher progresses on their research journey. Successful progression of a research project is in 
many ways marked by an increasing sense of familiarity with the empirical, theoretical and historical 
terrain which marks out the constructed boundaries of the research subject. It is this increasing 
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familiarity which both opens up further novel insights but can also produce the sensation of 
encountering immediate knowledge or the spontaneous social fact. This was of concern throughout 
the course of this research project due to my own experiences attempting to enter the military 
reserves, as well as the developing relationships I made with serving and former military personnel. I 
consciously attempted to re-subject my observations to critical analysis in light of this inevitable 
closeness that was developing between myself and the social object I was studying.   
 
5.15 Prenotions  
These ‘spontaneous judgements’ or ‘prenotions’ which give rise to the spontaneous social fact are 
acts whereby consciousness attempts to reconcile itself with itself and are made every day in regard 
to the social world we inhabit. They are ‘schematic, summary representations’ which are ‘formed by 
and for experience’ (Durkheim quoted in Bourdieu et al, 1991:13). Whilst the researcher may 
suppose themselves outside of this process, they never bear a relationship which is one of 
encountering pure knowledge or a singularity in the social fact (ibid). The sensation of the 
immediacy of the social as being given to us in experience, insinuated into sociological discourse 
through common language (Bourdieu et al, 1991:20), requires that the researcher makes the 
conscious effort to break with these “living, singular ‘all too human’ configurations that tend to 
impose themselves as object structures” (Bourdieu et al, 1991:14).  
This break takes place through an epistemological vigilance in relation to our use of the words we 
attach to concepts, the logical critique of ideas and the “radical and methodological challenging of 
appearances” (Bourdieu et al, 1991:15). They warn against a spontaneous sociology which is a form 
of artificialism, which claims that the sociologist can come to understand social facts through private 
reflection which rests on the assumption that an innate knowledge can be derived from familiarity 
with the social world. This insight was of importance in bringing out the embodied dimension of 
ethical conduct in existing work within Military Ethics which treated ethical conduct almost 
exclusively as a deliberative, deontological process. This represented an act of ‘spontaneous 
sociology’ par excellence as this assumption had passed unnoticed and without critical engagement. 
It became increasingly apparent that the experiences of soldiers suggested something more to 
ethical conduct than just a reflective consideration of ethical rules.  
For Bourdieu social facts then “have a constant mode of being, a nature that does not depend on 
individual arbitrariness and from which there derive necessary relationships” (Bourdieu et al, 
1991:15). This is not to say that social facts emerge unmediated as taken by the radical positivist 
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frame, rather it cautions against the sociologist as naïve humanist who “resents as a ‘sociolologistic’ 
or ‘materialist’ reduction every attempt to establish that the meaning of the most personal and 
‘transparent’ actions does not belong to the subject who performs them but to the complete system 
of relations in which and through which they are enacted” (Bourdieu et al, 1991:17). The objective 
dimension in the positivism that Bourdieu advocates is the relations within which the subject is 
located. The task for the sociologist is to systematise and understand these objective relations: 
“The principle of non-consciousness requires one to construct the system of objective 
relations in which individuals are located, which are expressed more adequately in the 
economy or morphology of groups than in subjects’ opinions and declared intentions. Far 
from the description of individual attitudes, opinions and aspirations being able to provide the 
explanatory principle of the functioning of an organisation, it is in understanding of the 
objective logic of the organisation that leads to the principle capable of additionally explaining 
individual attitudes, opinions, and aspirations” (Bourdieu et al, 1991:18) 
This principle provides the initial and perhaps most important methodological precept for this 
research. When encountering the social terrain of the military field through the words of soldiers, it 
is necessary to first attempt to describe the objective logic of the organisation and the field itself in 
order to understand those testimonies. In doing this one must also be vigilant against the tendency, 
both conscious and unconscious, to shape those words and experiences beyond their intended 
meanings to fit the construct itself. This being an act of symbolic violence where significant deviation 
exists between testimony and one’s prior conceptual framing of the organisation. It then becomes 
necessary to return to the initial construct and revise it and return again to the testimonies in light of 
this. This bridging between the objective relations of the organisation as a means to explain the 
intentions of individuals is not however an extreme form of methodological structuralism, as those 
intentions, whilst mediated by objective relations, form the basis of the reproduction of those 
relations through habitus being aligned with the field in which it is located. These relations tend 
towards reproduction, variation, deviation and change.   
Bourdieu reminds us of Poincare’s words that ‘facts do not speak’ (Bourdieu et al, 1991:37) to draw 
our attention to how the social fact is constructed and to caution us against replacing our own 
conceptions with those from the informant’s mouth. In the context of the interview the researcher is 
in a process of interrogating the social fact as well as their own methods. When one refuses or 
forgets that they are engaged in an interrogation they deny they are engaged in an observation that 
presupposes a construction of the social object which gives rise to the sense that one has opted for 
neutrality and is merely observing a fact rather than interrogating a construction (ibid). This leads us 
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to consider the following epistemological hazards that Bourdieu raises in relation to the interview 
setting: 
1. Failure to consciously construct a distance from the real. 
2. Imposition of questions on subjects that their experience does not pose to themselves. 
3. Omission of questions that the subjects’ experiences pose to them. 
4. Confusing questions which the interviewer has posed themselves for questions that the 
interviewee has posed. (Bourdieu et al, 1991:38) 
At the extreme, falling into the trap of the above can lead to the interviewer collecting a fictitious 
discourse which represents nothing more than a set of responses crafted by the subject to cope with 
the context of the interview. A situation where abdication of epistemic privilege “sanctions a 
spontaneous sociology” (ibid). The interview setting which depends on the use of questionnaires and 
coding represents a part of the ongoing conscious and unconscious process of constructing social 
facts (Bourdieu et al, 1991:39). This research has attempted to approach its research area with what 
Bourdieu refers to as the “rigour of the construction of the object” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1997:221). This is the act of constructing socially mundane objects into scientific objects of study and 
taking already socially significant objects and approaching the study of them from novel angles 
(ibid). This research is positioned in respect to both the former and later. The nascent process of 
construction of the object began with respect to questions surrounding Army ethos and its 
significance to soldiers and the institution itself. It was around this time that I began reading and 
considering the concepts Bourdieu had developed- field, capital and habitus. By first considering the 
military as a field, it allowed me to employ a “shorthand” for the type of construction of the social 
object (the military) which would inform my further practical choices regarding the research 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1997:228). The military as a pre-constructed object in the way it has usually 
been previously treated by sociological research, stood as something distinct and outside the ebb 
and flow of civil society. This is evidenced in the way in which work which employs terms such as 
civil-military, militarism etc to pick out the ways in which this social object comes ontologically pre-
packaged and pre-constructed.  
Through taking the military as a field understood relationally in terms of the relations of force 
(power) which “obtain between different social positions…of which struggles over the definition of 
the legitimate form of power are a crucial dimension” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1997:229-30), this 
freed up my initial analysis of the phenomenon of ethos which brought out further considerations of 
how an individual soldier’s embodiment of Army or Regimental ethos was related to questions of 
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social standing and power in within the military field. This relational mode of analysis advocated by 
Bourdieu opened up further insights such as considering the military as a field itself enmeshed in 
relations of power, and the legitimation of that power to the state field. This gradual application of 
these concepts took place very much in the way Bourdieu describes. It was a “protracted and 
exacting task that is accomplished little by little, through a whole series of rectifications and 
amendments” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1997:228).  
One of the main rectifications was the movement away from focussing on ethos to consider the 
broader effect of institutional ethics. This stood as an attempt to understand the codified 
dimensions of ethos. This was achieved through examining ethics in terms of its relation to dominant 
capital forms, and this provided my analysis the possibility of both accounting for the reasons behind 
its codified emergence as well its relationship to soldiers. Along with the concept of field, my initial 
application of the concept of habitus opened-up possible ways of understanding soldier’s experience 
of these institutional ethics in relation to combat. A theme which I had observed early on during my 
engagement with the Army Reserves and initial research on military ethics. Specifically, there 
seemed to be a disconnect between the predominantly deontological way in which ethics was 
conceptualised by the literature and how soldiers implicitly and explicitly talked about ethical 
conduct in combat. Soldiers recalled ethics both as a conscious process as well as something 
embodied and dispositional. The concept of habitus offered the potential of capturing this 
dispositional quality to ethical conduct, and also linking it coherently with the types of institutional 
processes which had led to its recent emergence as a significant discourse in the British Military.  
 
5.16 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide a map and description of the choices, events and some 
details of my own personal biography in order to explain why the research has taken shape in the 
way it has. In providing an ‘autobiography of an idea’, I wished to draw the reader’s attention to 
some of the initial experiences that I had in relation to my attempt to join the Army Reserves (which 
to add, was unsuccessful due to my failure to pass security vetting) as these were perhaps the most 
significant events in terms of the emergence of this research and the direction it took. In particular 
the emotional response I experienced during my participation in the selection process, specifically in 
relation to my desire for an alternative career path and the sense of belonging the Army would 
provide made me acutely primed to pick up on certain salient themes related to Army socialisation 
and the primary group. This provided an intellectual springboard into thinking about further 
questions related to ethos, ethics and the wider question of violence in the Army. Also, the initial 
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contact with the Army which was made as a non-researcher and the associated emotional memories 
that arose from this experience, contributed towards setting a normative trajectory which further 
determined the outcome of this research.  
From this point, my choice of Bourdieu as the theoretical frame for these phenomena provided a 
more substantive academic interrogation of ethics. It assisted in shining a light on a range of 
methodological concerns relating to conducting research, and also made it possible to account for 
ethical conduct as something more than just a deliberative process. Finally, by attempting at least to 
take seriously Bourdieu’s caution against performing spontaneous sociology, I have constantly made 
the effort to approach the Army as the unique social terrain it is, maintaining a sense of curiosity to 
its strangeness. Whilst this work probably wouldn’t sit in a journal in Critical Military Sociology, I 
hope some of the its observations go some way in examining the role ethics play in constituting and 
legitimating state violence, whilst not losing sight of the experiences of the soldiers themselves in 
the sense that the Army plays a primary role in the formation of their sense of self. The meaning that 
soldiers derive from their lives within the Army, with respect to Army Core Values, is this perhaps 
the most important thing that has been lost to the spontaneous sociology present in more critically 
















Chapter 6: War ‘Making’ and the Problem of Violence 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As initially introduced in Chapter 4, the second dimension which explains the emergence of this 
discourse of ethics in the military surrounding violence, is the bringing into being of an ethics of 
violence as symbolically directed towards the soldiers themselves as the carriers of this violence. 
This discourse around an ethics of violence in relation to the soldiers themselves bears similarities 
and distinct differences to the wider project of legitimising state violence. It is a process which is still 
concerned with legitimisation and employs ethics through processes of symbolic violence as a means 
of achieving this. However, it is also tied up with two general problems that have been bound up 
with state-organised violence. Firstly, state militaries and most likely non-state militaries, though the 
empirical record on this remains sparse, have historically faced the problem of how to motivate men 
to engage in violence as resistance to killing has been one of the central, though rarely recognised, 
problems facing these institutions. This resistance to violence will be conceptualised through Randall 
Collin’s (2008) notion of ‘confrontational tension’. Implicitly connected to this the idea that violence 
potentially contravenes individual soldier’s conscious and embodied ethics. It is these themes which 
this chapter will explore.  
The contemporary problem which has emerged in parallel to transformations in modern warfare and 
combat environments is the increasing tendency for combat soldiers in Western militaries to be 
deployed to fight in counterinsurgency (COIN) environments. This distinctly ‘new’ form of warfare 
first conceptualised in the mid-20th Century through the UK and US’s involvement in Malaya and 
Vietnam respectively, presents a complex set of tactical, strategic and implied ethical challenges. 
Namely that soldiers exercise both violence and restraint on that violence. This exists alongside 
increasing levels of media exposure, as well as heightened legal scrutiny of the actions of soldiers in 
war.  
In respect to the research question which asks why a discourse of ethics has emerged over the last 
30 years in the British Military, these factors explain the emergence of this discourse of ethics as a 
response by the Army, Military and connectedly the state. It will also draw attention to how 
operational experiences and the Army’s response to them have shaped the process by which this 
discourse of ethics has emerged in the time period this research is attending to. Ethics stands then 
as both a response to the problem of violence in that it aims to constitute a moral frame for that 
violence that potentially enables soldiers to carry it out, overcoming confrontational tension. It also 
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potentially provides a means of restraining that violence such that it is practically orientated towards 
the strategic objectives of the counterinsurgency, population centric operational environment. It 
also ties into the processes mentioned in chapter 4 which seek to make violence externally 
legitimate with relation to the state. This chapter will take up these themes through examining the 
problem of violence and how the military has tackled this. In particular, it will examine how 
institutional Core Values represent an institutional ethics which has developed as a response to 
these problems, and in the case of the British Army, a response to the operational experiences of the 
1970s in the Northern Irish Conflict. In order to examine these questions this chapter will use a 
selection of responses from the soldiers themselves to complement the historical and theoretical 
material.  
 
6.2 The Problem of Violence 
Violence as subject of sociological analysis, is often normatively bracketed as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This 
takes ‘bad’ violence to arise from ‘bad’ social conditions (gang violence, hooliganism, domestic 
violence etc) and ‘good’ violence falling from the analytical gaze as it is not seen as violence at all 
(Collins, 2008:2). ‘Good’ violence is more often than not, authorized and undertaken by state 
institutions such as the police or military and is a seen as a by-product of the normal social order 
(ibid) (policy, institutional culture etc) rather than a central phenomenon of the social terrain which 
individuals are enmeshed within. In the case of the military, violence is a defining feature of the 
institution and the history of the institution. To understand how the military and in our specific case 
the Army, comes to constitute its formal and informal practices in relation to violence- and this 
emergent discourse on an ethics of violence stands as one of these practices- one needs to attempt 
to understand it as a historical response to what is essentially the problem of violence. This being 
how to overcome confrontational tension (Collins, 2008). This problem can be framed in relation to 
modern military training in that:  
“Western armies have achieved with remarkably consistent success during the 200 years in 
which formal military education has been carried on, (is) to reduce the conduct of war to a set 
of rules and a system of procedures - and thereby to make orderly and rational what is 
essentially chaotic and instinctive” (Keegan, 1983:7) 
Military violence tends also to be idealized whether through media such as war films and 
biographies or the scholarly focus on macro level outcomes of this violence. It is a reasonable level 
of analysis to focus on troop movements and strategic losses/gains, casualty figures, enemy 
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engagements etc. However, these are the by-products of violence rather than the violence itself. 
When the violence finds its way into biography or analysis it is often ‘truncated’ (Collins, 2008:4). 
This truncation compresses the detail and depth of the phenomena, it inevitably misses out on the 
way in which violence “is about the intertwining of human emotions of fear, anger and excitement, 
in ways that run against the conventional morality of normal situations” (ibid).  
Military historians and sociologists have made important steps in terms of drawing our focus in upon 
violence as a social phenomenon rather than a truncated precursor or add-on to something else. 
Archaeological analysis of American Civil War battlefields discovered extremely high rates of loaded 
and multiple-loaded weapons which Grossman (1995) has argued evidences that soldiers were quite 
often unwilling to engage the enemy and would repeatedly load weapons whilst avoiding actually 
firing them in order to maintain the image of soldierly activity in absence of killing. Military 
historians such as Keegan (1983) have sought to provide detail to the experiences of those in battle 
by recomposing individual action as the central aspect of battle. In doing this he brings violence to 
the foreground, understanding it as being: 
“essentially destructive of all Institutional studies; just as it compromises the purity of 
doctrines, it damages the integrity of structures, upsets the balance of relationships, 
interrupts the network of communication which the institutional historian struggles to identify 
and, having identified, to crystallize” (Keegan, 1983:17) 
Although in many ways violence is characterised by the way it pushes against formal characterisation 
through its ‘chaotic and instinctive’ features, it is still a form of interaction between humans and 
within and throughout social structures and institutions. As is often the case when looking towards a 
social phenomenon, we organise it temporally along the lines of cause and effect and position it as 
an emergent relation running through the two main categories which sociology tends to deal with- 
agency and structure (institution). In the case of military violence, we bring into focus both the 
institution of the military, the soldier themselves and significantly, questions of how the enemy itself 
is constructed.  
 
6.3 The Emergence of an Ethics of Violence 
The historical emergence of ethics and values as objects of discourse runs as the direct precursor to 
their codification within the institution of the military itself. As previously introduced, the starting 
point in this regard were The Nuremburg Principles which emerged out of the military tribunals set 
up to address the war crimes of Nazi Germany. They brought into being in a quasi-legal and codified 
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sense, the possibility that soldiers could be considered as morally autonomous and as such legally 
responsible for their actions in the context of war. This was something which had previously been 
absent at least in terms of institutional and legal understandings (United Nations, 1950:375). These 
principles both introduced in a normative legal sense, at the very least, the notion of moral 
responsibility and the possibility that the actions of the individual soldier be judged as morally 
autonomous. Whilst the full implications of this would take decades to be realised, and are still 
ongoing, they did represent a new paradigm in terms of the consideration of soldiers as autonomous 
ethical actors by both wider society and the institution of the Army itself. They both contributed to 
the Laws of Armed Conflict, and normatively shaped ethical thinking in relation to the conduct of 
warfare.  
This initial emergence of ethics did not however represent the first emergence of the ethical 
dimension of soldierly experience. The combat soldier has likely grappled with the deep moral 
implications of combat for a very long time, and perhaps this struggle with the moral significance of 
taking another’s life has grown alongside our increasing social interrelatedness as human beings. The 
social norm which prohibits the taking of human life in most circumstances is one which is a product 
of historical social processes. Norbert Elias sees the existence of norms such as these as being 
products of the ‘civilising process’ (Elias, 1998:51-52). As a result of social functions becoming more 
differentiated over time, the number of functions and people who the individual depends on 
becomes greater. The individual is thus “compelled to regulate his conduct in an increasingly 
differentiated, more even and more stable manner” (ibid). This process not only generates a self-
conscious level of control but also a “blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly 
established” (ibid). As such, according to this account, the degree to which human life becomes 
morally valorised as expressed in relation to the existence of ethical and moral norms is an emergent 
process. Humans have developed over time a resistance to the taking life to a greater degree. 
However, our understandings of soldiers at least from the perspective of formal analysis, as ethically 
autonomous actors, has taken far longer to emerge. The ‘problem of violence’ taken as being the 
resistance to the taking of human life, at times at the expense of one’s own, and the observation of 
this phenomenon amongst combat troops (S.L.A Marshall, 1947; Grossman, 1995:4; King, 2013:62), 
has shaped to a significant degree the other key process of emergence of a discourse of ethics in the 
military.  
Soldiers, despite the effort the military invest in their training, are highly resistant to the idea of 
killing another human being, and at times on the battlefield will die as a result of their failure to 
overcome this resistance (Grossman, 1995:4). Grossman claims that “throughout history the 
majority of men on the battlefield would not attempt to kill the enemy, even to save their own lives 
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or the lives of their friends” (ibid). Commenting on the account of an American mercenary working 
with the Nicaraguan contras whose entire unit deliberately ‘fired high’ at a civilian river launch 
completely missing their target, Grossman states:  
“Without a word being spoken, every soldier who was obliged and trained to fire reverted — 
as millions of others must have over the centuries — to the simple artifice of soldierly 
incompetence…these soldiers took a great and private pleasure in outmanoeuvring those who 
would make them do that which they would not” (Grossman, 1995:15).  
The soldier of the American civil war, whom at the time was the best trained and equipped soldier 
the world has ever seen, demonstrated the same unwillingness to kill:  
“But even while firing in regimental volleys, something was wrong. Terribly, frightfully 
wrong. An average engagement would take place at thirty yards. But instead of mowing 
down hundreds of enemy soldiers in the first minute, regiments killed only one or two 
men per minute. And instead of the enemy formations disintegrating in a hail of lead, 
they stood and exchanged fire for hours on end”. (Grossman, 1995:20).  
The resistance to violence or the resulting inactivity which arises as a result of confrontational 
tension can also be found in posturing in battle, considered as a “bloodless pushing match” 
(Grossman, 1995:13). Historically, the largest losses in battle have occurred when one side pursues 
the other after the battle had been won and the other side were in retreat (ibid). Posturing 
represents one aspect of this resistance to violence and the aim to overcome it is partially the 
history of warfare (ibid). It is also intimately bound up and responsible for contributing to shaping 
the current discourse of on ethics of violence found in both the British Military as well as other state 
militaries. Various evolutions in the technology of violence in warfare can be attributed in part to 
transformations in the spatial modalities of killing. The distancing of the soldier from his/her target 
makes the act of killing easier to undertake. This is not to say that the technological evolution of 
weaponry is principally concerned with distancing to limit resistance to killing, only that were this 
not the case and distancing had no impact on reducing resistance to killing, we would observe a very 
different outcome to warfare. In the context of killing at close range, the act of looking into the eyes 
of another human being and taking their life represents “the single most basic, important, primal, 
and potentially traumatic occurrence of war” (Grossman, 1995:31). In all these moments we see 
Randall’s notion of ‘confrontational tension’ at play as well as the conscious and embodied ethical 
resistance to engaging in a form of violence which has the taking of human life as its object.  
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Anthony King supports the notion that mobilising troops to fight has been a common problem that 
armies encountered. Militaries recognised that the “devastating effect of mechanized fire forced 
their troops to disperse and take cover, but once they had done so it was very difficult to encourage 
them to participate in combat again” (King, 2013:62). The question then is how have various 
militaries addressed this phenomenon which directly challenges their ability to undertake their 
primary institutional aim? Anthony King sees the contemporary army of the 21st century relying less 
on shared social identities through the “appeal(s) to masculine honour, nationalism, ethnicity, and 
patriotic duty in order to encourage participation on the field of battle” (King, 2013:97). He claims 
that unit cohesion and professionalism achieved through modern drills (King, 2006; 2013) have 
replaced these as a means of mobilising troops to fight, transforming combat performance. In 
particular he claims that rather than the soldiers’ ability to resist and fight being “a function of the 
capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid social disintegration” (Shils 
and Janowitz, 1948:281; Siebold, 2007), it is through communication drills, namely, collective 
representations, collective movements, and commands on contact (King, 2006:496) that soldiers 
achieve unit cohesion and are able to fight effectively. It has also been argued that soldiers rarely 
referred to more abstract concepts such as democracy and freedom as motivating factors within 
combat (Stouffer, 1949, quoted in Olsthoorn, 2005:184). This is also supported through interview 
data this research derived whilst spending time with the 2nd Mercian Infantry Regiment, Dragon 
Company: 
“People don’t fight for Queen, and they don’t fight for country, they fight so as not to look like 
a coward in front of their mates- that’s the first reason. When they first stick their head out of 
the parapet it is so they don’t look like a coward, there is no worse thing” (Soldier J, 2016) 
Anthony Burke (2018) draws attention to the primacy of social cohesion in determining battle 
performance or ‘fighting power’. He acknowledges Anthony King’s assertion that professional and 
task cohesion plays a role in battlefield performance, but draws attention to the role emotions 
played in the context of British soldiers in Ulster; “Feeling fear, isolation, and above all, a desire 
to avenge the fallen were also important influences on their operational behaviour” (2018:11). 
He also applies the concept of ‘Mythic Violence’ developed by Ruth Horowitz in her study of 
Chicano street gangs in Chicago- arguing that “the legends and stories shared by gang members 
about their participation in violence” (Horowitz quoted in Burke, 2018:12-13) contributes to 
group cohesion but leads to situations where the group will respond highly aggressively to 
threats. To add to this argument, this notion of mythic violence also provides a morally 
legitimating frame of reference for the violence the group engages in, a means of making moral 
sense of it and normatively supporting it. It also elides to how the death of one’s fellow soldier is 
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also made sense of and morally justified. As Shaw outlines, the problem of life-risk is a matter of 
representation of whether “whether the cause is seen as justifying loss of life; whether the war is 
seen as successful; and how actual casualty incidents are perceived. (Shaw, 2005:80). In absence 
of a justifying cause, the final explanatory recourse for the death of a soldier is in the framing of 
the death as a heroic death, whilst loaded with pathos it is less futile than a death wasted on a 
worthless conflict- in this sense an ethics of violence shapes the heroism of pointless death when 
framed as a sacrifice for the unit/section or military as a whole. Mythic violence justifies violent 
reprisals directed at threats to the group and also elevates heroic death to a virtue. 
Ideology, whether in political or nationalistic forms seems to play a negligible role in motivating 
soldiers to fight with reference to state militaries. The question then is what further resources 
have state militaries employed to overcome this confrontational tension and moral resistance to 
engage in violence? The moment the military focussed their attention on this problem what 
necessarily emerged, however indirectly and implicitly, was a discourse on the ethics of violence 
which sought to overcome this ‘problem of violence’. This emergent ethics of killing or violence 
was rarely identified as such, reflecting perhaps a culture of shame similar to that which has 
marked our understandings of sexuality, which until Freud had gone largely ignored by academic 
thought. This ethics of violence was dressed in the euphemisms of ‘combat motivation’, but at 
the core of it was a discussion of how the institution of the military can effectively encourage a 
human to take another human’s life within the confines of state sanctioned violence. Inherently it 
relates to further problems relating to how the military is able to train individual soldiers to 
overcome confrontational tension (Collins, 2008), as well as the associated moral resistance to 
violence whether conscious or embodied. The moral dimension to this resistance can be 
explained through Collin’s notion of confrontational tension- if we accept that ethical behaviour 
has an embodied dimension then the tension that Collins identifies, arises partially from a 
resistance to contravening moral norms which sanction against violence towards others and the 
taking of life.   
One of the resources which were utilised to answer this complex problem, and serve as a means 
to overcome this tension, were ethics translated and codified into the form of institutional Core 
Values. Considering this as a significant part of this emergent discourse surrounding ethics in the 
military, the following illustrates how other state militaries have sought to codify institutional 
Core Values: 
 
Israel                                       Australia                    Canada                     US Army 
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Mission perseverance         Professionalism        Honesty                    Loyalty 
Responsibility                       Loyalty                        Loyalty                      Duty 
Credibility                              Innovation                 Integrity                    Respect 
Personal example                Courage                      Courage                    Selfless service 
Respect for human life       Integrity                      Fairness                    Honour 
Purity of arms                      Teamwork                  Responsibility          Integrity 
Professionalism                                                                                           Personal courage 
Discipline 
Comradeship 
Sense of mission 
 
Japan                                      Norway                               Germany                           France 
Awareness of mission         Respect                               Loyalty                               Mission 
Individual development     Responsibility                     Duty                                   Discipline 
Fulfilment of                        Courage                               Discipline                           Initiative 
responsibility.                                                                    Valour                                Courage 
Strict observation of                                                        Moral values                     Self-controlled 
discipline.                                                                            Democracy                       force                                                                                             
Strengthening of                                                                                                           Fraternity 
solidarity. 
 
Royal Navy                            Royal Marines                   British Army                     Royal Air force  
Mutual respect                    Humility                              Integrity                            Integrity 
Loyalty                                   Unity                                   Respect                             Mutual respect 
Courage in adversity           Courage                              Loyalty                              Service before self 
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Discipline                               Fortitude                            Courage                            Excellence 
Teamwork                             Unselfishness                    Discipline 
High professional                 Professional                      Selfless commitment 
standards                               standards 
Leadership                            Determination 
Determination                      Adaptability 
‘Can do’ attitude                  Commando 
Sense of humour                  humour 
                                                Cheerfulness                                                                (Robinson, 2008:7)      
A brief comparison of the values different militaries prioritise demonstrates a certain common 
ground. Values such as discipline, courage, fortitude and loyalty appear across a number of 
militaries, and tend to bring out the moral and ethical dimension to the military profession: 
“This frequent use of the language and concepts of virtue gives rise to a highly 
moralized picture of the good fighter. The good fighter not only aims to carry out her 
duties efficiently and within the bounds of legality; she aims to cultivate a set of morally 
admirable character traits such as loyalty, courage, integrity, and trustworthiness.”                                    
(Wolfendale, 2008:166) 
The similarities in the respective value systems in the different militaries examined point to what 
Wolfendale picks out as a ‘moralized’ notion of the soldier. This framing of the virtues of the 
profession in these terms can be situated in the context of significant changes in how states have 
perceived and represented war in the context of the post-1990s. Whilst there were more wars in the 
early 90s than the previous post-war period, they were perceived differently (Shaw, 2005:18), this 
change aligned with the development of the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ or what might 
be framed as ‘humanitarian violence’13. This was the “armed element to humanitarian aid” (Shaw, 
2005:19). Whether this new form of militaristic violence was defensive or offensive, it required that 
each military that adopted this doctrine, internally, moralise the violence itself and one way in which 
this was done was through processes of ethical codification which brought about images of the 
moralized fighter seen previously. 
 
13 For more detailed discussion see 6.6 Humanitarian Violence and the New Western Way of War.  
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6.4 Ethics and the Primary Social Group 
The first moment that militaries implicitly drew ethics into the organisation as a response to this 
problem of violence was through their efforts to overcome this confrontational tension through 
their focus on the central importance of the primary social group in the life of the soldier. Shils and 
Janowitz (1948) and Siebold (2007) claim that “primary group cohesion (peer and leader bonding) 
and secondary group cohesion (organizational and institutional” (Siebold, 2007:286) are crucial in 
understanding how unit cohesion is achieved and also how soldiers are mobilised to fight and kill- 
both in the practical material sense and also as providing a route by which the act of violence in the 
context of war can be morally justified to oneself as a soldier as the agent enacting that violence. As 
Hockey has claimed, the normative or ethical code of the infantry soldier can be summed up by one 
overriding concern, that of ‘looking after your mates’ (Hockey, 1986:123). This centrality of the 
primary social grouping within which soldiers are socially positioned is also identified within an 
interview this researcher conducted with the Head of Personnel for the British Army:  
“The Values and Standards have a multitude of roles, they are there to strengthen cohesion, 
they are there to set an aspiration of how we want people to behave.” (Brigadier John 
Donnely, Head of Personnel, British Army, 2016)  
This first implicit engagement with the question of ethics and values from the standpoint of military 
and associated academic fields was through emphasising the importance of primary group cohesion 
and combat motivation. This proposed relationship draws on the language of ethics and values to 
explain the salience of the interpersonal relationships which form the durable bonds of the primary 
group. The claim that the interpersonal relationships which form primary group cohesion are crucial 
to combat motivation or ‘fighting power’ (Grinker & Spiegel, 1945; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Janowitz 
& Cottrell, 1959; Hockey, 1986; Wong, Kolditz, Millen, and Potter, 2003; Holmes, 2004; Seibold, 
2007) has been made largely consistently within the broad range of disciplines focussing on this 
question, though there have been alternative explanations arguing that the communicative rituals of 
modern drills best explain the formation of the primary group cohesion (King, 2006, 2013). It is 
however hard to conceive that this adequately explains combat motivation were it to exclude 
interpersonal relations from primary group cohesion. 
Others have argued that it is necessary to draw the distinction between the social cohesion of the 
primary group and task cohesion, the latter being “the shared commitment among members to 
achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group” (MacCoun quoted in MacCoun, Kier 
and Belkin, 2004:647). This emphasis on task cohesion and commitment to a common goal claims 
that a commitment to the mission objectives is the best correlate with combat performance, a point 
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they argue is supported by a meta-analysis of numerous empirical studies (MacCoun, Kier and 
Belkin, 2004:648). This claim is in response to the study of US combat soldiers in Iraq by Wong et al 
(2003) which further supported the account of the primacy of the relation between social cohesion 
and combat performance, seeing commitment to mission objectives as being a second order relation 
to performance in combat. Wong drew on numerous interviews with combat soldiers to support 
this, which was subsequently challenged by MacCoun et al, “Even though soldiers believe, in other 
words, that social cohesion explains their own motivations in combat, these beliefs in and of 
themselves are not proof of their own accuracy. The soldiers may simply be telling us what they 
have been told in the past” (2004:650). This critique which discounts the soldier’s own explanations 
seems essential for their own claims concerning the centrality of task cohesion, represents a 
significant symbolic violence to the testimony of the soldiers themselves. Drawing on Bourdieu’s 
own observations on the space of the interview, Schostak understands this notion of symbolic 
violence in the following manner, “It would be a violence for the interviewer as listener to disabuse 
what is confided in those spaces by selective interpretation, by imposing desired meanings that suit 
a particular case, by omitting aspects of what is told and privileging others” (Schostak, 2006:60).  
Whilst a degree of symbolic violence is always inevitable, as we researchers come to the social world 
socially positioned, with particular conceptual means of framing the world, this concern should at 
the very least guide the manner by which we interpret empirical data, and also, make ontological 
claims, as these cannot be divorced from our implicit and ingrained understandings as subjects 
inhabiting the world which we study. Without delving into this debate in further depth, it is enough 
to say that this research will give primacy to the testimonies of soldiers concerning their own 
accounts of what motivates them to engage in combat whilst also arguing that task cohesion- plays a 
second order role in terms of combat motivation. 
Accepting then that interpersonal relationships play a primary role in combat motivation, they rely 
on a number of further factors, in particular the role of training regimes in relation to military 
socialisation. The barracks can be understood as a ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1961), offering a 
totally encompassing provision of a world within its boundaries and “is symbolized by the barrier to 
social intercourse to the outside” (ibid). The unique role of the barracks and regimes of basic training 
contribute to a process of ‘self-mortification’ (Goffman, 161:24), whereby the soldier-recruit is 
‘stripped’ of his prior social arrangements which contribute to the stable conception of self. Invoking 
this state of deliberate disorientation is done for the purpose of socialising in the military identity as 
well as forcing soldiers to seek support from their fellow recruits which contributes directly to the 
formation of the primary social group. Other processes such as the mobilisation of particular notions 
of aggressive masculinity which underpin aspects of the Warrior Ethos; and a closely connected ‘cult 
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of virility’ (Holmes, 2004:46), and notions of ‘heterosexual potency’ (Hockey, 1986:35) also 
contribute to combat motivation.  
Values supplement these processes and are institutionally valorised such that a soldier’s orientation 
towards and acceptance of certain values, forms the basis of the possibility of the formation of these 
interpersonal relations and consequently the orientation towards the primary group. Arguably it is 
difficult to conceive of a platoon, section or unit operating effectively if its soldiers didn’t consider 
worthy in some sense values such as selfless commitment, courage and integrity for example. These 
values come to form a crucial basis by which soldiers form their notions of self and other. They 
measure one another in terms of these values. In effect part of what it means to be a ‘good’ soldier 
is derived by one’s embodiment of these values through concrete actions. Whilst their meanings are 
never completely stable these values operate as crucial referential sources which guide concrete 
ethical conduct at the level of individual soldier. In determining what qualifies as integrity or moral 
courage, soldiers will often refer to these values as one means of eliminating ambiguity in ethically 
complex situations ex-ante, and ex-post as a means of testing the moral legitimacy for one’s act and 
potentially deriving moral legitimation for that act. Interviews with serving infantry soldiers that this 
research conducted, confirmed the role these values play with respect to ex-ante and ex-post 
sources of moral legitimation for the act of killing: 
“If your friends in danger then you are going to fight…It’s to do with the friend next to me who 
you are fighting with…If I know that if I have killed someone, I know that if I hadn’t, he would 
have gone and killed me or one of my friends…I would be feeling ten times worse if he had 
killed one of my friends”. (Soldier B, 2016) 
And also, the direct connection to shaping ethical conduct in the context of combat: 
“Courage, I see that as more moral courage, because physical courage you have anyway. 
Fighting with your friends ties in with respect for others. Courage for me is more like a moral 
courage, to say ‘I don’t think that is right’, like I was saying before about the full screw giving 
the order, it would be up to the Lance Jack to say ‘Are you sure that’s right?’, whether that 
order should be carried out is when moral courage comes into it” (Soldier B, 2016).  
The centrality of values to the shaping of ethical conduct has been acknowledged institutionally by 
the Army itself. It recently created the Brigadier level post of SO1 Ethics, initially occupied by Padre 
Phillip McCormack, who was tasked to ‘maintain and develop the ethical content of doctrine and 
training to Land Forces operations’ (McCormack, 2015:32). Primarily, the outcome of his work 
argued for the need for an ethical grounding to Core Values, on a universalist conception of an 
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ethical good. Brigadier John Donnelly who worked closely with Padre McCormack, outlines the main 
aim of this ethical grounding to the institutional Core Value: 
“I had some input from Phillip in the latest version of Values and Standards, in particular 
Phillip helped define what I’m proposing is the ethical foundation and then the ethical 
principles that come above that. The latest work in Values and Standards is making that 
ethical foundation absolutely explicit…whereas hitherto it was implied- your Values and 
Standards could be about an organisational efficiency, rather than an ethical good…Everyone 
has equal worth- that is the fundamental strapline that we give to the soldiers, that is what I 
am proposing to ECAB (Executive Committee of the Army Board).” (Brigadier John Donnelly, 
Head of Personnel, British Army)  
Given then that values play a significant role in primary group cohesion and also as a crucial source 
in shaping ethical conduct, one must attempt to pick out sociological processes which may explain 
why soldiers orientate themselves towards these values as well as examining how these values come 
to contribute towards shaping ethical conduct.  
 
6.5 Codifying Values 
The role of what are now referred to in the contemporary vernacular of the British Army as Core 
Values can also be understood in a number of further ways. Not only do they contribute to form the 
basis of the social relations at the centre of the lifeworld of soldiers, they also shape both embodied 
ethical conduct and reflective ethical decision making. This deliberative dimension to ethical conduct 
is something which has implicitly shaped the British Military’s specific form of ethical discourse 
around violence. The British Army’s commitment to Aristotelian virtue ethics makes the instinctive 
ethics of character a comfortable frame to discuss wider questions of ethical conduct. The following 
interview response draws attention to this instinctive dimension to ethical conduct in the following: 
 “I don’t think the Army is doing enough to calibrate our instinctive reactions to how we 
confront particular situations. If we sit around and discuss, we will often come round to what I 
call the right answer, but instinctively, and we can talk dramatically about the heat of battle, 
we (can) come up with the wrong answer.” (Soldier J, 2016) 
Core Values form part of a set of moral resources which soldiers refer to deliberatively in order to 
engage in ethical conduct, often as an attempt to overcome and eliminate ambiguity both in the 
context of Army life at home and as well as the operational setting. They also over time shape 
embodied ethical conduct in that many decisions which soldiers take in the context of combat, 
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which would be identified as having an ethical component, take place without conscious ethical 
reflection. It is this emphasis not only on critical moral judgements, but on the embodied and 
intuitive aspect of moral conduct which this research will focus on in Chapter 8. Although conscious 
moral judgements are a valuable focus when considering military and combat ethics, an over 
emphasis on this dimension has foreclosed an attention to the embodied and non-deliberative 
character of ethical conduct.  
The British Army has through the Discipline and Standards Paper (1993) and through evolving 
publications in doctrine (2000; 2010), embarked on an institutional process of codification of these 
values. The practice of codification is to formalise and to adopt formal behaviour (Bourdieu, 
1990:78), it “goes hand in glove with discipline and the normalisation of practices” (Bourdieu, 
1990:80). Bourdieu sees this process of codification as particularly important in situations where 
there is a chance, conflict or hazard (ibid); and that the more dangerous (socially/materially) the 
situation, the greater the degree of codification of a practice (Bourdieu, 1990:78). This institutional 
process undertaken by the Army where corporate values have emerged as a formal aspect of the 
institutional culture, represents an attempt to formalise ethics as a means to “banish the effect of 
vagueness and indeterminacy, boundaries which are badly drawn and divisions which are only 
approximate” (Bourdieu, 1990:82). Head of Personnel in the British Army, Brigadier John Donnelly 
discusses the way in which Army Core Values run the risk of becoming a relative institutional 
morality which potentially leads to moral ‘drift’:  
“5 of them (the Army’s core values, as mentioned previously) you could apply to ISIS or the SS. 
It’s the one, Respect for Others which you can’t apply to them. If you look at Deash- Courage, 
Discipline, Loyalty, Selfless Commitment, Integrity, it’s all there. You cannot argue that they 
have respect for others. Which is why you need an ethical foundation, you can use those 
values to become the rules of the club, and that is about organisational efficiency.  The US 
army had a similar discussion a few years ago on the back of Abu Gharib. If you do not ground 
your Values and Standards in an underpinning ethical good, that everyone has an equal worth, 
inalienable natural rights, you can drift because it becomes rules of the club”. (Brigadier John 
Donnelly, Head of Personnel, British Army, 2016)  
And Padre McCormack, the Army Head of Ethics discusses his own experience of moral drift: 
“Ethical resilience erodes by degrees; it becomes incremental to the extent that you don’t 
notice this. It might seem very difficult for a civilian to understand how this might be so, 
having been the Task Force Senior Chaplain in Helmand in 2009, -I was conscious that I was 
changing, my moral reference points hadn’t changed, but my daily exposure to the realities, of 
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what was in effect, high intensity war. My family picked this up immediately, my family will tell 
you that it took me about a year to ‘return’. I physically came back, but my wife’s husband and 
my son’s father- what they understood me to be like, took time to ‘come back’” (Padre Phillip 
McCormack, Brigadier, SO1, Ethics) 
This notion of ‘moral drift’ framed as an ‘erosion of ethical resilience’ connects one aspect of the 
‘problem’ of violence to this discourse of ethics as well as the possibility of a response to it through 
institutional Core Values which aim at implicitly strengthening moral resilience. Donnelly’s response 
refers to recent attempts by the Army to re-codify Core Values such that they are not founded on a 
relative, institutional morality but rather formalised by taking a universal ethical good as their 
foundation. This represents an effort to banish an indeterminacy which allowed soldiers to take Core 
Values as synonymous with the ‘rules of the club’.  
The experiences of the British Infantry units in Northern Ireland had profound effects on their 
respective operational cultures which in no small way shaped future implicit and explicit processes 
of ethical codification within the military. The first codified institutional response was in the form of 
the Discipline and Standards paper (1993), which can be situated directly as emerging as a response 
to explicit and ongoing concerns around recruit background. It is also necessary to see it also in the 
context of the Army’s recent COIN experience in Northern Ireland, where high levels of unit 
autonomy led to vastly different outcomes in how force was used, impacting on strategic-level COIN 
objectives. Discipline and Standards was the response to a debate which had its origins primarily in 
the Infantry’s experiences in Northern Ireland, however, it would go on through its future iterations 
in Army doctrine to provide a template by which to make sense of questions of ethical conduct and 
their relationship to strategic outcomes in operations.   
Edward Burke (2018) explores these themes in his work which focuses on the ‘bottom-up’ of military 
organisation through the examination of the conduct of small groups of soldiers deployed in the 
context of the Northern Irish war during the years 1971 to 1972. He argues that small infantry units 
experienced high levels of autonomy at the beginning of Op Banner and were permitted to employ 
aggressive, kinetic tactics or more benign approaches, as dictated by their commanders (Burke, 
2018:5). Civil-military tensions for Burke were played out operationally at the unit level, where 
soldiers resented what was perceived as interference in their ability to wage war through the 
attempt to apply the ‘minimum force’ principle in COIN. Senior Army leadership were reluctant to 
punish infractions of standard operating procedures which then created uncertainty amongst 
soldiers as to expected conduct and desired outcomes. This confusion over standards for acceptable 
conduct, principally concerning the scope for deploying violence, had the result that “overly 
137 
 
aggressive groups of soldiers could also be mistaken for high-functioning units with consequently 
had negative consequences for the Army’s overall strategy in Northern Ireland from 1971, namely 
the erosion of the IRA’s capability and support among the Northern Irish population” (2018:5-6). The 
British Army’s operational experiences in Northern Ireland have arguably contributed significantly 
towards the ‘turn’ towards ethics this research describes. Whilst currently seen as an exemplar of a 
successful COIN operation overall, and a continuation of a ‘minimum force’ approach to warfare 
resulting from an Army organisational culture tracing back the Nineteenth Century (Thornton, 2004), 
Burke and also Sanders (2012) see the development of the minimum force principle, or for the 
purposes of this research the restraint principle in conduct ethics, as haphazard in the context of the 
relatively new situation the Army found itself in towards the late 1960s and early 1970s (Sanders, 
2012:465). Operation Motorman, launched on July 31st 1972 (ending December 1st 1972), which 
had the aim of re-taking ‘no-go’ areas in Belfast and other urban centres, illustrated that the 
principle of ‘minimum force’ was still not well-understood and applied at the tactical, unit level. The 
Army’s experiences in Motorman had illustrated quite clearly that “the application of a minimum 
force strategy was possible, but that actually defining the concept of minimum force was highly 
problematic” (Sanders, 2012:485). This mirrors similar questions thee Army has been posing to itself 
through the course of its COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defining the concept of ‘minimum 
force’ at the tactical level, principally in relation to small units, has come to define the current ‘turn’ 
towards ethics that the Army has been articulating through its narratives of restraint on violence and 
explicitly through its codification of ethics initially found in Discipline and Standards (1993) through 
to the emergence of Core Values.  
As mentioned previously, the relationship between the unit level and strategy was articulated in 
Krulak’s (1999) ‘Three Block War’ in the concept of the ‘Strategic Corporal’ in the late 90s. However, 
for the British Army, this relationship between the impact of the actions of semi-autonomous units 
and strategic success in an operation was a lesson that was in the process of being learnt since early 
on in the Northern Irish War, with outcomes which continue to shape Army doctrine today. Burke’s 
argument essentially draws attention to the problem of violence in war and its effects at an 
operational and political level. It is an argument which also implicitly draws in considerations of the 
types of problems that Shaw poses (2005) related to ‘global surveillance’ and war fighting (Shaw, 
2005).  
Burkes goes on to explicitly draw out the tension between an ethics of violence and an ethics of 
restraint on violence which this thesis has discussed elsewhere. He argues that small unit cohesion, 
which is necessary for battlefield effectiveness, can lead to acts of deviancy where a “units desire to 
assert its absolute physical dominance area of operations and/or over rival groups of young men is 
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not contained or tempered by the wider institution, the Army, to which they belong” (2018:14-15). 
This is a situation where the unit is threatened by an immediate danger and reverts into the 
construction of a micro or communitarian ethics, which morally justifies reprisal type violence. Burke 
clearly acknowledges this fundamental ‘problem of violence’ and tension between an ethics of 
violence and an ethics of restraint on that violence, “the Army seeks to foster group cohesion in 
small units but then may fail to limit its growth to a state of group hyper-investment, resulting in 
deviant behaviour that works against the military interest” (2018:14-15). The roots of this micro-
ethics for Burke can be found partly in the unit’s narratives around violence and the role these play 
in supporting primary group cohesion.  
As mentioned previously, the initial first steps in this process of codification were taken in the late 
1980s/early 90s against the backdrop of operational experiences in Northern Ireland, however they 
were framed by the Army themselves as a response to fears of a disintegration in the moral fabric 
and culture of the British Army resulting largely from perceived changes in the ‘moral backgrounds’ 
of recruits. A view which is still prevalent today in senior officers such as the ones this researcher 
spoke to and represents a continual theme within the institutions culture and history, predating its 
explicit reference in Army doctrine in the 1980s. This continual emphasis on recruit background and 
character reflects the British Army’s emphasis on virtue ethics, but also has historically been the 
means by which the Army has come to tackle the concrete tactical and strategic problems related to 
ethical conduct. The tacit claim underpinning this emphasis on character is that if the character of 
the soldier correctly is shaped correctly, virtuous moral behaviour will follow; and the desired 
outcomes in combat will follow also. Core Values are perceived as a means of shaping moral 
deficiencies or shortcomings in recruits and are often framed in relation to class perceptions 
concerning their backgrounds: 
“The Values and Standards have a multitude of roles... I recognise we recruit people, some of 
whom have not been exposed to some of these concepts, that doesn’t mean to say they are 
not capable of following them” (Brigadier John Donnely, Head of Personnel, British Army)  
And: 
“A misunderstanding of the notion of loyalty can lead a soldier to doing the wrong 
thing…(t)hat is a difficult thing to get through to a young lad that has grown up as a football 
lout possibly, an inherently tribal culture.” (Soldier J, 2016) 
The focus of the first attempt at a codification of ethics in the form of institutional core values was 
the Discipline and Standards paper (Wilkes, 1993), which was clearly self-identified as a means of 
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addressing at least a perception that some change had occurred with respect to the ‘moral 
background’ of recruits: 
“The Army’s code of conduct has not reflected the recent change in accepted standards of 
personal behaviour in society at large. We have tended to rely on those joining and serving in 
the Army having an innate understanding of what is acceptable and what is not” Discipline 
and Standards Paper. (Wilkes, 1993:1) 
Regardless of whether one accepts the claim that recruit backgrounds and standards had changed in 
some manner at that point, it is certainly clear that the Army perceived it as such: “Sergeants were 
also dismayed at the change in the recruits they were getting since about 1987. (Right across the 
Army almost everyone puts their finger on that year, although nobody can give a satisfactory 
explanation)” (Beevor, 1991:xxii). This was the background to which initial attempts to codify these 
values emerged: “In these circumstances, it becomes yet more important to define and justify the 
standards which the Army deems it essential to maintain” (Wilkes, 1993:2). The response at the time 
to the introduction of Discipline and Standards, was less than sympathetic amongst rank and file 
soldiers. A former Major in the Parachute Regiment, who was a junior soldier at the time Discipline 
and Standards was released, expressed his reaction to it: 
“With a huge helping of disbelief…a bit disdain…and very cynically I think…Because the people 
writing this and telling you how to behave weren’t necessarily the role models you would have 
chosen…Who are you to tell me how to behave…I think most people felt it was belittling” 
(Soldier A, 2015) 
The reasons prompting this need to establish a greater clarity concerning institutional 
understandings of values was couched in the perceived threat to primary group cohesion as a means 
to battlefield efficiency, still implicitly conceived in terms of combat motivation rather than the 
notion of ethical conduct within combat:  
“The service aims to foster group cohesion within a structured chain of command, which is 
such a decisive factor in battle; but by its very nature, such cohesion can be destroyed quickly 
where there is a loss of trust or confidence” (Discipline and Standards, Wilkes, 1993:4) 
This paper led to the first example of the inclusion of Core Values within Army doctrine in 2000, 
framed as the ‘Moral Component of Fighting Power’ (Army Doctrine Publication Volume 5-
Soldiering: The Military Covenant, 2000). Whilst this document still largely focusses on the functional 
role values have in relation to combat motivation, it also begins to draw out the possible role they 
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play as a means to shaping ethical conduct implied within the bringing about off ‘conditions for 
lasting peace’: 
“However, consistent and sustainable national strategy, and true and enduring success on 
operations depend on moral strength- in war on moral dominance over an enemy- not just to 
overcome the adversary, but to establish the conditions for lasting peace. Enduring moral 
strength requires inner qualities in all soldiers” (Army Doctrine Publication Volume 5-
Soldiering: The Military Covenant, 2000:1-3) 
Codified values have been mobilised by the British Army in different ways and for different purposes 
over the last 30 years. This institutional ‘turn’ to values and implicitly ethics has also been shaped 
through responses to pressures external to the Army. Arising out of the 1995 Bett Review, the 
personnel management for the armed forces were centralised, precipitating a sense of profound 
shock, specifically that the Army was aligned with the RAF. Further there was the growing influence 
of managerialism in the form of human resource management, a discrete management discipline 
that was being taught and adopted throughout the private sector and was beginning to gain a 
foothold in terms of management practices within the Army. This was observable through the 
introduction of concepts such as ‘duty of care’ and ‘health and safety’, under government oversight 
(Mileham, 2016). These pressures pushing for reform at various levels of the organisation prompted 
responses which demonstrated the sense that the institutional culture of the Army had been 
threatened in some way. In 1996, the Executive Committee of the Army (ECAB) published a paper 
titled, “The Extent to which the Army has the Right to be Different” (ECAB, 1996), which mobilised 
terminology of values in the form of ethos, first referred to in the Discipline and Standards Paper. 
This perceived threat from outside interference was mentioned explicitly against the backdrop of 
‘equal opportunities’ and ‘health and safety’ and the increasing tendency of parliament to impose 
changes:  
“there is a tendency for the differences between the Army’s imposed standards and those 
prevailing outside to widen…More importantly, there is also a risk that external social and 
legal pressures for change, sometimes prompted by the increased visibility of its differences, 
will unwittingly be allowed by those who regulate the Army, i.e. Parliament, to undermine not 
just peripheral but also core values of military ethos” (ECAB, 1996:6) 
Clearly Army culture and values were perceived to be threatened and the response was a process of 
further codification of those institutional values as a means of preserving the Army’s self-identified 
exceptionalism. Largely these attempts at codification have focussed on the formation of an ethics 
of military service distinct through omission from any explicit notion of an operational setting. Most 
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articulations have been limited to explaining values as foundational to the ‘Moral Component’ of 
‘Fighting Power’ through their role in providing moral cohesion (Army Doctrine Publications- 
Operations, 2010:2-16). Whilst there is a short reference to their contribution to ethical conduct and 
its relation to the operational environment (Army Doctrine Publications- Operations, 2010:2-11), 
when they are explained at length it is in terms of their contribution to a definition of operational 
effectiveness, in terms of defeating the enemy through the application of force where the ethical 
component is conceived of as either an imperative or strategic feature. Consideration of them as 
being crucial resources in shaping ethical conduct in the operational setting has been largely absent 
(Army Doctrine Publications- Operations, 2010:2-19), falling back on explaining them in reference to 
their role in maintaining strong peer relations.  
This reflects what Patrick Mileham identified as an absence of engagement by both formal and 
historical military literature with the ‘moral dynamics’ of military power (2008:46). This is not to say 
that the Army has been wholly ignorant to these questions. In parallel with the institutional 
emergence of values as central to the corporate culture, there has also been a slow but emerging 
engagement with the question of the ethical component of military capability by the Army itself, 
amongst others, a Royal College of Defence Studies Seminar was convened to examine this question 
in 2011. The following section examines how recent transformations in how Western states conceive 
of and fight war, have also contributed to this ongoing ethical ‘turn’.  
 
6.6 Humanitarian Violence and the New Western Way of War 
The development of understandings of the ‘moral dynamics’ of military force also can be situated in 
the broader changes in how the use of military force is understood in the context of the post-1989 
operational contexts. In contrast to RMA advocates who argue that technological and strategic 
advancements are driving revolutionary change in how wars are fought by the West, Shaw see’s the 
‘new Western way of war’ (Shaw, 2005:4) as being shaped predominantly by broader social and 
political forces. Specifically, as a response to the moral degeneracy of 20th Century warfare which 
consciously targeted civilians as part of strategy. Chartering a course from the allied bombing 
campaigns of WW2 which targeted the civilian populations of Germany and Japan to the apex of this 
logic found in the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), Shaw points to its self-defeating 
quality when considering warfare as a means of policy, “in reaching this limit, war also negated itself. 
If there were no longer internal constraints, and war became absolute destruction, it also became 
self-defeating as a means of policy” (Shaw, 2005:5). This acknowledgement of the self-defeating 
quality of absolute war as policy was also the recognition that it could not be morally sustained in 
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the eyes of the domestic populations who were asked to support these conflicts. Not only did 
absolute war come to be morally rejected by the public, limited war of the type fought in Vietnam 
also became problematic and represented a watershed moment (Shaw, 2005:6) in the development 
of a ‘new Western way of war’. The public perception of the huge human costs of the Vietnam War 
in terms of American lives (and less so in terms of Vietnamese, though this certainly played a part in 
the criticisms of its conduct), as well as the political cost to three successive administrations raised 
the fundamental question (Shaw, 2005:7) of how war could continue to be used to forward policy 
and remain legitimate in the eyes of the domestic population. It fundamentally demanded a 
response which re-legitimated war.  
As mentioned, war for ‘liberal democracies’, in principle must not violate the rule that the state has 
the monopoly over legitimate violence. Vietnam and the contradictions of absolute war invalidated 
not only its possible use as a part of policy, but also challenged the states claim to the monopoly 
over legitimate violence- in the case of Vietnam, the first order cost of this was felt at the ballot box. 
Legitimacy is not only measured in terms of how the violence is directed towards one’s enemy’s but 
also in the cost of that violence to the one’s own soldiers and civilians. In the context of the Vietnam 
War, the stated policy objectives were unaligned with the human cost in terms of American lives 
(and less so Vietnamese) which resulted in the war being viewed as illegitimate at a moral level by 
the public. M.A.D with the absurdity of war-gammed outcomes which saw almost 80% of the world’s 
population dead and dying in a full nuclear exchange, further eroded the claim to legitimate violence 
by the state. Risk-transfer as Shaw describes it (Shaw, 2005:1) represents a fundamental shift in 
western risk-strategy for warfare and is one of the defining characteristics of this new Western way 
of war. It explicitly attempts to minimize risk to western soldiers at the expense of the lives of the 
enemy combatants as well as the civilian inhabitants in the theatre of operations. This transfer of 
risk away from soldiers and onto enemy and civilians represents a development in Western military 
strategy that fundamentally underpins the ongoing effort to legitimise war in the eyes of the 
domestic body politic.  
The new Western way of war was partially a means to legitimise warfare at the moral level, an ethics 
of violence necessarily had to develop to support this at the level of the military field. If risk is 
transferred onto the enemy and civilians, away from soldiers, this risk must be framed as morally 
acceptable and necessary for domestic populations. It is through an ethics of violence and now 
restraint that this becomes a possibility. 
Shaw (2005:9) picks out the UK’s campaign in the Falklands/Las Malvinas as being a turning point in 
the development of the ‘new Western way of war’ in that it demonstrated that limited wars could 
143 
 
be fought successfully without incurring mass-causalities. It also showed that political leaders had 
learned lessons from the US’s experience in Vietnam regarding the criticality of controlled media 
coverage. The British government prevented journalists from accessing the war zone and controlled 
satellite relays to delay transmission of images of the war (Ibid). The UK’s management of the media 
in the Falklands for Shaw, represented ‘a virtuous circle’ “influencing media coverage to produce 
positive reporting, which reinforced public support for the war, which in turn reinforced the 
tendency of journalists to report within a framework which legitimated the war” (2005:11).  
Media coverage represents an aspect of ‘global surveillance’ which is the set of institutions which 
are presumptively negative towards war (Shaw, 2005:72-73) and seeks to circumscribe its legitimacy. 
Along with the media this also includes international organisations such as the International Criminal 
Court. In contrast to other armed actors, Western governments need to pay close attention to the 
problems brought about by this network of global surveillance such as the tendency for publics to be 
more averse to the fighting of wars due to experiences shaped through World War 2, Vietnam and 
the Cold War: “global surveillance remains omnipresent, and all Western wars have to be prepared 
in that light” (Shaw, 2005:75-76). Part of the preparation and prosecution of war under the gaze of 
global surveillance, with its associated penalties, is the maintenance of the ethical discourse of the 
legitimacy of the violence enacted by soldiers Framed via the Rules of Armed Conflict and 
constrained by the various internal ethical discourses that have been enacted by various state 
militaries, the partial objective is to make violence ethical and palatable through the lens of global 
surveillance. 
Alongside the constant necessity to manage global surveillance is the requirement that wars 
themselves must be limited, “the bottom line was that it must not damage polity, economy or 
society to any significant extent” (Shaw, 2005:72-73). In this sense the ethical framing and discourse 
which is maintained around military violence must feature in this logic also as a means of 
maintaining the states claim over legitimate violence. To add to Shaw’s argument concerning limited 
risk, the violence itself must be framed in such a way, ethically that moral responsibility for the 
violence is the burden of the enemy and the victim. The violence is restrained, constrained and 
reactive (in line with COIN principles) with regards the enemy. When civilians do die, it is accidental 
and unfortunate rather than being a directly caused of the actions of individual soldiers- morally 
culpability is transferred.   
Narratives of ethical violence are essential to these forms of Western intervention as a mode of 
what Duffield refers to as ‘global governance’ (Duffield quoted in Shaw, 2005:53), characterised by 
‘liberal strategic complexes’ encompassing state and non-state actors: NGOs, multilateral agencies, 
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military establishments, the corporate sector and academics (Shaw, 2005:53). The ethical framing of 
the New Western Way of War (Shaw, 2005:67) is that civilian deaths are incidental to the violence 
rather than a central outcome of it. This moral logic must be maintained at the level of the soldier in 
terms of the continuing ethical discourse on the restraint of violence. The current provision of an 
ethical framework for violence conducted at this level allows the soldier, in principle at least, to 
develop deontological rules which support the violence in its moral sense. Where civilian casualties 
result from military violence, the soldier has a potential recourse to self-justify the outcome of the 
violence, also in respect to managing the constraints put in place by the regimes of global 
surveillance. This ethics of restraint provides a moral framework of justification for those civilian 
deaths. If the military and government can provide a compelling moral narrative of restrained 
violence, then the deaths, though tragic, are justifiable morally. This is in essence ‘humanitarian 
violence’.    
Shaw also argues that this new type of war must be time limited (2005:76-77). By separating 
counterinsurgency as a phase distinct from ‘the war’ means that the war can be claimed to have 
ended whilst bracketing off COIN operations as the maintenance of the peace.  The imperative that 
violence can be framed as morally legitimate is still a necessity in this phase of war. Also, the 
violence in counterinsurgency is an activity which often occurs in parallel to reconstruction activities 
and peacebuilding which further place the legitimacy requirement on that violence. In the case of 
when formal conflict is announced as over and the ‘exit strategy’ is put in place, the background 
rationale for violence changes and there is an even greater discursive demand that violence is 
framed as limited and ethically justified. Counterinsurgency is the strategy that fills this gap in the 
continuous exit from conflict; underpinning this is the ethics of restraint on militaristic violence 
which is fundamental to this strategy in light of both the requirements that are in place due to global 
surveillance and also at the interpersonal level of the soldiers that are required to undertake that 
violence. 
What Shaw omits to discuss, though his argument applies in a slightly altered form, is how legitimacy 
is also sustained in face-to-face combat between soldiers and enemy combatants and the deaths of 
civilians as a result of this violence. Where the results of violence cannot be sanitized whether 
civilian deaths or the death or injury of military personnel, the root cause which is the violence takes 
centre stage as the justification for its own outcomes- ideology and rational for war is no longer 
needed. Ethical and heroic violence sustain and justifies its outcomes. The ethical discourse 
proceeds in the following way; the violence was ethical as it was restrained, necessary and in-line 
with international rules of armed conflict, therefore the outcomes, however terrible maintain their 
legitimacy. When Shaw was writing, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were in their nascency, as 
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they progressed there was less of a reliance on ‘precision’ airpower and more on counterinsurgency 
and traditional kinetic operations. Under the conditions of global surveillance, it become harder to 
legitimise this form of violence as ‘precise’ The violence then must be legitimised via different 
discursive routes and ethical framings of restrained and reactive violence were a means to do this. 
These ethics could never rely on an appeal to ideology or the justness of the conflict as public 
opinion was too far opposed. Therefore, the legitimacy of violence must be sustained by an ethical 
framing of the violence itself. An ethics of restraint which underpinned the developing discourse of 
an ethics militaristic violence in this context, no longer needed anything else to provide its 
legitimacy. The violence was by definition legitimate if it was restrained and in response to 
significant threat, the rationale for the military presence in the theatre of operations becomes 
beside the point. It was made more palatable to public consumption through its framing as heroic 
violence.  
The precision of violence for Shaw (2005:88) is critical to the maintenance of legitimacy in this ‘new 
Western way of war’. For him “Precision makes war seem efficient in achieving delimited political 
goals…Precision subsumes the violence of war under its rational schema”. Moreover, his ‘rational 
schema’ relies on an ethics of restraint of violence to support it and this represents a significant step 
in this ‘turn’ towards ethics in war. The deployment of ‘precision weaponry’, whether the end results 
are ‘precise’ or not- and one must remember that military planners are aware that these weapons 
still run the risk of causing indiscriminate civilian casualties, relies also on a discursive framing of 
restrained violence. Violence in this new way of Western war, at all levels of spatiality must be 
attempted to be brought under an ethics of restraint on that violence. The principle deontological 
rule underpinning this ‘ethical turn’ which marks the New Western Way of War is that whilst the 
outcomes of the violence themselves may still cause civilian deaths (and of course the deaths of 
enemy combatants), that violence can satisfy the moral rule as ‘just’ if the conduct can be framed as 
restrained. It is essentially the moral maxim that violence in the context of the New Western Way of 
War is just if the violence is restrained in motivation and conduct, regardless of the outcomes of that 
violence. Shaw rightly picks out distanced killing, via ‘precision weapons’ as being fundamental to 
maintaining this form of what is essentially moral legitimacy. Violence deployed at the level of 
infantry soldier as can also framed under this ‘rational schema’ as ‘precise’ in that it strives, 






6.7 Ethics and the Modern Operational Setting 
‘Humanitarian violence’ and the ongoing process of ethical codification of that violence has been 
significantly informed and shaped through the experiences of the institution of the British Army in 
the operational contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan, again a further articulation of the ‘problem of 
violence’. This can be framed as a secondary stage of codification in that it is distinct from previous 
institutional representations of values as core to corporate culture and connectedly a resource for 
combat motivation. Current Army discourse on values has shifted to be predominantly informed by 
the very distinct ethical complexities which have characterised these recent deployments and which 
have precipitated a moment of indeterminacy and contradiction. However, this current framing of 
ethics can also partially be taken back to the British Army’s experiences in Northern Ireland. Notions 
of external moral scrutiny, as well as the inherent ethical complexities of undertaking operations on 
‘sovereign’ territory, were becoming salient due to the increasing media exposure as well as 
internally concerning the questions around how to successfully apply the ‘minimum force’ principle 
in the Northern Irish COIN setting. These are reflected in the comments of a former Parachute 
Regiment Major that was interviewed for this research who had numerous deployments in Northern 
Ireland throughout the 90s: 
“You have got to take the local public along with you, so it is hearts and minds, people talked 
about hearts and minds but didn’t really understand what it was all about. Every action has a 
reaction and you have to make sure that your actions are the right ones or at least can be 
described positively, otherwise your actions can be played back in a different way, sound-
bitted to suite someone else’s needs. We became very aware, very conscious that if someone 
from the press spoke to you, they might not be on your side. Northern Ireland shaped this” 
(Soldier A, 2015). 
This effect of the external observation, or ‘global surveillance’, and scrutiny of soldier’s actions finds 
its expression in reactions to the prosecution of Sgt Blackman for killing a Taliban prisoner of war. 
The notion that certain ethical outcomes are guided by the potential for being observed and 
subsequently held accountable, is still arguably a defining feature of soldierly role morality and 
ethics as Soldier J identifies: 
“I think there are a few situations where we have reaped the whirlwind, with the likes of Sgt 
Blackman, but, and I am speaking with no knowledge at all but those are the guys we caught, 
and I think there are things like that happening under fire. You show young lads the Sgt 
Blackman video and you ask them what did they learn from that, and they say, ‘turn off your 
helmet cam’.” (Soldier J, 2016) 
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Largely these processes of formalisation and codification have focussed on an understanding of 
ethics related to military service rather than an explicit reference to operational ethics. The reason 
for this is the space between the external contingencies which are pushing this ethical discourse and 
institutionally embedded understandings of ethics and connectedly values. There exists an inherent 
tension between an ethics of violence which shapes aspects of the Army’s current codification of an 
ethics of military service, and an ethics of restraint which is implied in the types of ethical 
evaluations necessitated in the COIN operational environment and within the context of 
‘humanitarian interventions’. This view is reflected in the following response from the Army’s Head 
of Personnel: 
“An officer has two functions in the army, to inspire and to restrain. There are loads of 
examples of inspiring, there are fewer of restraint as I imagine they are not immediately 
apparent. The role is to restrain, and say stop, that is not appropriate.” (Brigadier John 
Donnelly, Head of Personnel, British Army)  
In many ways the ethical imperatives of this relatively new operational environment in which the 
British Army increasingly finds itself, run in distinct opposition to the implicit values and ethical 
assumptions that the Army has formed over the experiences fighting and preparing for conventional 
statist conceptions of warfare. This current effort at the ‘symbolic ordering’ of ethics can be taken as 
a response to the indeterminacy and hazard which has been recognised through recent operational 
experiences, necessitating the disciplining of violence and connectedly ethical conduct. The jus in 
bello/jus post bellum distinction carried through international legal conventions such as the Geneva 
Convention, has largely informed implicit and explicit understandings of conduct ethics in warfare 
and post-conflict environments at both the level of institution and individual soldier. This bipartite 
conception of ethical conduct can be displayed in the following manner:                                                            
 The Two Ethical Environments 





Internal War Enemy Maximum Force Military Necessity 
Criminal Justice Suspect Minimum Force Law and Order 
                                                                                                                                   (Dowdall & Smith, 2010:38) 
The COIN environment sees both these ethical terrains at times as being cotemporaneous with 
combat. Soldiers, whether NCOs or Officers, are continuously faced with complex ethical situations 
which concern issues of discrimination and the proportionality of force. Not only do these decisions 
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have strong moral implications in of themselves for the individual soldier and the Army; ethical 
conduct is also an operational behaviour with strategic affects. Current explicit institutional 
articulations of Army values and associated ethics are in part a means to ensure unit cohesion and 
enable fighting power at the level of individual soldier. This ethics of violence which has been at the 
core of the ethics of military service, runs at times in opposition to an ethics of restraint which is 
implied in the COIN environment. The US military Field Manual comes very close to articulating this 
new ethics, through its commentary on the paradoxes of the COIN environment: 
• Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. 
• Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is. 
• The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the 
more risk must be accepted.  
• Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. (quoted in Pavlischek, 2009:21) 
The moral or ethical dimension of military power must be considered both as a moral imperative, in 
that there is the desire soldiers to do the ‘right’ thing, and also as a central pillar of military doctrine. 
Ethical conduct at the level of every rank can have wide and far reaching implications for strategic 
outcome of an operation, as such it has a parallel tactical and strategic component. There is nothing 
new in this claim and it is implied in many of the observations made concerning the COIN 
operational environment (Krulak, 1999; Dowdall & Smith, 2010). If we accept this, then it should 
lead us to consider with far more depth and attention the question of ethical ‘education’ in the 
military. From the first day a soldier embarks on their training much of the attention of the 
institution is rightly focussed on training the new recruit to perform their primary function of 
soldiering, through socialisation into the military, weapons handling, tactics etc. Whilst it is possible 
to identify an ethical hue to a number of different training contexts, ethical ‘education’ in the 
military is considered distinct from these as evidenced in a Navy command report, “While military 
training can prepare individuals for likely scenarios, education helps to develop skills and insights 
that can be applied in complex situations that present unexpected challenges or which are simply 
beyond the scope of training” (Navy Command Headquarters, 2014:9). This distinction between 
military training and ethical education arises from the prevalent account within military 
understandings of ethics, that sound ethical conduct is accompanied by sound moral judgement 
which is deliberative in nature. This appears to exclude the notion of soldierly skill acquisition which 
is trained, developed and matures into an intuitive response14. 
 
14 This theme will be taken up in greater depth in Chapter 8. 
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The current trend in the study of military ethics and the view taken by the British Army is that ethical 
conduct at the level of junior soldiers and NCOs is largely derived from ‘sound’ moral leadership 
from the commissioned ranks, as such, what might qualify as ‘ethical education’ in the British Army 
is more often than not focussed at these ranks (Wolfendale, 2008:168). The hope has been that 
moral leadership will ‘drip down’ through some poorly understood process of socialisation and 
consequently shape and influence the ethical conduct of lower ranks. As mentioned previously, 
ethical conduct is often considered as a deliberative process whereby soldiers engage in acts of 
conscious decision making when faced with ethically ambiguous situations. Whilst there have been 
recommendations that military training integrate the ethical dimension (Bumbuc, Ş. & Macovei, C, 
2015:557), there is still a continued emphasis on reflective judgements as being the sole hallmark of 
ethical conduct and this has clear implications for how ethics are conceptualised, operationalised 
and ‘taught’.  
The British Army has generally eschewed formal ethical education preferring a particular type of 
virtue ethics, whereby the character of the soldier is shaped such that correct ethical conduct 
follows, though the process by which this occurs, or even evidence supporting this claim is generally 
absent. However, paradoxically in the few Army classroom discussions of concrete ethical problems, 
there is still the tendency to conceive of ethics training as a process which can be taken from the 
classroom, in which ethical dilemmas are debated, to the battlefield. This is obviously part of the 
picture, but what has perhaps received far less attention is a focus on junior soldiers as autonomous 
ethical agents and the role of embodied ethical conduct. That being the notion that soldiers can 
engage in ethical conduct in a non-reflective way, ethics under this reading is also a dispositional 
feature of a soldier’s habitus. Finally, by considering ethics in this way it allows us to ask the question 
of what constitutes ethical expertise, is it the ability to reason and act in an ethically sophisticated 
fashion or the moral quality of the outcome of the act? Most importantly perhaps, if we treat values 
as important resources which potentially shape ethical conduct, why do soldiers orientate 
themselves towards them or not, and what sociological processes may explain these processes? 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified one of the essential problems that militaries have faced with respect to 
the conduct of war as being the problem of violence. The resistance to violence as expressed 
through confrontational tension founded upon moral resistance to the act itself. This problem of 
violence has transformed as war itself has transformed becoming not only a problem concerning 
how to motivate men to engage in violence but also restrain that violence and present that violence 
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through the lens of ‘global surveillance’. This is a defining strategic requirement of the COIN 
operational setting as well as the broader requirement the state violence itself is restrained such 
that it does not disintegrate into illegitimate violence threatening the states claim over their 
monopoly over legitimate violence. The state has responded to this problem of violence initially 
through the emergence of the Nuremburg Principles and Laws of Armed Conflict, to restrain violence 
in its broadest sense. This ongoing process of codification and symbolic ordering of violence by the 
state and military has recently in the case of the British Army sought to codify institutional Core 
Values as an institutional ethics. The aim of which has been to both enable violence through the 
development of the social bonds of the primary group and also restrain that violence, as recently 
evidenced through its attempts to found this ethics of violence on a universal moral good. The 
background to this with respect to the British Army can be found in their experiences in the 
operational context of the Northern Irish war, specifically the problem of defining and implementing 
the ‘minimum force’ requirement at the level of highly autonomous units. More broadly it identified 
1989 as a turning point in global conflict with the emergence of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention which also drove this ethical ‘turn’ in framings of militaristic violence. Finally, this 
ongoing and unfinished working-upon of ethics as a means to ‘make’ war is essentially connected 
into the project of ‘making’ the state in that it supports the states’ claim to the monopoly over the 















Chapter 7: Core Values and Symbolic Capital 
 
7.1 Introduction 
“A sense of belonging may sound like a small thing. Yet it fuels you as much as food and water, 
because it doesn't just feed your body, it feeds your mind and soul. 
Sure, you could look for belonging in a football team or club, but the sense of belonging you'll 
find in the Army - well, that's the next level. When you've trained together side by side, learnt 
things no classroom can teach you and fought with each other, for each other - that creates a 
bond like no other. A bond that lasts a lifetime.” (British Army Recruitment Website, 2018) 
The above quote is taken from the British Army’s recent recruitment drive titled ‘This is Belonging’. 
The campaign itself provoked numerous critiques ranging from the opinion that Army advertising ‘is 
not about being nice’ it’s about ‘fighting power’ against the ‘Queens enemies’ (Major General Tim 
Cross, Radio 4 Todays Programme quoted in The Big Issue, 2018) to the pacifist Quaker argument 
that war fighting is the exact opposite of belonging- no one belongs in front of or behind a gun (The 
Big Issue, 2018). Both these critiques are emblematic of two broad yet distinct ways of coming to 
look at this recruitment campaign. Either from a militaristic or anti-militaristic standpoint. However, 
they do share something in common in that they agree that the focus of the campaign is on 
something other than warfare. The Army’s choice in focussing on ‘belonging’ is indicative of 
something more than a slickly produced marketing strategy to target socially marginalised working-
class males though that is certainly a part of it.  
In many respects this advertising campaign represents a further step along an ongoing process by 
which violence is symbolically constituted by the Army through its institutional ethics. Belonging 
speaks to recognition, and what this research will identify as an ethics of recognition, which is the 
foundational ethics of the British Army and the military field and is expressed through codified 
corporate Core Values. This ethics of recognition can only be understood in relation to how violence 
is socially constructed by the Army, involved in ongoing practices of state-making and war-making, 
both of which are closely related. Military violence continuously underpins and constitutes the 
situated social practices within which a soldier may find this sense of belonging and through 
equivalence, recognition. An individual soldier achieves recognition through practices which 
contribute to bringing about of militaristic violence symbolically (mis)recognised as legitimate.  
This chapter will argue that the drive for recognition, reducible only to its emotional capillary forms 
the basis of an ethics of militaristic state violence and by extension the Army itself. This ethics of 
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recognition is the foundation on which the main symbolic capital form- honour derives its status as 
being valued as strive-worthy. Whilst honour is not ever explicitly referred to by the soldiers 
themselves, it can be taken as the nominal sociological category which picks out a distinct form of 
symbolic capital. It also encompasses the possibility of successful adherence to norms of behaviour 
in military social life. Corporate Core Values, such as Selfless Commitment and Moral Courage are 
codified institutional objects which provide concrete means which allow individuals to coordinate 
social practices towards the achievement of honour considered as a form of symbolic capital. This 
chapter will outline how corporate Core Values can be understood in relation to this form of 
symbolic capital in the military field and throughout this chapter, these understandings will be 
looked at in relation to the understandings and responses of the soldiers themselves along with 
reference to theoretical debate. 
The following sections will address the 2nd main research question which asks how soldiers have 
experienced this discourse of ethics? It will look to the experiences of soldiers of 2nd Mercian with 
respect to Bourdieu’s observations on how these primary dispositions, structured in the context of 
the field of the family make soldiers of particular backgrounds attuned to distinct forms of 
recognition seeking practices. Or to put a different way, have stakes in a social game where symbolic 
capital in the form of honour is the central defining interest.  
This chapter argues that recognition seeking practices and by extension the struggle for symbolic 
power, form the basis of explaining why soldiers from particular backgrounds are more likely than 
not to be practically attuned to the type of values and social practices present in military life. Also, it 
sees these recognition seeking practices as a distinct ethical foundation within the military field 
intimately tied up with processes which constitute the possibility of militaristic state violence. In this 
sense, in order to understand how soldiers have experienced this emergent discourse of ethics in the 
Army, one must consider this ethics as founded upon processes of recognition seeking practices.  
Neither state violence nor military socialisation can be understood without first considering this 
ethics of recognition.  
 
7.2 Attunement to the field 
“In The Winter War , their account of the Falklands conflict of 1982, Patrick Bishop and John 
Witherow pointed out that many of the men in British marine commandos and parachute 
battalions came “from Britain’s economic wastelands: the Clyde, Ulster, the North-East, and 
they had better experience of than anyone else in the country of its imperfections and 
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injustices. They joined up in many cases because there was nothing else to do’.” (Holmes, 
2004:50) 
Holmes’ reference to this account is emblematic of explanations as to the predominance of working- 
class recruits in the rank and file of the Army. In particular, the Corps at the sharp-end of war making 
such as the infantry. According to this explanation, the ‘push’ towards joining the military is social 
marginalisation and poverty. Class understood in relation to the work of Bourdieu, advances its 
conceptualisation beyond the economic dimension to understand it as being defined in relation to 
the “fundamental cultural and social differences within a society” (Atkinson, 2015:62). Those 
differences are expressed through relations of domination and struggle over primarily sources of 
symbolic power, as expressed through the possession of various forms of capital and dispossession 
which is at core the ‘denial of recognition’. The working or ‘dominated class’ primarily make up the 
ranks of non-officer recruits within the British Army, markedly more so in the Infantry. The Select 
Committee on Defence (2005) noted that amongst 500 non-officer recruits to the Army between 
1999-2000, 69% came from ‘broken homes’; 50% were classified as coming from deprived 
backgrounds; 16% had been long term unemployed; 35% had more than eight jobs (mostly casual 
employment) since leaving school; 60% left school with no academic qualifications; and 40% were 
joining the army as a last resort. These statistics confirm what has always been widely recognised 
about Army recruitment, that the motivation for enlisting in the Army is a ‘last resort’ and captures 
what Atkinson terms ‘the choice of the necessary’ (Atkinson, 2015:66). The dominated class who can 
be defined by their dispossession of capital produces “habitus which gives primary to substance, 
practicality and functionality” which arguably characterise aspects of the military field.  
This dispossession of capital and denial of recognition finds its extreme manifestations in neglect, 
violence and abuse, also being common features of recruit background (Beevor, 1991:4). Thus 
“group identity promises a substitute family to the large minority who have been pushed out by 
mothers or their mother’s boyfriends”. What marks the backgrounds of many recruits to the infantry 
is this common denial of recognition, which for Bourdieu is the most “unequal of all 
distributions…the distribution of symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 2000: 240–241). Attunement to the 
military field is a sensitivity to particular forms of symbolic capital which grant the possibilities of 
recognition; and a primary habitus developed in the site of the family field which is practically 
compatible with the military field with respect to particular forms of physical capital. Soldier I and C, 
who were interviewed for this research bring out the salience of this point when discussing their 
backgrounds with respect to motivations for joining the Army: 
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“Ever since I was little I wanted to join the army, from my background which wasn’t exactly 
brilliant, the army gave me something…When I told my parents I was joining the army, they 
thought it would be good for me, but they weren’t sure about me joining the infantry- they 
wanted me to join because they thought it would change my life- because when I was at 
school I was a little shit” (Soldier I, 2016) 
And: 
“I think my parents were always proud of what I had done. I lived on a council estate which 
was quite rough, and I got involved with lots of things I shouldn’t have really been doing, that 
progressed worse- I never got arrested, I was always a bit quicker on my feet!” (Soldier C, 
2016) 
These accounts share, an acknowledgment of undescribed difficulties in their respective 
backgrounds prior to joining the military. Without knowing the precise details of the types of 
challenges these soldiers faced it is difficult to speak clearly in terms of denial of recognition. What 
appears evident is that prior negative life experiences, shaped with reference to class identities (all 
three self-identified as working-class) have some bearing on the choice to seek out the Army as 
career path and life choice. Recognition as a primary motivation within the military field becomes far 
clearer in soldier’s testimonies when discussed in relation to the positive attributes of Army life: 
“I think the infantry, generally people come from broken homes, you get a lot of council estate 
lads joining- I think it’s the guaranteed money, I think it appeals to those type of people who 
need that direction in their lives…My mum died when I was young, and my dad remarried, and 
he sort of palmed us off. So I got raised by my grandparents” (Soldier E, 2016).  
In this response, Soldier E ties together the themes of economic marginalisation and coming from a 
‘broken home’ as a push towards the positive promise of ‘direction’ that the Army is thought to give. 
This ‘direction’ is most likely understood with reference to pragmatic decisions regarding career and 
livelihood but also seems to hint a something deeper with reference to the push of coming from an 
unstable or non-traditional family background. This may connect to what Holmes identifies as the 
paternalistic language which marks the new recruit’s experience of training: 
“Yet alongside this language of abuse goes the language of family. Recruits are, collectively, 
likely to be called boys or lads rather than men, while the sergeant who vilifies a recruit on the 
parade-ground will call him son in a gentler moment. This paternalistic language goes far 
beyond basic training, and has done for centuries.” (Holmes, 2004:46). 
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Soldier J provides further insight into the types of backgrounds that recruits come from, and how 
these possibly shape their experiences of the training regime: 
“They often have very strong family backgrounds even if they might sometimes come from a 
broken family…Put them in a section here and put them through a hard training regime, put 
them through training here that does bound soldiers together” (Soldier J, 2016) 
What seems to be implied in this observation is that soldier’s valorisation of family, perhaps greater 
for the fact that many come from precarious family situations, primes them in some distinct way for 
their enmeshment in the social relations which emerge through the training regime. The promise of 
recognition derived initially through enmeshment in the relations of the primary group provides a 
substitute for the social relations of the primary field of family, often experienced as fragile: “‘It’s a 
generation without fathers’, another colonel observed. Some applicants are trying to put behind 
them disturbing memories of home, from neglect or violence and even sexual abuse. Becoming a 
soldier seems the obvious way to build confidence”. (quoted in Beevor, 1991:4). This language of 
family is the observable surface of social relations which Hockey see as particularly important in 
relation to not only the backgrounds of soldiers but also their age. In the context of initial training 
the NCOs provide the first and arguably most lasting ideal of soldierliness. For Hockey (Hockey, 
1986:31) they represent the Meadian ‘significant other’ in the lives of the young recruits:  
“They are also the principal role models available to newcomers: superiors who present an 
image of soldierliness par excellence…In effect the Training Team NCOs become ‘significant 
others’ for the recruits in their charge. The average age of the recruits I observed was 18 years 
and 4 months. These individuals were in transition between adolescence and adulthood, a 
particularly impressionable period in their lives.” (Hockey, 1986:31) 
With an average age of approximately 18 years and 4 months, at an impressionable age in their lives 
“basic training sharply cuts off communication with their neighbourhood and their family, as well as 
the social control they have hitherto derived from other sources.” (ibid). Soldier F expresses this 
profound sense of shock in the following: 
“It was a massive shock to the system, I had never been in a situation where, one, work so 
hard, I don’t mind a bit of a graft but that was such a shock because you’ve not done anything 
to that extreme. The lack of sleep was just horrendous, and also just people shouting at you- 
you’re told what to do at school to a degree, but this is you ARE doing as they are saying”. 
(Soldier F, 2016) 
156 
 
The potential potency and affective possibility of the social relations which are formed within this 
context of shock and social dislocation are framed in the language of family and pregnant with the 
possibility of recognition, and are further impacted on the recruit through the uniqueness of the 
social space that they enter in basic training. The barracks in this context represent a form of ‘total 
institution’. An institution, in its commonly understood sense is a place where specific types of 
activity goes on (Goffman, 1961:15). They provide something a world to those who inhabit it, as 
distinct to the world which goes on outside the institution. The degree of this encompassing 
character can be measured by the extent to which they aim to supply a world distinct from the world 
outside. A total institution is one which totally, or at least approaches, a totally provision of a world 
within its boundaries and “is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse to the outside” (ibid). It 
is marked by physical boundaries such as walls, fences, barbed wire etc. In this sense the recruit in 
basic training experiences a significant degree of social dislocation and what Goffman terms, ‘role 
stripping procedures’ (1976:27-30), understood as institutional practices which aim to replace 
recruits prior civilian self-image (Hockey, 1986:24:44) and shape their habitus according to the eidos 
of the military field. Hockey (1986:28) picks out the salient features of these role stripping 
procedures as marked by disorientation, anxiety and fear in relation to the recruit’s encounter with 
this new ‘social world’, or in the terms of this research, the military field and totalising qualities of 
the barracks. The novel and unfamiliar ‘structure, norms, values, and practices’ (ibid) which mark out 
the boundaries of this social terrain are the boundaries of the military field with its associated eidos 
and capital forms. Soldier F draws attention to how this sense of profound change penetrates all 
dimensions of social practices, to the level of things such as the quality of humour: 
“It’s such a different world, you are a normal person so to speak and then you get the army 
banter side of you, you know, you end up becoming quite a weirdo if I’m honest. Not 
initiations or anything, you’re just more prone to do things you wouldn’t normally do” (Soldier 
F, 2016) 
The anxiety and fear that is ever-present among most recruits during those first few weeks of basic 
training, represent the outcome of a deliberate set of practices undertaken by the military 
institution which can be taken as a form of symbolic ‘shock therapy’ which aims to rapidly attune a 
recruit’s habitus to the eidos and stakes at play in the military field, which rely on the underpinning 
ethics of recognition. Bury reflects on these practices and experiences in relation to his own 
experience of military training: 
“Throw the new platoon together in an alien environment. Deny them sleep. Change their 
terms of reference and benchmarks of self-worth. Replace societal and language norms with 
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an alien culture and vocabulary. Deny them wristwatches. Put them together and dress them 
identically. Scream commands at them and watch as they respond without question, without 
thought, moving as one body, united”. (Bury, 2010:27) 
The physical and psychological practices involved in role stripping make individual recruits more 
sensitised to the possible prizes of recognition. The social dislocation and disorientation which marks 
out this first encounter of the military field, is simultaneously the first introduction to the ethics of 
recognition which is the ethical eidos of the military field. “Beastings”- excessive physical exercise 
and verbal abuse by training NCOs, marks one of the most significant experiences for new recruits 
and functions as an essential feature of the initial formation of primary group relations (Beevor, 
1991:18). Soldier recruits find themselves in uniquely demanding physical and psychological 
situations and tend to turn to fellow recruits as means of support, whilst simultaneously developing 
a partially adversarial relationship between the primary group and training team. This plays a 
significant role in forming the initial relations within the primary social group and is consciously 
acknowledged as such the soldiers this research interviewed as being fundamental to the 
development of the social bonds which form the basis for the motivation to fight: 
“It is a bit like school, you remember the best friends you had, it’s a bit like that, you build 
bonds potentially stronger through the training. I know blanket punishment isn’t acceptable, 
but it does make you bond. Getting beasted together, sweating together, crying together, you 
share similar emotions.” (Soldier I, 2016).  
This process also offers the possibility of a masculine initiation rite. The type of masculinities tied up 
with working-class identities, place a premium on physicality and one’s choice of profession serves a 
means to the realisation of this masculine ideal. Due to the hollowing out and replacement of 
traditional working-class jobs, the normal routes to the realisation of working-class masculine 
identities have become harder to achieve. This likely makes recruits coming from these backgrounds 
particularly attuned to the possible prizes involved in this type of masculine rite of initiation which 
the military offers. This relationship which could be characterised as an attunement of habitus to 
certain forms of physical capital, shaped prior to entry in the military has been observed through the 
relationship between participation in sports and entry into the military. Samuel Stouffer and his 
colleagues observed that there was a strong correlation between sports, particularly body contact 
sports and military behaviour (Stouffer quoted in Holmes, 2004:55). This relationship between the 
recruit’s habitus attunement towards particular forms of physical capital shaped in the field of family 
and entry into the military field likely encompasses an understanding of physical capital in a broad 
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sense including not only proficiency in sports but also other forms of physical capital such as outdoor 
pursuits etc. This was noted in many of the responses from the soldiers interviewed: 
“My father used to take me shooting, fishing and camping when I was growing up so when I 
joined it was just a bit more aggressive- aggressive camping! So I enjoyed it, I didn’t think it 
was a shock at all. I think that helped me to excel in training” (Soldier C, 2016) 
And:  
“It wasn’t really (a shock to the system). I always liked going outdoors, I was a bit different to 
my mates- they were involved in crime, drugs and all those type of things, I was always a bit 
different, I would get the train out to Wales and do my own thing.” (Soldier C1, 2016) 
And: 
“The whole idea of the actual fighting and doing the good stuff. I thought it would be the most 
enjoyable as well- getting out there and getting into a scrap.” (Soldier E, 2016) 
And: 
“I did a lot of sport when I was a kid- my parents probably would have given me a pat on the 
back for doing well at that- I wasn’t very academic. I was quite good at Karate when I was 
younger- played a lot of sport- played football, cricket and rugby when I was at school. I did a-
level and GCSE PE-I think it was a lot to do with the friendship group I was in- my civvy mates 
are very close friends of mine. Sport was kind of our thing as a group of people. My civvy 
mates are a bunch of people I have known for a long time, we grew up playing on the same 
teams, we’ve done various team sports together. I think it makes sense that these experiences 
prepared me for army life in some way.” (Soldier H, 2016).  
Recognition then is also bound up with masculinity as partially defined with respect to the 
possession of specific forms of physical capital. Hockey observes that the Army remains focussed on 
traditional conceptions of masculinity such as aggressiveness and toughness whilst also co-opting 
productivity and a strong work ethic as being indicative of the masculine ideal (Hockey, 1986:33). 
This also connects to notions of heterosexual potency in that the soldierly ideal is the embodiment 
of it (Hockey, 1986:35) and the infantry in particular stands out in this respect:  “I couldn’t 
understand why anyone would join the army and not join the infantry…No one with the warrior 
calling joined the army to be a logistician, administrator or educator”. (Bury, 2010:33). Bury goes on 
to tie together this clear notion of masculinity and heterosexual potency and infantry soldiering; 
“The cool element of war. Feeling cool, tough, powerful. Manly, really. It attracted all of us at some 
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level.” (Bury, 2010:81). Soldier C1 explicitly references masculinity as a motivation for joining the 
Army, and specifically the infantry: 
“It’s where the real men are. It’s like a thing with the army- ‘what do you do?’- ‘I’m Royal 
Artillery’- ok, sound but when you say you are the infantry that’s a proper job, it’s what 
everyone joined for. To go to war- it’s what people joined the Army for and to be fair that’s 
what I joined for” (Soldier C1, 2016). 
Conversely, the language of abuse attached to instances where this masculine ideal fails to be met is 
heavily gendered, where inadequacy is framed oppositionally, in feminine terms (Hockey, 1986:35). 
Soldier C comments on his experiences of basic training and how it has changed since he passed 
through:  
“Got beasted all the time, it was horrendous. I hear stories now of when they pass out of 
depot and they don’t even have to pass fitness tests. When I joined it was a bit more robust. 
Its pink and fluffy at the moment.” (Soldier C, 2016) 
This recollection is loaded with nostalgia and frames the perceived physical and psychological ease 
which marks current training as being pejoratively feminine. Recognition is bound up with group 
membership and traditional masculine identities, the more attractive because of its fragility. This 
fragility is experienced through the constant cycles of reward and punishment which mark out the 
first experiences of military socialisation. Recognition as reward in the form of praise from NCOs in 
the training team and is initially experienced through a constant process of confusion as the rules by 
which praise is achieved are at best ambiguous and at the extreme unintelligible. This fragility of 
recognition coupled with background experiences where sources of recognition in prior civilian life 
were scarce makes new recruits extremely attuned to the possibilities of recognition from other 
recruits that basic training offers. It brings about in parallel a rapid adjustment of individual habitus 
to the ‘rules of the game’ and defining features of the eidos of the military field.  Soldier E comments 
on his own experiences of basic training and its further significance in his military career and 
experiences:  
“They get it into your head straight away because when you deploy onto tour you need that 
trust and that friendship with the blokes around you- you need to be able to count on them 
for your life potentially. It is the bond and your brothers around you which is the main 
motivation, it is definitely the love of your friends around you and your wish to see them live.” 
(Soldier E, 2016) 
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The reference to blanket punishment and ‘beasting’ speaks directly to the confusion in relation to 
the systems of recognition and punishment during basic training. However, viewed retrospectively 
they function as crucial practices for Soldier E in reference to the formation of the primary social 
group, which is at its foundation a matter of recognition seeking practices and also combat 
motivation. This represents the first reflective experience of this ethics of recognition in soldier 
recruits and the first dramatic transformation in their habitus which attunes them to the specific 
symbolic prizes on offer in the military field. These symbolic prizes find their codified referents in the 
form of Core Values.  
 
7.3 Core Values and Symbolic Capital 
Corporate Core Values, in the context of the Army and considered in terms of understanding the 
military itself as a social field, can be considered as codified objects which provide concrete 
referents, intersubjectively constituted and contested for the main source of symbolic capital in the 
military field- honour. Soldiers have a strong irreducible emotional orientation15 towards them in 
terms of the formation of self in respect to others as well as them being referent points providing a 
possible means of banishing ambiguity in ethically complex situations. The military field can further 
be defined in terms of orthodox and heterodox belief systems, which “imply an awareness and 
recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs” (Bourdieu, 1977:164). In the case of 
Core Values, the process by which they have been codified into a formal system was one where the 
content and form were debated, and points of contention were broached.  
These institutional Core Values also have a history in relation to the institution of the military. The 
Army’s response to the context of the perceived secular transformation in society was to codify its 
conception of its own institutional ethics. It was based in the claim that the Army’s unique task, that 
of killing or being killed, required a unique ethical framework which was derived from traditional 
morality (Deakin, 2008:20). The significant aspect of the response was initially to emphasise ethos 
rather than ethics. During an interview, Brigadier John Donnelly discusses the centrality of ethos to 
the Army as well as its connection to Core Values and Standards: 
“Well ethos is sort of the spirit, the code the organisation has. It’s one of those words we all 
know what it means but struggle to put it into words. It is the spirit, the way we are, what we 
aspire to be, which sums up the Army. There is clearly the overarching Army ethos, I’m not an 
expert on ethos, I’m not sure you would have some ethos’, I think you have cultures, I think 
 
15 See Chapter 3.5 
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you have sub-cultures. There is an Army ethos, there might be some people who say my 
regiment has this ethos- I’d say that’s more of a culture or its’ tradition. I think the Army ethos 
should pervade from top to bottom, and to some extent that’s linked to having a Values and 
Standards based on an ethical good rather than an organisational efficiency. Because if you 
have an ethical good that goes from top to bottom of the establishment, I think that means 
that your ethos goes from top to bottom.” (Brig John Donnelley, 2016). 
This notion of ethos in respect to the British Army, arises out of a Christian Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
whereby the actions of an individual are ethical in virtue of their character being shaped through 
habit. This relationship between Christian ethics and military ethos was also closely tied into notions 
of masculinity. The Army during Victorian times embraced the notion of ‘muscular Christianity’ 
which emphasised the virtues of chivalry, physical fitness and moral purity- particularly as a means 
of regulating the sexual behaviour of troops (Harrison, 1999:225).  This notion of virtue which is 
integral to the Army’s conception of ethos in its broadest sense, historically incorporated a Christian 
conception of morality. This quasi-religious bent to the notion of an entry into an ethos of the Army 
and Regiment has been compared by some to a conversion experience (Stouffer, quoted in Holmes, 
2004:52). This allegory both emphasises the moral dimension of entry into military life whilst also 
demarcating it from the civilian world. Its form in this context is uniquely defined by the social and 
historical specificity of the British military.  
Given the British Army officer classes’ traditional rejection of intellectualism and treating ethics in a 
Kantian sense, this initial emphasis on ethos rather than ethics is not surprising. The following policy 
document demonstrates the explicit acknowledgement of the connection between ethos and 
mobilising soldiers to fight, “That spirit which inspires soldiers to fight. It derives from, and depends 
upon, the high degrees of commitment, self-sacrifice and mutual trust which together are so 
essential to the maintenance of morale’ (The Values and Standards of the British Army 2000, para. 9, 
quoted in Deakin, 2008:20). This represented one of the first examples of the Army connecting 
ethos, ethics and violence in official documentation.  
The ‘spirit to fight’ is the spirit to kill- and that must at least presume a norm which legitimises that 
act. The degree to which the institution of the Army and the soldier are capable of manifesting and 
self-constituting that norm is a matter for the empirical component of this research and will be 
examined in greater detail through Chapter 8. The ‘spirit to fight’ and kill is more than an exception 
to the norm which states that the taking of human life is wrong, it must be posited as a positive 
ethical norm in terms of the ‘role morality’ of the soldier. It is, as Kratochwil states, an interpretive 
reference point, which for the purposes of the military, legitimates the material act of killing. The 
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reference to the dependency on commitment, self-sacrifice and mutual trust show the explicit 
connection between this ‘sprit to fight’ and ethos as embodied in the list of virtues of the British 
Army. According to this view, effective or good soldiers in the military sense are also good in the 
moral sense (Aronovitch, 2001:13, Dannatt, 2011). This notion of the moral soldier is well expressed 
in the following, “they must be able to kill and show compassion at the same time” (Dannatt, 
2011:14). Lord Dannatt, the former head of the British army has made similar claims concerning how 
the Army can no longer presume that the family and wider community, supply soldier recruits with 
the necessary core values that the Army requires (Dannatt, 2011:14). Significantly this 
acknowledgement by the Army that it has a role to play in the moral education of society in part has 
led to the implementation of education programs in schools which aim to instil notions of military 
ethos and character in students (British Government, 2014).  
The process of codifying ethos and pre-existing informal ethical systems within the Army was 
undertaken by different actors with different degrees of symbolic and cultural capital who were able 
to propagate orthodox beliefs or mobilise challenges against these. Brigadier John Donnelly, who 
when interviewed by the author, was head of Army personnel and played a significant role in a 
recent review of Values and Standards, represents and actor with significant resources of symbolic 
capital. Donnelly started his military career as an Infantry Officer and has served in the Army for over 
33 years. He was responsible for setting up the officer training program for the Afghan Army whilst 
deployed in Afghanistan and was involved in overseeing discipline policy and casework for the British 
Army for the last 6 years. He was the author of the Army’s last Values and Standards (2008) and is 
currently writing a new version of it. His combat experience within the infantry as well as 
educational background, length of service and rank all afford him a significant cache of symbolic 
capital. 
His following response captures this process of codification in the sense that it is primarily targeting 
ambiguity but also speaks to processes of (mis)recognition: 
“The Values and Standards have a multitude of roles, they are there to strengthen cohesion 
(primary group cohesion); they are there to set an aspiration of how we want people to 
behave. I recognise we recruit people, some of whom have not been exposed to some of 
these concepts, that doesn’t mean to say they are not capable of following them. We recruit 
some people from quite troubled and difficult backgrounds, but we say that if you want to be 
a soldier, as a profession then we require you to exhibit these characteristics, these values and 
behave in this way. It is aspirational but that is to allow our soldiers to behave appropriately.” 
(Brig John Donnelley, 2016).  
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This response also speaks to the explicit recognition that Core Values are directly related to 
strengthening primary group cohesion which as argued previously, is the means to the possibility of 
enacting violence on behalf of the state. (Mis)recognition is implied in relation to recruits having not 
been ‘exposed’ to the types of values present in the Army. This suggests that Core Values sit 
somewhere outside the doxic understanding of new recruits which presumes some process of 
symbolic violence in that the (mis)recognition of Core Values as a primary structuring set of ethical 
values for the soldiers themselves, makes the possibility of state violence legitimate. It normalises a 
set of relations which exist between soldier, Army and state which legitimises state violence. This 
legitimation of state violence also implies a simultaneous transgression of individual moral 
standpoints concerning violence. The primary aim of the Army is to professionalise the act of killing.  
Historically, armies have operationalised shared identities in the form of masculinities and patriotism 
in order to motivate troops to fight (King, 2013) and still continue to do this, however moral 
transgression arguably requires something more than this and this is where a codified ethics of 
violence has emerged. The modern army of the 21st century has become ever the more 
professional, utilising drills and emphasising unit cohesion in order to physically deliver violent force 
(ibid). However, in addition to the physicality of the act of killing the Army must presume also the 
norm which permits the act of killing, as it seems a necessity if the Army is resistant to losing high 
numbers of battle capable troops to PTSD or as it has recently been framed, moral injury. Soldiers 
must in principle be able to consider that their use of violence as morally justified. The Army must be 
able to make in principle at least, the act of killing morally justifiable. As such, the Army does then at 
least implicitly, seek to constitute its soldiers with this ethical norm which sanctions the taking of 
human life in the context of war.  
Whilst this norm is not explicitly acknowledged, it is implicitly through the institutional valorisation 
of particular values and ethical norms in the form of institutionally codified Core Values as a means 
of ethically constituting a soldier who is capable of realising the institutional aim of professionalising 
violence. Adherence to ethical norms plays a crucial role in the maintenance of a stable sense of self 
and this plays out in relation to military Core Values in one sense through commitment to the 
primary group which is the foundation of an ethics of recognition. This commitment to the primary 
group is crucial in enabling individual soldiers to enact state violence, as this commitment to the 
primary group fulfils a core ethical imperative. It simultaneously legitimises the violence that goes 
along with it and it seeks to symbolically order violence to make state violence legitimate at the level 
of individual soldier through this process of symbolic violence and (mis)recognition.  
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The concept of doxa denotes the “quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and 
the subjective principles of organisation” (ibid). In the case of the Army’s formal definition of Core 
Values as a normative set of ethical principles, the fact that they were debated and defined and 
came to form an official statement takes them outside the doxic mode. Doxa in the Army can be 
taken to be self-evident statements concerning the purpose of the Army. The Army’s codification of 
Core Values can partially be seen as a response to transformations in the doxa of the social and 
educational fields which soldiers inhabit whereby certain ethical norms which had been taken as 
self-evident, were no longer perceived as such leading to the necessity that they are codified.  
This is evidenced in the Army’s acknowledgement that “positive attitudes towards authority have 
been in steady decline: religion, education and the family no longer always provide the framework of 
behaviour, social structure and responsibility they have in the past” (The Discipline and Standards 
Paper 1993, Quoted in Deakin, 2008:19-20). Honour is arguably a key form of symbolic capital in the 
military field and exists beyond the formal hierarchical structure of rank. This research uses the 
concept of honour as a means of framing this form of symbolic capital, of which various social 
practices compose its achievement. Through orientating practices towards these codified values, 
these practices function to accumulate symbolic capital in the form of honour which soldiers engage 
in interested strategies to achieve. In order to further understand the significant role Core Values 
have in the military, specifically the British Infantry, returning to Bourdieu’s definition of field will be 
a helpful starting point.  
A field is an objective set of relations between the objective positions of individual agents or 
institutions, determining the occupiers of these positions, present and potential situations “in the 
structure and distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the 
specific profits that are at stake in the field” (Wacquant, 1989:39). Considering this claim in relation 
to the military field, and the location of one of this chapters particular foci, the infantry; symbolic 
capital manifest as honour, confers the ‘belief in the values of the profits at stake’, and is the main 
determinant of the objective relations of this field. Symbolic capital is representative of symbolic 
power which is the basis of legitimacy. In the sense that legitimacy arises from the entrenchment of 
a form of reality which defines as valuable an associated set of practices.  
The striving towards the accumulation of this form of capital is the very rationale of interested 
action in the military field, the accumulation of other capitals such as cultural and economic function 
as ‘species of power’ in the military field are of a second order. Symbolic capital is the primary 
capital form in the military field. It is valued and thus confers greater profits than other capitals. In 
the following, Soldier C1 discusses which individuals were the most significant role models through 
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the course of his military career. He identifies Corporals who occupy a relatively low rank but often 
accumulate a significant degree of experience, something which he connects to this valorisation 
which speaks to the accumulation of symbolic capital in terms of honour, contra rank: 
“Probably the full screws (Corporal) as they are the ones that run the platoon. That’s who I 
would look up to and that’s who the lads look up to because once you become a sergeant you 
take about 5 steps back. When you’re a Lance Jack (Lance Corporal) your just like an 
experienced bod (Junior Soldier), you haven’t got the experience… If you took away the 
Corporals from the British Army then I don’t think it could work as well” (Soldier C, 2016) 
Whilst never directly referred to by Soldier C, this looking-up can be arguably be presupposed to 
relate to an individual being honourable. The conferring of respect and the ‘looking up’ to another, 
which is the essence of symbolic power, can nominally be captured through the concept of honour 
as a form of symbolic capital. Whilst role models themselves do not necessarily equate with 
individuals who have significant banks of capital, in the case of the military field, the determinant of 
whether one looks up to somebody is defined by the degree to which they have accumulated 
symbolic capital in terms of honour through combat experience and embodiment of Core Values. In 
this respect, Soldier D also identifies experience as being significant in terms of respect, which is 
another word for framing an individual’s symbolic standing and position: 
“That’s obviously the section commander, they’re always telling you the war stories and all 
that, they teach you. I would always respect experience over rank.” (Soldier D, 2016) 
This valorisation and objective ordering of capital forms is itself a function of symbolic power in the 
sense that certain practices are valued as worthy over others. The attainment of the soldierly ideal is 
achieved through the accumulation of forms of honour as symbolic capital through the orientation 
towards and embodiment of practices which reflect Core Values. This soldierly ideal is not a stable 
concept, rather it has been subject to change as the Army as has changed. It is an aspirational ideal 
closely tied to notions of masculine virility, honour and courage, best framed through the idea of the 
‘warrior ethos’ or calling. John Hockey in his ethnographic work on a British infantry unit in the 
1980s sees the soldierly ideal in the following manner, “If recruits display endurance, toughness, 
aggression, and the requisite degree of skill, adequate military performance is likely to follow. The 
recruits are then soldier’s and by definition thoroughly masculine”. (Hockey, 1986:35). The 
motivations for joining are often framed in similar terms, “I couldn’t understand why anyone would 
join the army and not join the infantry… No one with the warrior calling joined the army to be a 
logistician, administrator or educator”. (Bury, 2010:33).  
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Core values, such as Physical and Moral Courage, Integrity and Selfless Commitment all function as 
routes by which to achieve symbolic capital in the form of honour, the accumulation of which 
confers the possible achievement of the soldierly ideal. Honour as this research takes it, is nothing 
more than a nominal sociological means of capturing a form of symbolic capital made of the 
concrete, inter-subjectively constituted acts which make it up. To act with integrity or courage is to 
embody honour, and potentially accumulate it as a form of symbolic capital and power. The 
accumulation of symbolic power contributes to the possibility of embodying the ‘warrior ethos’ 
representing the achievement of the particular profits offered by the military field, and further 
entrenching the social practices which make this soldierly ideal valuable in the first place. This is also 
intimately related to the wider ethics of violence which aims to both legitimise state violence and 
make that violence possible at the level of the individuals that carry it out. This ongoing set of 
practices which seek out a form of symbolic power closely associated with notions of the soldierly 
ideal, achieved only through the enactment of militaristic violence, imbues that violence and the 
associated practices with legitimacy.  
Selfless commitment and Integrity are two Core Values which closely tie into and build up to the 
possibility of being considered by others as Honourable. Selfless Commitment and Integrity are also 
intimately related to the primary group, predominantly understood in reference to it. It is possible to 
expand on this definition and say that it is Selfless Commitment towards the primary group and 
integrity in relation to the primary group. Soldier C when asked to discuss Core Values chose both: 
“Integrity- is he honest enough to be trusted to do his job, be around certain bits of kit. 
Selfless Commitment- is he willing to put his life on the line for the lads at the side of him- 
that’s the biggest thing with the infantry because our lives are on the line and are you willing 
to…that’s the biggest thing you can give.” (Soldier C, 2016) 
As implied through soldier C’s comments, the failure to meet these standards of Integrity and 
Selfless commitment would be a failure of professional standards but also a failure in relation to ‘the 
lads at the side of him’. The central focus of the primary group in relation to soldier’s understandings 
of Core Values was prevalent through many of the responses in interviews. Soldier C refers to 
Loyalty in relation to beasting in Phase 1 initial training which evidences a conscious awareness of 
how the social practices employed through training regimes contributes to the formation of the 
primary group: 
“The training staff I had used to beast everyone- whether you were good or bad. I think that is 
where Core Values start to kick in like your loyalty- you’re always with each other so if one gets 
beasted everyone gets beasted and you start forming a group then. It’s almost a competition- it’s 
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yous (sic) against them. You want to do well and beat them then you’ve got the competitiveness 
brought in between the sections, and within the sections, everyone wants to beat each other and 
be better than the next person. You have respect for the hierarchy even though they are treating 
you unbelievably.” (Soldier C, 2016) 
 
7.4 Symbolic Capital and the Construction of Violence as Legitimate 
The primary group, the boundaries of which are initially defined in relation to different sections, is 
not stable and comes to be reinterpreted in relation to various oppositional settings. As Soldier C 
mentioned in the previous section, in the context of initial training the primary group represents the 
section pitted against other sections in competitive contexts. In other situations, the boundaries of 
the primary group may shift to encompass the platoon with the secondary group being found at the 
level of the Regiment. What is a common feature is that these boundaries are always constituted in 
opposition to an outside group or enemy Other16. The apex of these boundary drawing practices is 
found in the operational context against a hostile force. This process itself contributing to the initial 
possibility of militaristic state violence. As previously discussed, military sociology has broadly 
argued that the cohesion of the primary group makes possible militaristic state violence, however 
this explanation whilst broadly correct has omitted the role ethics plays in the formation of the 
primary group. Soldier F discusses the foundation of Core Values in relation to primary group 
relations:  
“My first one, it’s not down as a value if you’re talking about the Solid Cs (reference to Core 
Values)- it would be your teamwork. Helping each other, even clean the toilets- get somebody 
out of bed you know, they’re a bit lazy- to motivate them- I’d say that starts in training, 
literally day one. You know, you’ve got your Core Values, people always say it’s about the 
person next to you, the person fighting next to you- I think they’re all built off that. You can 
put them in a nice way you know- Loyalty, Courage- in a way civilians would understand, but it 
is all off that person next to you.” (Soldier F, 2016).  
As mentioned previously, the objective significance of these capitals in the military field is marked by 
their codification as evidenced by bureaucratic artefacts such as Discipline and Standards and 
Military Doctrine. One judges oneself a soldier and is judged by others to be a soldier partially by the 
degree to which one embodies these Core Values, whose meanings are subjectively and 
intersubjectively constituted and contested. The degree of orientation towards these values is 
 
16 See Chapter 8 for detailed discussion of the phenomenology of enmity. 
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clearly represented in interviews conducted with serving British infantrymen, and the salient role 
they play in shaping ethical conduct is apparent in the following response: 
“Selfless commitment, you don’t really need that unless you are on tour … integrity, that to 
me is a big thing, I hate people that lie, I haven’t got time for them. Discipline, my father was a 
bit strict when I grew up, and that was put into me from a young age and when I come into 
work I am well presented, it’s very rare I get in trouble unless I blow a gasket. I try as hard as I 
can to be the best in terms of values and standards.” (Soldier C, 2016) 
This response also reflects how a soldier’s primary habitus, the particular dispositions which shape 
ones’ interaction in social ‘games’, formed in the context of family is reflexively matched against the 
particular requirements of the military field, in this case orientation towards Core Values such as 
discipline. Further conversations with a Staff Sergeant with extensive combat experience in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan mirrored the central importance of Core Values: 
“The Core Values are pretty much bang on. I think all the Core Values go into build your head 
before you go on tour, you do judgemental  training … something does take over you when 
you are in combat, it is just ingrained in you … moral courage, that’s more doing the right 
thing … it goes back to you knowing right from wrong, if you know someone has done 
something wrong, obviously not just being a general snitch but if you know someone has shot 
an innocent civilian, you have to go up the chain of command to say that someone has done 
this.” (Soldier E, 2016) 
Codified Core Values represent a form of symbolic capital in that they all connect into and support 
the existence of the primary group- the interpersonal relations between soldiers. The accumulation 
of honour considered as the primary symbolic capital, through practices which seek to embody Core 
Values, sees honour as being partially synonymous with commitment to one’s peers founded itself 
upon an ethics of recognition. This commitment can be classed as comradeship, though not 
necessarily dependent on the social relations of friendship. Often soldiers are able to perform 
effectively within a unit, even if they do not bear strong relations of friendship with all its members. 
All symbolic capital in the military field express some relation to the primary group as a soldier’s 
social standing or objective position in the military field is measured partially in relation to this 
distinctly masculinised form symbolic capital as also expressed in relation to combat experience. 
Thus, honour as a form of symbolic capital in the military field is derived through commitment to the 
primary group, expressed through behaviours such as those that embody values such as integrity 
and courage, and experience in combat. Core Values as a codified system of ethics in the military 
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field are represent a codified template which guides soldier’s practices towards the potential 
accumulation of this source of symbolic capital.   
In that this form of symbolic capital determines an individual’s position within the military field, it 
also represents another form of symbolic violence directed at the soldier in relation to the violence 
that they carry out. For them to be able to undertake violence on behalf of the state effectively, with 
the belief that their actions are justified, it must be taken as legitimate by the soldiers themselves. 
This is achieved through attaching this form of symbolic capital to the violence itself, which is how 
Core Values come to be represented to soldiers implicitly. The violence then becomes legitimised. By 
enacting violence on behalf of the state it offers the possibility of accumulating symbolic capital and 
connectedly recognition of others. This form of symbolic capital must be considered as strive-
worthy, something worth having a stake in, connectedly then the violence is brought into this 
normativity and becomes (mis)recognised as legitimate.  
The violence becomes of itself the primary route for soldiers to achieve recognition. In principle at 
least one cannot strive to be courageous when the violence itself is considered illegitimate or 
immoral. Through the striving to embody aspects of these Core Values which contribute to the 
possible achievement of symbolic capital, the violence that is essential in the social practices which 
enable individuals to accumulate this symbolic capital is made legitimate. An individual soldier 
comes to belong (and can only come to belong) through enacting militaristic violence or contributing 
to its enactment. This violence is (mis)recognised as legitimate as it is a means by which belonging, 
and recognition is achievable. Violence is always for something beyond the aims of the state within 
the context of the military.  
The codified partners to this symbolic capital form are Army Core Values, and they represent a 
subjective and inter-subjective means of picking out individual soldier’s experiences of the multitude 
of practices and understandings directed towards this primary capital form. They also provide the 
lens by which to understand this ethics of recognition which is the primary ethical eidos of the 
military field. The role of Army Core Values is not only limited to this description, they further 
function as a means of shaping and constraining violence at the level of the soldier who enacts it. 
They provide the possibility of an ethics of restraint on state violence which represents a response to 
the recent ethical complexities which have marked the modern state’s military experience. 
The desire for the recognition of others is the primary drive which motivates individuals to seek out 
and accumulate different capital forms. It is this motor which drives all human action, the validation 
of one’s own worth and humanity which is the ethical partner to militaristic state violence. 
Paradoxically perhaps, any understanding of an ethics of militaristic state violence is also an attempt 
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to understand processes by which those who enact it also seek to affirm their own humanity. The 
figurative quality to representations of militaristic heroism and ‘mythic violence’, is the elevation of 
humanity through some destructive process. Whether enemy or oneself, one finds one’s apex as 
human through the destruction of the corporeal dimension of humanness in self or other. This logic 
in the heroism of militaristic violence is the promise of the possibility of having one’s own humanity 
validated and it is this logic which is the foundation of an ethics of violence in the military. 
In the military field, recognition as having worth in one’s own right is tied up with the enactment of 
state violence.  This is most clearly seen in the relationship between the primary social group and 
the motivation to fight- one fights for the person next to them. A significant source of recognition in 
the military field is derived through commitment to the primary social group, thus, this is the first 
and perhaps most significant way in which state violence and an ethics of recognition become 
closely constituting of one another. Whilst the multitude of strategies and social practices individuals 
employ in attempting to accumulate symbolic capital are reducible to this primary drive of 
recognition seeking, the drive itself is reducible to nothing more than itself. It is an emotive force of 
the type outlined by Goldie (2000), a foundational element in a human ontology for Bourdieu. If one 
can reduce this drive at all, it can only be reduced to the emotional force which brings it about- a 
brute fact about being human.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to understand the ways in which soldiers have experienced the 
emergent ethics in the Army with respect to how these ethics come to make war with respect to 
institutional Core Values. This claim at first appears contradictory, but when we take ethics as being 
normative principles which shape practices, then it becomes possible to examine the role of these 
practices as separate from their founding normative principles. Ethics understood specifically in the 
context of the British military field and Army Infantry bring about practices at the level of the 
individual soldier which makes militaristic state violence possible. In this sense, by understanding 
soldiers experience of ethics, we also interrogate the reasons which this ethics exists in the way it 
does. The manner in which violence becomes possible, is firstly through constituting a set of 
practices which allow soldiers to overcome their resistance to violence by making the commitment 
to the primary group the foundational ethics of the Army. Secondly, and connected to this process, 
is the legitimisation of that violence at the level of the individual soldier. The primary ethics of the 
military field, as expressed through the commitment to institutional Core Values, is an ethics of 
recognition which is achieved through this commitment. Violence becomes imbued with the 
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possibility of achieving the recognition of one’s worth as a human being through its enactment. The 
violence is then symbolically constituted as legitimate as it represents a possible path towards 
recognition.  
Core Values are codified proxies which make up the sociological concept of honour considered as a 
form of symbolic capital which is the main capital form in the military field. The accumulation of 
which is possible through the orientation of individual practices towards these Core Values. The 
motivation towards the accumulation of this capital form is founded in both the desire for 
recognition of one’s worth as a human and also the emotive force that is experienced by soldiers in 
their valorisation of these Core Values. They represent a significant moral good for soldiers and this 
relation between the soldier’s emotional response to these codified ethics is non-reducible. This 
symbolic form of capital represents the primary capital form in the military field above others such 
as cultural or economic capital. It determines an individual’s objective position within that field. 
Chapter 9 will go on to take up some of these themes in relation to soldier’s experiences within the 

















Chapter 8: Between an Ethics of Killing and an Ethics of Restraint 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This research has over chapters 5 and 6, attempted to answer the first overarching question that it 
posed in relation to its focus on ethics in the British Army, namely, why has a discourse of ethics 
emerged in the British Army? The response to this was to suggest historically and socially situated 
phenomena which have driven the emergence of this institutional discourse of ethics. It then 
claimed that these formed part of broader processes of state-making and war-making. Ethics both 
internal to the institution of the Army, and also observed by wider society, plays a significant role in 
enabling and constraining state-violence through the symbolic legitimation of the violence itself. The 
state is made through its claim over the monopoly of legitimate violence; war is made through the 
overcoming of that resistance to enacting violence at the level of both soldier and society. Violence 
must be made legitimate to the soldier’s such that they can enact it, and to society such that they 
accept it as legitimate and by extension, contribute towards making the state legitimate. Ethics plays 
a crucial role in this process.  
Chapter 7 examined soldier’s experience of this ethics in respect to processes of recognition seeking 
and the striving for the accumulation of honour considered as a form of symbolic capital in the 
military field. The second significant context within which this discourse of ethics has emerged and 
has been experienced by soldiers most recently is through the British Army’s operational 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. These settings for state-violence represented examples of 
non-conventional warfare, both of which came to gradually be defined in principle, if not practice, by 
COIN doctrine. Whilst some degree of restraint has always been internal to the logic of state-
violence, the COIN environment brings out the inherent tensions between the twin processes of 
enabling and restraining state-violence. Violence in the context of COIN must be markedly more 
restrained than conventional warfare as there is a further audience to the violence in terms of the 
population of the occupied country. In the effort to win ‘hearts and minds’, violence whilst present 
must be legitimised to the population as a necessity. The principles of this restraint on violence see 
an emphasis upon population-centric approaches which attempt to limit ‘collateral’ damage to the 
population and infrastructure.  
The COIN doctrine along with the material realities and experiences of these two conflicts have 
come to define how ethics in the British Army have recently come to be experienced by the soldiers 
themselves. Chapters 6 and 7 began to explore the second question of how soldiers’ experience this 
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discourse of ethics by examining its relationship to enabling violence, and through an ethics of 
recognition, and its role as a crucial source of symbolic capital in the military field. This chapter will 
examine the experiences of the soldiers themselves in the context of training and combat with 
respect to ethics considered in the ways mentioned. It will be organised along the following themes. 
The first section offers an application of ethical conduct as a reflective process as well as a 
dispositional feature of an individual’s habitus through the work of Dreyfus and Dreyfus that was 
initially explicated in chapter 3. This will provide a means of making sense of the soldiers’ own 
understandings of ethics which talk of ethical conduct as an intuitive process.  
The remaining sections will turn towards the words of the soldiers themselves, beginning with an 
overview of their experiences in relation to ‘training-in’ ethics in relation to combat. Following this, it 
will look at the experiences of soldiers in terms of how ethics potentially contributes to enabling 
violence. It will examine the role of the primary social group, chain of command and how violence 
becomes legitimised ex-ante and ex-post to the act itself. It will provide some theoretical 
background to the construction of confrontational groupings, the concept of the enemy as Other, 
both considered as preconditions for militaristic violence. The next section will examine the soldier’s 
experiences within the operational setting concerning the constraint of violence, examining 
understandings and experiences related to the Rules of Engagement (ROE), Courageous Restraint 
and navigating ethically ambiguous situations in combat. Finally, it will examine the idea of ethical 
conduct as an embodied, dispositional feature of habitus which forms a crucial part of soldier’s 
experience of ethics in the context of combat.  
Most significantly, this chapter will foreground the words of the soldiers themselves as a means of 
contextualising the previous analysis this research has undertaken. The extracts of quotes will tend 
to be quite large as the context and detail of the experiences of soldiers are key to both 
understanding and making sense of this analysis as well as respecting the experiences of the soldiers 
themselves.  
 
8.2 On Habitus and Ethical Conduct: Towards an Understanding of Dispositional Ethics 
As previously commented upon, accounts of ethical education and ethical conduct developed both 
academically and internal to the British Army, treats it exclusively as a deliberative, reflective 
processes. In the case of the British Army, this focus sits awkwardly within an organisational culture 
which is more inclined to regard ethics in the Aristotelian sense, eschewing the idea of formal type 
ethics education pursued by other state militaries. This consideration of ethics as a deliberative 
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process at the level of conscious, reflective thought is of course a relevant mode of inquiry, but it 
does foreclose the non-deliberative, practical aspect of ethical conduct as merely being an outcome 
of the deliberative process of ethical reasoning. To put it differently, as is often implicitly the case 
the traditional aim of military ethics is to get soldiers to think ethically, in order for them to produce 
conduct which reflects that form of ethical thinking. Deontological ethical accounts- rule based 
ethics- will always have some role in ethics training/education in the military, but it does not follow 
that this ought to be the only emphasis when considering ethics in this context.  
Arising from this preference for deontological approaches to ethics, it is assumed incorrectly that 
praiseworthy ethical conduct in the context of combat is traditionally determined through the 
increasingly tenuous jus in bello, jus post bellum binary, brought about by a process of ethical 
deliberation by the soldier. This account of ethical conduct claims that the soldier consciously 
reflects on the most appropriate course of action, with reference to some set of constraining ethical 
principles (Rules of Engagement, personal ethics, institutional ethics etc.) and preferably acts in line 
with these principles to produce the desired ethical conduct. This is an implicit restriction of ethics to 
judgments rather than behaviour. This account as mentioned previously, implicitly draws on a view 
of moral expertise similar to that developed by Kohlberg (1971) in his ‘Stages of Moral Development’ 
which argues that, moral maturity is “the ability to stand outside the situation and justify one’s 
actions in terms of universal moral principles” (Dreyfus, H.L. & Dreyfus, S.E. 1992:183). According to 
this praiseworthy ethical conduct must be accompanied by the ability to justify the act with 
reference to moral principles. What seems to follow from this claim is that an act which lacked the 
associated conscious justifications, whilst still producing the desired ethical outcomes, would not be 
praiseworthy ethical conduct, rather accidental.  
The soldier’s habitus considered as a set of ‘durable dispositions’ including ethical dispositions 
shaped in relation to the military field, represent a form of ‘tacit competence’ and a ‘practical ability’ 
to cope with different ethical situations. This is in opposition to an exclusive account of ethical 
conduct considered as a conscious moral judgement. This possible form of ethical comportment is 
one aspect of a soldier’s habitus, and its development is significantly shaped though a soldier’s 
orientation and embodiment of Core Values as a means of accumulating symbolic capital and 
through the everyday ethical contexts that the soldier faces. Other experiences within the soldier’s 
lifeworld will obviously impact on the development of their ethical dispositions (positions in other 
fields such as family). However, due to the role Core Values play in the context of the military field as 
means by which soldiers can orientate their practices so as to possibly accumulate symbolic capital, 
they will tend to influence the development of these dispositions significantly.  
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This notion of an intuitive account of ethics, considered as a practical ability, draws also on the work 
of Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1992). Ethical expertise which is the aim of any military ethics, ought 
to be as much concerned with intuition and ethical comportment as it is with a detached, critical 
moral judgement. Quite often what can be determined as ethical expertise when considering the 
experiences of combat soldiers is often determined as much by the absence of the associated ‘moral 
mindset’ as by it. Ethical conduct ought to be regarded as much an act of spontaneous coping, 
consisting of unreflective, egoless responses (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1992:185) as a reflective 
application of moral principles.  
These everyday ethical skills are often passed over and the conscious and deliberative dimension of 
ethical conduct is read back into the act. Again, this stands as a clear example of the scholastic 
fallacy that Bourdieu discusses. It is not to say that ethical conduct is separate from moral 
deliberation and judgement, only that they play a different role in our experience of moral and 
ethical expertise. Dreyfus and Dreyfus provide through this phenomenologically inspired reading of 
ethical expertise, which discusses the relationship between the deliberative aspect of moral action 
and intuition (intuition in the case of this chapter understood as a dispositional feature of habitus): 
“Expert deliberation is not inferior to intuition, but neither is it a self-sufficient mental activity 
that can dispense with intuition. It is based upon intuition…in familiar but problematic 
situations, rather than standing back and applying abstract principles, the expert deliberates 
about the appropriateness of his intuitions…” (1992:193) 
An expert in this situation whom experiences a novel ethical situation cannot only rely on intuition 
developed through experience, but consciously reflects on which intuition is best suited to the 
situation that is encountered (Dreyfus, H.L. & Dreyfus, S.E. 1992:193). Intuition is then central to this 
account of ethical expertise and abstract deliberation alone does not account for the embodied and 
spontaneous coping that is the hallmark of competent ethical conduct. This intuitive response to 
ethically complex situations was reported throughout the interviews conducted with the combat 
soldiers that this research has drawn upon. In relation to target discrimination, a Corporal and a 
Private referred to the ethical complexities of COIN operations and what experience meant in this 
context:  
“Say you’re getting shot at from a building, and you can’t see anything, there might be some 
other random people in there, you can’t just go in and absolutely destroy a building, you’ve 
got to think of that even though we were at a time where we could do stuff like that, you still 
have it in your mind that you don’t want to be the guy that put a round through a kids head” 
(Soldier C, 2016) 
176 
 
In response to this comment: 
“It’s experience, it comes like second nature, the more you have been exposed to a certain 
experience you can almost know what is going to come next” (Soldier, D, 2016).  
This ‘second nature’ and the knowing of ‘what is going to come next’ are the embodied dispositions 
which mark the ethical dimension of a soldier’s habitus and are essential in our accounts of the 
nature of ethical conduct and potential ethical expertise. The following attempt to directly situate 
this notion of ethical competence developed by Dreyfus and Dreyfus with reference to the 
experiences of the soldiers of 2nd Mercian.  
  
8.3 Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise 
As outlined in Chapter 3 and the previous section, Dreyfus and Dreyfus provide a phenomenological 
description of five stages to the development of expertise in a general sense, focussing on driving a 
car and playing chess and then turn towards applying these understandings to the question of 
ethical expertise. As such the following will expand on this argument in order to draw out its 
potential application into the question of ethical conduct and expertise with reference to the 
military and combat ethics. These will then provide the basis for the following interpretation of the 
soldiers’ own understandings of ethical conduct in the context of combat. 
Ethical comportment is taken by Dreyfus and Dreyfus to exhibit a developmental structure similar to 
the 5 stages of skill acquisition that they outline, however they are aware that ethical expertise sits 
as something apparently quite different to expertise in driving or chess the latter is determined by 
winning or losing, and being a competent driver would likely mean driving safely and obeying the 
rules of the road. Ethical competence strikes one as different as there are abundantly no clear 
answers as to what constitutes an ethical ‘win’. But we still do attempt at a deliberative level to 
sketch out what courses of action constitute acceptable or virtuous ethical conduct. Much the same 
as the sense of pleasure experienced in driving well or winning a game of chess, we also experience 
the sensation of pleasure in ‘doing the right thing’. Dreyfus and Dreyfus see ethical competence in 
these terms: 
“To become an expert in any area of expertise, one has to be able to respond to the same 
types of situations as similar as do those who are already expert. For example, to play master-
level chess, one has to respond to the same similarities as masters. This basic ability is what 
one calls having talent in a given domain. In addition, the learner must experience the 
appropriate satisfaction or regret at the outcome of his or her response. To become an expert 
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driver, one should feel fear, not elation, as he or she skids around a curve. Likewise, to acquire 
ethical expertise, one must have the talent to respond to those ethical situations as similar 
that ethical experts respond to as similar, and one must have the sensibility to experience the 
socially appropriate sense of satisfaction or regret at the outcome of one’s action.” (Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus, 2004:254) 
This embodied and sensory quality to the mastery of ethical conduct, the sense of satisfaction which 
transgresses the deliberative quality to the experience of one having done the ethically appropriate 
course of action speaks closely to the primary role of emotions as mentioned in both Chapter 3 and 
7. This deep sensory and emotional quality that accompanies the ethical mastery of a situation, 
leaving aside what in actual terms that might mean, becomes habitually embodied and acts as a 
motivator towards acting in the ethically appropriate way. This emotional dimension to the 
experience of ethical conduct becomes crucial in understanding how ethical learning takes place 
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:254). To learn is to reflect on the adequacy of the past experience and 
also to re-live that experience through memory within the present. The memory of the emotional 
response of success or failure of one’s ethical conduct in a situation is crucial to developing ethical 
expertise.  
Deliberation over past ethical conduct in terms of its adequacy in meeting ethical principles also 
does not function alone in accounting for ethical learning (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:254). Applying 
a utilitarian ethics across each situation of conduct perfectly, might qualify for a precise exercise of 
the principle and may yield success and the associated emotional experience of satisfaction. 
However, in another situation this may mean that one treats an individual as a means to the 
fulfilment of that principle and along with it feel regret. The fact is that ethical expertise cannot be 
expressed in relation to the fulfilment of principles of action, whether utilitarian, Kantian or 
otherwise. Further, this account of skill acquisition bears little relationship to the lived experience of 
increasing mastery of ethical conduct. The following responses potentially highlight what ethical 
proficiency feels like to an experienced combat soldier and how that proficiency develops from the 
novice level where deliberation is present to the more proficient levels where ethical conduct is 
characterised by comportment: 
“It’s like second nature, it comes with experience, the longer you have been doing your job or 
exposed to an experience you can almost, like, know what’s going  to happen next, you know 




“It’s definitely instinct, it’s just there, you’re doing it, you can’t hesitate. At the start of the 
tour you’re more cautious but by the end its second nature.” (Soldier D, 2016) 
If expertise is to be understood in the sense that ““Know-how [techné] does not deliberate,” 
(Aristotle quoted in Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:255), is this a sufficient condition for understanding 
ethical expertise? Is deliberation in the context of ethical conduct always disruptive in the sense that 
it interrupts the fluid engagement with the situation that a novice encounters when facing the 
unfamiliar? Crucially Dreyfus and Dreyfus distinguish the following situation:  
“The intellectualist account of self-sufficient cognition fails to distinguish the involved 
deliberation of an intuitive expert facing a familiar but problematic situation from the 
detached deliberation of an expert facing a novel situation in which he or she has no intuition 
and can at best resort to abstract principles” (2004:256) 
Deliberation for the expert like the novice is a crucial resource when facing novel ethical situations 
where the resource of prior experience which orders situations into classes of events is absent. 
Where this deliberation differs from the novice is that the expert realises that deliberation between 
different principles of action often produces outcomes that are sub-optimal. Expert intuition in the 
novel situation still exists alongside deliberation, and it is this that marks out the difference between 
novice and expert deliberation when faced with the unfamiliar. The expert will deliberate over the 
appropriateness of her intuitions. These intuitions are habituated responses formed over 
experiences of like, or nearly like situations, and the associated outcomes of courses of action 
relative to those situations and the emotional responses to those outcomes, either regret or 
satisfaction (ibid). 
Ethical conduct is always situated temporally and at times the expert performer will be faced with a 
course of action where two competing courses of ethical conduct which appear equally compelling. 
In these situations where possible, the course of action will be delayed “as the situation develops, 
elements may gain or lose prominence; as these prominences evolve, the perceived situation 
changes” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 2004:256). The ability to situate ethically complex situations as 
temporally unfolding, represents an intuitive knowing of when to delay the response to a situation in 
favour of allowing the situation to unfold. Being aware of the ambiguity of an ethical situation is a 
crucial part of expertise.  The following interview response was from a Major who was discussing a 
situation he defined as ethically complex during a tour in Iraq, stands out particularly in the manner 
in which the temporal unfolding of the situation, along with his arguable ethical proficiency founded 
in his extensive combat experience, shaped his overall response: 
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“I was in a situation in Al Amara where we were on a snatch Op to go and grab a load of 
people; my job on that mission was, I was on the outer cordon basically and a massive riot 
built up. There wasn’t any shooting at the time but it was getting pretty hairy and a lot of 
rocks being thrown, all sorts of stuff. So we were in our Warriors (armoured people carriers), 
blokes were dismounted in between and a small kid climbed up (onto the Warrior) and had 
something in his hand which looked very much like a grenade, I had to make a pretty snap call 
as to…well I had two options, I had a hickory stick with me so I could have swatted him. There 
was a good chance if I did this that I would have really hurt him because I would have had to 
hit him in the head, because he literally just pulled himself up and would have fallen head first 
to the floor as I would have just clocked him on the head. Or I could have drawn a pistol and 
shot him, again, that would have definitely killed him as the only option I would have had 
would have been to shoot him in the head. Urm, I had to make a pretty quick call on that, and 
in the end I just decided to wait and see what he did (emphasis added), fortunately as it turned 
out it was just an oil filter from lorry which he threw and hit me square in the face- they are 
really good at throwing stuff. He hit me square in the face with the oil filter and then just ran 
off. But that was a fairly close call that one- in Al Amara, the classic reasoning process of do I 
use force or not- you are patrolling on a normal day it was very common for- it was a grotty, 
horrible place and it was where the RMPs (Royal Military Police) got killed- that mission we 
were there to snatch the suspected quartermaster of the cell that did that. The whole place is 
a warren of small alleyways, very dark and dingy, a really horrible place, and massively 
punchy- they would kick off at a moment’s notice. You would quite often get a grenade 
dropped over a wall if you patrolled down a narrow alley- so for a small kid to be on the side 
of a lorry with what looked like a grenade, it fitted the pattern of lethal force that they used. 
We get that there are rules (ROEs) there but in situation 1 where you can sit and think about 
it- it’s all well and good, in situation 2, it becomes more instinctive, where you hope that you 
have prepared yourself well enough that when you do act, you act within the rules of 
engagement- which nine times out of ten people do because we are quite good at it.” (Soldier 
H, 2016). 
The choosing between what this soldier classes as situation 1 where one may deliberate on the 
situation and situation 2 where intuition and coping guides the response, marks the type of 
competency that Dreyfus and Dreyfus discuss. This choice at the level of non-deliberative, intuition 
between the immediate response to a situation, and the delay of that response in favour of allowing 
more information about the situation to present itself is crucial for the expert performer in the 
ethically ambiguous situation. At its fundamental level, ethical expertise becomes habituated within 
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a person as this is the only means of explaining the relationship between intuitive response and 
experience leading to expertise developed over time: 
 “Do I think before I shoot? Yeah, I did personally, before I ever shot back at someone, I would 
always try to 1- PID (Positive Identification) the target- I don’t want to go to prison; 2- that 
person might be a father, you don’t want to shoot the wrong person and also I’m not going to 
lie, I think the first time I ever shot at someone, I did take a second, even though that person 
was trying to shoot at me, I can vividly remember thinking I am about to potentially kill 
someone, and then pulled the trigger. However, then that’s when your typical default answer 
of your training would kick in and you return fire. There’s a massive amount of emotions, it’s 
quite hard to know…I still sleep at night but, it’s quite almost surreal to think that you put your 
weapon down and you take a second to think that before….(Soldier F, 2016) 
The next section will consider the words of the soldiers themselves to explore their experiences of 
ethical conduct in the context of training and warfare in relation to these observations as well as the 
claims made through the preceding chapters. 
 
8.4 ‘Training’ in Ethics 
The requirement that state violence at the level of the soldier is both enabled and constrained when 
considered in reference to the type of operational environments that the Army has found itself in in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and where it foresees future conflict, is one which presupposes a new type of 
ethical subjectivity in relation to the soldier. This presupposition of a new subjectivity brings with it a 
set of problems in terms of how to bring that subjectivity into being. This can be framed in terms of 
‘training’ in ethics. ‘Training’ in this context goes beyond an understanding of it as limited to formal 
and technical procedures such as classroom-based ethics education and ethics orientated fighting 
simulations. In order to understand the ways in which the Army goes about ‘training’ in ethics, one 
must look to the informal processes of socialisation and how they are explained and understood by 
soldiers in relation to ethics, and how the Army has sought to transform these informal processes to 
address the possibility of constituting this new ethical subjectivity.  
The Warrior Creed with its associated ethics was sufficient for motivating men to fight, and enabling 
state violence; and was shaped with understandings of conflict which arose from experiences in the 
Second World War and understandings formed with respect to a possible conventional engagement 
with the Russians. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a significant set of 
pressures, which have forced the Army to reconsider the suitability of its understanding of ethics in 
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terms of the warrior creed and its doctrinaire counterpart the Moral Component of Fighting Power. 
This emergent realisation that the type of ethics which underpinned the warrior ethos, those 
predominantly orientated towards enabling violence are insufficient for the complex ethical 
environments that the Army is increasingly finding itself. This complexity comes down to the 
definition of what it is to be a soldier, the demands of the role and what it functionally entails. The 
following response draws out some of this ambiguity, the inherent tensions within COIN and also the 
demands of shifting role requirements: 
“COIN is fantastic, it works you know it has been proven in Northern Ireland and the rest of it 
but I mean, at what line do you draw? Do you go into a COIN situation because the enemy you 
are fighting is an insurgency? Or do you go into a COIN type situation because politically it 
looks a lot better? When in reality you are not listening to what is going on at the front- it is 
still very kinetic, and your hands are tied essentially. I think it is wrong, I think there is too 
much politics involved in front-line soldiering, but again it is all because of Afghanistan, they 
learnt the things that went wrong in Tellick they then tried to find a political solution to it but 
it should have been left to the Army to solve. I think the infantryman is a toolbox, at the end 
of the day, my first tour was Kosovo, I was naïve but I remember saying ‘where do you want 
me first?’, when you’re on tour you’ve got your route, we were there and went where we 
wanted, we were policing. I think being raised as I was in a British culture, I inherently know 
right from wrong, I feel perfectly comfortable saying I am capable of great violence and to be 
able to say ‘pack it in the two of you’ (referring to the policing dimension to soldiering), I have 
never had a problem with that and I have thoroughly enjoyed it, what the problem is, is doing 
that (policing) when it was the wrong situation. I am happy to come down aggressively on the 
Queens enemies but if you want me to do that you have to tell me which one you want me to 
be (soldier or policemen). Don’t tell me you’re a hammer and a screwdriver, you’re a hammer 
OR a screwdriver, because as I said, Afghanistan, we weren’t fighting at all, and yet the 
government were pushing us to be COIN. COIN suited the political agenda but not the ground 
situation…What they should have done is found someone who is better at the hearts and 
minds stuff and used the infantry as a hammer- as I said, I am more than happy to be that 
peaceful kind of guy, I know right from wrong, but is that my job in the infantry, I don’t really 
know?” (Soldier K, 2016) 
This quote draws out very clearly this soldier’s experience of the inherent tensions involved in the 
COIN environment with respect to an ethics of violence and the ethics of restraint implied in this 
type of warfare. It speaks to a sense of confusion regarding what the soldierly role is with respect to 
violence. It is a viewpoint also reflected in the following discussion with the commanding officer 
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Soldier J. He begins by discussing the NCO course that the Army runs and the role of the warrior 
creed: 
Do you see the warrior creed as reconcilable with an ethics of restraint? “Yes I do, they are 
reconcilable; they are only reconcilable through a proper look, perhaps a restructuring…not 
restructuring, what’s the word…a shift in focus in our training establishments and not just 
where soldiers are trained, but critically where the NCO’s are trained. (Soldier J, 2016) 
The cleavage between an ethics of violence as embodied in the warrior creed and an ethics of 
restraint which is implied in the COIN operational environment, which can demand that the soldier 
rapidly changes from classic kinetic operations towards more policing type roles, is clear in this 
response though considered potentially reconcilable. He continues to discuss the example of the 
current training regime for NCOs in relation to these themes: 
“On these Brecon courses they train guys to be tactical experts, low level infantry tactics, it’s 
the best school in the world. Rangers’ school come over from America and they fail Brecon, 
because they are like ‘Wow! This is nails!’ and it is, it is about the toughest course for NCOs in 
the world. They train guys to be experts, strong and fit and experts with weapon systems, 
understanding the enemy, coming up with a plan, reading ground, all the kind of tactical 
stuff…what I don’t think do enough of is test judgement, and exercise judgement.” (Soldier J, 
2016) 
This reference to the importance of judgement and different types of judgement becomes clearer 
when discussed in relation to another training course: 
“They set up various situations where there would be a crying baby, there’d be screaming 
women, an atrocity, and the young NCO had to make a judgement, where is the priority, what 
do I do here? Really, really good and that’s where I would like to see us, particularly the way 
the world is, not just that we are doing everything in front of the world’s cameras, but every 
situation is complex. If we were to fight what is called a ‘near peer enemy’, i.e. the Russians, 
even if we were to fight them in Eastern Europe it would be amongst refugees, it would be in 
the full glare of the world’s cameras, there would be humanitarian counter-insurgency, war 
fighting, all on the same day, General Krulak’s three block war- how I try and train the 
Battalion, and we tried to do it in Kenya is for the blokes to have the intellectual agility to 




‘Judgement calls’ then clearly seem to be moving beyond the type of decision making required in the 
traditional and conventional sense of gaining tactical and strategic superiority over one’s enemy. 
Judgement relates to the ability to successfully navigate the complex “humanitarian counter-
insurgency” warfighting environment undertaken in ‘full glare” of the world’s cameras”. Both 
references to the changes in warfare implied through ‘humanitarian interventions’ and the 
disciplinary effects of ‘global surveillance’. These concerns speak directly to the aim of making 
violence legitimate, which implies the ability to make the correct ethical ‘judgements’. These 
judgements are also considered as intuitive and often stand in opposition to the type of instinctive 
conditioning which is embodied in the warrior creed: 
“Instinctively we may come up with the wrong answer because the background warrior creed 
ethos- which I do think can be toxic…but I don’t feel we currently equip young commanders 
with the intellectual tools which will calibrate that initial instinct” (Soldier J, 2016) 
The external pressures which have forced the Army to consider questions of how militaristic violence 
is regulated and constrained have been driven partially by the increasing media and increased legal 
exposure which soldier’s now find themselves subject to. This relates directly to the associated 
possibility that soldiers fear that their actions could lead to them being prosecuted for violations of 
the Laws of Armed Conflict. As the previous reference to the necessity of making the right 
judgements when under the gaze of the ‘world’s cameras’ shows, ethical decision making is a 
significant question in relation to military training.  
The emergence of ethics of a discourse of ethics in the Army cannot be explained entirely in relation 
to external pressures of ‘global surveillance’. The internal drive to regulate this violence has always 
been present in an institution where the institutional rationale is the structured application of 
violent force. As previously argued, the state must distinguish its use of violence from other non-
state social organisations or individuals in order that that violence is understood as legitimate and 
this means that the violence must be regulated and constrained. However, this process of 
constraining state violence is uneven and irregular and driven by pressures arising from within and 
without the organisation itself. This question of ethical conduct considered in relation to the ability 
to make adequate judgements, or intuitive responses is notable in the Army’s increasing use of 
Judgmental Training. The following introduces responses from different soldiers concerning their 
experiences and opinions surrounding the role of judgemental training: 
“The DCCT sim is useful (a training sim focussed on target correct target acquisition). The guys 
first start on it they go wild, shooting everything- they’re only messing about obviously. It does 
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work, its good training. We also get classroom exercises on ethics, you get practicals where 
you have to act things out- it’s a good thing.” (Soldier D, 2016) 
And: 
“The judgemental training we do, I know that’s not ethics- that’s the basic building block- is it 
a good guy or is it a bad guy, to start with, that’s your sort of lowest level (of ethics) isn’t it. 
We have proper visual based training for that and that is exactly what the soldiers need. To 
layer on top of that, if we were to do anything more complex, what we try to do is to weave 
stuff into exercises- Rob or Steve did a really good one the other day- they did a prolonged 
firefight, they had a load of prisoners on standby, that they just chucked at them straight after 
they had been through the firefight, all sorts of incorrect things- people hooded and bound 
incorrectly, all the big no no’s, they market it as (the scenario being) one of the local soldiers 
going ‘this is Britain’s problem’. They had obviously been handed a load of prisoners by 
soldiers from a foreign nation that doesn’t have the same rules as us, they had to untangle 
everything- they threw in a chick who was hooded and they realised they didn’t have a 
woman to perform the search. There was all that sort of stuff- you need an example; you can’t 
just tell soldiers.” (Soldier H, 2016) 
This notion that ‘you can’t just tell soldiers’ in relation to ‘training’ ethics expressed by Soldier H is 
one shared in the following: 
“We’re all kinaesthetic learner’s, aren’t we? People who join the Army tend to be more 
kinaesthetic learners…In the field you watch people, even if you don’t do it on a conscious 
level you watch people, you take things in then you rationalise and decide what’s right, and 
what’s wrong. If you were on tour for instance, and a corporal was running around shooting 
random civvies for no reason, you’d be thinking that must be the right thing to do, especially 
as a young soldier” (Soldier A1, 2016) 
And: 
“You can force as much information as you like onto the blokes, they will just dump it 
immediately, well, two things- people always misunderstand the way soldiers learn, like 
kinaesthetic, visual, all that sort of stuff. The entire reason they join the infantry is because 
they don’t like academic learning.” (Soldier H, 2016) 
Soldiers also appear to be acutely aware of the inadequacy of conventional training in respect to the 
type of ethically complex environments they have faced and are likely to face in the future: 
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Q. What should ethical education look like for junior soldiers?  
 “It’s pretty much covered before operations, you get put in experiences- we had training 
exercises where people played the Afghan Army, people with missing limbs- what we should 
do more of is whenever we go down the range (shooting range), it’s just enemy everywhere- 
I’ve never been a place (on operation) where it’s just enemy- there’s always civilians there. 
The firing range is literally just one massive space with tanks. That’s how we always train, 
whenever we do training now, we train to fight the Russians. Digging trenches, hiding away in 
little worm holes. What we need is training where we go into built up areas with civvies there- 
we do a little bit of it when we go to places like Brecon where we go through riot patrol and all 
that stuff…(Soldier C1) We went to France after Herrick and trained with the French Foreign 
Legion in an area where they had a mock town with factories, sewers and everything. 
Everything in that training was orientated around what we should be doing and training for 
next (fighting in built up areas). (C) You need a lot of ‘realistic-ness’ because if it came to it, say 
if something was happening in Chester town centre, if we had to walk through there, you get 
some of these Private soldiers now in these rifle companies that have been in here for 2 or 3 
months, and you sent them down the street and they got shot at, they would just open up at 
anything and anyone- people with experience just know that it’s not everybody, it’s just 
‘some’”. (Soldier C, 2016) 
Finally, Soldier F (2016) comments on the role of Core Values in relation to training in ethics: 
“I think (Core Values) are massively useful- I think what the Army does wrong is that they try 
and teach it, I don’t think it can be taught, it just naturally happens, you don’t just…if you’re 
out on a patrol in Afghan or on an exercise, you are doing so much more than the solid C 
(Courage); the army just try and teach that to you rather than it just coming naturally.” 
(Soldier F, 2016) 
This notion of ethical conduct ‘coming naturally’ was an insight expressed across a number of the 
interviews with soldiers and Judgemental Training in many respects is designed to constitute this 
intuitive, phenomenological dimension to ethical conduct. Judgemental training is designed 
specifically to shape non-reflective ethical responses. It attempts to shape the ethical comportment 
of a person’s habitus, the dispositional attitude towards certain situations. It also experientially 
primes the soldier to enact that violence as it provides familiar visual scripts so when violence is 
deployed, it is encountered as less unfamiliar. In this sense the experiences are within the horizon of 
perception. It aims at the type of non-deliberative ethical expertise as previously outlined by Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus.   
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Judgemental training is designed to train-in the appropriate ethical response which non-reflectively 
distinguishes between the almost instantaneous use of force against a perceived threat and the 
semi-conscious and conscious deliberation on a developing threat. Distinguishing between the 
ethical appropriateness of either or moving into the mode of ethical deliberation is itself the core of 
ethical expertise in these types of situations. The non-reflective juncture where an almost instant 
reaction and deployment of force is closed off in situations where the threat could be determined as 
non-immanent and moves onto conscious deliberation, which represents the development of ethical 
intuition in this context. It draws on the content of the horizon of perception which has been 
developed through prior experience. This stands in contrast to the immediate falling back into 
instantaneous conscious deliberation which could lead to the catastrophic delay or failure in the use 
of appropriate and morally justified use of force. The instantaneous use of force without the 
accompanying non-reflexive determination of its appropriateness, even if it leads to an acceptable 
outcome, would be incidental and not qualify as the application of expert ethical conduct. As such 
this picks out ethical expertise as potentially being present in absence of deliberation, but not 
incidental. 
This instantaneous recourse to the use of force might lead to an acceptable ethical outcome, by 
accident or conversely lead to the unjustified loss of life. Both represent conduct which is lacking 
both a conscious and non-conscious ethical dimension. The refinement of non-reflective judgements 
on ethical conduct are likely only possible through post hoc rationalisation of them to determine 
which stand as ethically acceptable and which don’t. These determinations are then subsumed into 
embodied experience and when like experiences are encountered again through repetition, they 
come to evoke dispositional responses according to the post-hoc rationalisation of the genus of that 
experience. This post hoc rationalisation which goes into the rule-building around ethical conduct is 
most likely strengthened through the institutional and inter-subjective classification of the ethical 
content of the genus of ethical situations. This being evidenced with respect to the Army’s use of 
group discussion on operational and combat ethics. The provision of mutually shared 
understandings of ethically ‘correct’ conduct provides the individual a further means of determining 
and justifying an ethically ambiguous act as an ethically correct one 
The underlying explanation for why this process of constraint takes place is always connected to the 
ongoing effort to make state violence legitimate, and by extension make the state itself legitimate. 
Ethical ‘agility’ is the ability to react to ethically complex or ambiguous situations such that the 
associated response, whether through the use or absence of force at the level of the soldier can be 
viewed as ethically appropriate. It must also be considered legally justifiable and also satisfy the 
external standpoints of those who view that violence. All these determinations contribute towards 
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making that act legitimate which makes the states use of that violence legitimate by extension. This 
constitutes partially the states existence but also the legitimacy of the violence makes possible the 
overarching objectives of the use of the violence itself, for furthering the states interests.  
To achieve these aims, the Army has mission objectives which contribute to the rationale, 
determined by the state for engaging in that violence. Constraint of violence and its relationship to 
the legitimacy of that violence goes further than constituting the states legitimacy, it also attempts 
to make violence legitimate with respect to those subject to that violence. The COIN operational 
environment with its strategic emphasis on a population centric approach, seeks to bring on board 
and legitimise violence in the occupied population in order to achieve strategic objectives. The 
violence must be limited and reigned in, often sacrificing tactical mission success so that violence 
can at least be presented as necessary and moral in the eyes of the population. This requires the 
associated activities of psychological operations utilising propaganda techniques where a distinct 
‘other’ is framed as counter to the population’s interests. This is not to deny that a moral imperative 
exists somewhere amongst these different processes of legitimising violence, as it must for 
individuals to be able to reflectively make sense and legitimise the violence to themselves.  
Moreover, for violence to be possible in this context, historically the construction of the enemy has 
gone hand in glove with the other processes which have enabled violence at the micro-sociological 
level. The following section examines the phenomenology of enmity, which is primary to the 
possibility of enabling the act of violence. 
 
8.5 A Phenomenology of Enmity 
Enmity in the context of military violence at the reflective and phenomenal level deserves some 
consideration. Whilst it may not be the case that it is the experience of enmity, whether reflectively 
or intuitively, is always present in order for an individual to engage in violence within war; its 
presence is significant enough in the biographies of those who have taken part in war that it 
deserves some attention. Also, the social concept of the enemy has been central within processes of 
military training and socialisation as well as wider ideological narratives which seek to draw in 
support for military action. Violence more broadly, of which the experience of enmity is often 
present, lends itself to the phenomenological approach in that it is fundamentally a problem of 
‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ when considering violence in this way, “it is as if our experience were somehow 
incapable of articulating its meaning, as if we always come up short, revealing the depth of the 
absence of sense at the heart of the experience of violence itself” (Dodd, 2009:15). Violence 
according to this reading is fundamentally subjective (Dodd, 2009:48) though it draws into its sense 
188 
 
the outer social structures which constitute its occurrence. Violence contains the possibility of 
constituting meaning through the promise of providing some ‘cogency of the self’ (Dodd, 2009:138); 
it tests us in a radical manner: 
“in this sense (it) promises to offer us a unique perspective on the essential outlines of who 
we are. If we are drawn to violence, whether violent acts (challenging a sexual competitor to a 
duel) or situations (volunteering for a dangerous mission), it is because of such a promise; it is 
the promise that, in stepping beyond the confines of the “normal,” we will discover, at the 
other end of what is allowed and acceptable, the truth of who we are (I am for sure “the one;” 
I am brave, honorable, engaged, etc.)” (Dodd, 2009:138) 
This possible resolution of questions of self (one’s honour, ones superiority over the enemy) in the 
existential sense represents for Sartre a temporal breakage and suspension (Sartre quoted in Dodd, 
2009:138) of the ongoing process of ‘open-ended self-articulation’. It is a phenomenological 
distortion animi whereby the individual extricates themselves from this ongoing process of 
determining self-hood and hopes that the act of violence itself will bring about a ‘given being’. The 
act of violence defines ones selfhood as brave; ones domination and superiority over the enemy as 
complete.  
If we accept as Sartre suggests that violence offers the promise of a given being, we must also 
attempt to understand how violence is made possible in this relational sense in the context of war 
with an opposition force. It is not enough that one is simply opposed to the other force in war, that 
opposition must be a relation of enmity to make violence a possibility. The form of violence that will 
be discussed in these terms will be limited to political violence, that is, violence projected by the 
state for some policy objective. The enemy in this context is never a stable and subject to change.  
Carl Schmitt argues that a political enemy need not be morally evil, only that he is the Other, “the 
stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially 
something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (Schmitt, 
1976:27). A very specific form of violent death lies at the heart of Schmitt’s determination of the 
friend/enemy distinction; this threat of violence directed towards one from the enemy (and vice 
versa), is specific in that it is a matter of how we as a collective live, contra the way of life of the 
Other (Dodd, 2009:34). This is fundamental to the possibility of forming fighting collectives, “with 
the possibility of a particular modality of cohesive force that lends such collectivities a specific 
existential profile an individual could never have” (Dodd, 2009:34). The ‘enemy’ Other in this 
relation embodies a specific type of threat determined by each’s membership of their respective 
collective. The construction of the Other as enemy along these lines is made possible by the 
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production of ideology which cements the national imaginary whilst simultaneously alienating the 
Other. This production of the Other as enemy for the purposes of political violence has historically 
required a clear delineation between in internal and external such that enemies exist outside the 
political order: 
“The fundamental difference between internal and external is hence that between enemy and 
criminal. Enemies are not criminals, criminals are not enemies, since criminals are internal to 
the political order and only a State law defines them as such. Enemies are instead other States 
outside the political order and they exist in a natural relation with the State” (Gali et al, 
2009:203) 
Enemies are then external, outside the political order of the state and in opposition to the ‘ways of 
life’ which mark that political order. As Barkawi also states, national identities also depend on 
representations of threat from other nations (Barkawi, 2006:99). As such, the enemy Other and Self 
co-constitute one another. In this sense the practice of war produces cultural resources which shape 
images of self and enmity towards the Other (Barkawi, 2006:97). In World War 1  the dynamic of 
internal/external opposition which made violence possible in the way Schmitt understood it, 
constructed the enemy as an “antagonist in a clash of civilization, both internal and 
external…commerce opposes war…freedom opposes authoritarianism or organization” (Gali et al, 
2009:209). In the post 1989 political and economic order, Global war, as Gali terms it, or the ‘the 
New Western Way of War’ (Shaw, 2006) is one where these binaries of internal and external are no 
longer as easy to bring into focus. The ideological machinery of the state still does attempt to draw 
the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the internal and external, ‘our way of life’ and theirs, ‘I’ and 
‘Other’. However, the processes of globalisation which Shaw outlines such as the movement of 
people and ‘ways of life’ mean that “the internal and external bleed into one other until they 
disappear and lose sense” (Gali et al, 2009.214). Still, if we accept Schmitt’s necessity that for the 
possibility of political violence the enemy is required as a counterpoint of strangeness which 
threatens the collective way of life, then how do we make sense of the enemy in the context of the 
Global Wars that Western militaries have found themselves fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq? The 
predicament facing those who wish to fight these wars is how to distinguish the enemy when 
“Global War has no fronts or regular armies; it is incapable of distinguishing between enemy and 
criminal, between military and civilian, between private and state armies” (Gali et al, 2009:216). The 
enemy in these contexts, due to the impossibility of approximating the imaginary boundaries of the 
internal and external, becomes a ‘phantom’: 
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“The phantom-enemy is so irrepresentable that even its hyper-representation is difficult: it is 
not by chance that the opposed propagandas are more preoccupied with the virtual 
construction of the friend's identity than with the enemy's representation. The phantom 
enemy is the ultimate figure of hostility and the most uncanny because it is not different or 
distant from us” (Gali et al, 2009:217) 
This phenomenon whilst intensified presently, has always been a characteristic of the problem of 
violence in the context of state military action. The boundaries of internal and external, I and ‘Other’ 
have never had a true facticity even within the contexts of the First and Second World War. As 
explicit ideological narratives which reify these types of boundaries have become harder to maintain 
in the context of Global Wars, the production of these boundaries often takes place with respect to 
the discourses of hyper masculinity, set against the enemy Other. In this case, the collective whose 
internal and external boundaries can no longer be drawn according to national identity tropes, is 
brought into being, and likewise the enemy, through specific framings of Western masculinity. This 
militarised Western masculinity, discussed in the context of the American soldier is framed as 
embodying virtues such as courage, benevolence and self-sacrifice in contrast to the defiance, lunacy 
and random violence of the Iraqi male (Sjoberg, 2007:82). To support these ideological framings of 
masculine Self and Other, it also relied on a pedigree of Orientalism which takes as given the 
Western man as “tough but tender and technologically sophisticated” in contrast to the “Arab villain 
from an inferior civilisation” (Niva quoted in Sjoberg, 2009:82). Barkawi also identifies this as a form 
of ‘military orientalism’ linking Western military strategies in the non-European world and 
constructions of Western identity (2006:109). As mentioned previously discourses of hyper 
masculinity feature frequently within processes of military socialisation and have arguably become 
central to the framing of enemy Other as occupying a distinct way of life in opposition to the 
western ‘collective’ which makes possible the possibility of political violence in this context.  
The notion of ‘humanitarian war’ is also central to attempts to delineate the ‘phantom enemy’ as 
well as provide the ideological basis for ethical militaristic violence. Western military action in the 
non-western world is by definition, framed according to the narrative of humanitarian war. Likewise, 
this means that the violence itself must be constructed in line with the logic of this narrative. 
Western war is “warfare that seeks to liberate and civilise. Western self-interest is occluded among 
tropes of civilisation and barbarism” (Barkawi, 2006:105-6). If western war is according to this 
discourse civilised, then violence itself must be civilised. This finds clear expression within the 
current framings of an ethics of restraint. 
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The language and appeal to universal humanist ethics which characterises the current discourse of 
ethics as expressed through institutional Core Values in the British Army is situated in an obvious 
tension with the phenomenology of enmity that has previously been outlined. The possibility of 
political violence, as Schmitt argues, requires the production of the enemy Other as a threat to the 
collectives ‘way of life’. This in itself is contra the underpinning universalist morality implied in Core 
Values which seeks to base itself on an appeal to the intrinsic value of every human life. Core values 
seek to impose a moral framework which limits and restrains violence, whilst the necessity of 
constructing the enemy Other brings into being the possibility of its, and one’s own complete 
destruction. This itself further marks out the lines of tension between an ethics of violence and an 
ethics of restraint. 
 
8.6 Enabling the Act of Violence- Ex Ante/Ex-Post 
In many ways, the principle aim of this research has been to understand not only the role of ethics in 
the British Army but also how soldiers come to understand and make sense of the violence that they 
are asked to take part in on behalf of the state. Making sense of that violence before and after the 
fact is something that all soldiers experience and it is these experiences which this chapter now 
directs itself towards. Soldiers responses to violence have been a salient concern to the Army as this 
determines a soldier’s ability to repeatedly constitute violence successfully in order to carry out the 
institution’s aims. Ethics are the foundation of shaping soldier’s responses to violence, whether the 
formal institutional ethics taken as Core Values, or informal ethics enmeshed within the institutional 
ethos. As mentioned previously, Core Values are the means by which soldiers can orientate their 
practices such that they may accumulate symbolic capital in the form of honour. Soldiers attempt to 
embody Core Values as strategy to achieving this primary capital form within the military field which 
determines individual soldier’s objective positions within that field. In order to understand ethics as 
a means to enable violence in this context, one must look towards how soldiers understand their 
motivations to engage in that violence and also how they come to make sense of that violence to 
themselves after it has taken place. The following accounts discuss motivations regarding fighting 
and how if at all these connect with Core Values: 
“I think it is in the team, I don’t think it is derived from anything so, sort of lofty as ethical 
goals or the will of the people…It’s the officers job to worry about the mission, but frankly 
when it comes to fighting it’s about your lads.” (Soldier H, 2016) 
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Whilst when it came to considering violence and specifically killing after it had taken place, this 
Major was remarkably open about how he felt about it:  
Soldier H: “I don’t really have to deal with it because it doesn’t bother me. Yeah, I just don’t 
have a huge problem with it.” 
Q: Why do you think that is?  
Soldier H: “Slightly sociopathic (laughs), I don’t get very emotional about stuff at all, and I have 
always been like that. I have read a couple of the texts (on sociopathy) and I am definitely on 
the high end of the spectrum. I certainly didn’t join the Army because I wanted to kill people. 
But the corollary to that is I don’t have a huge problem to kill someone” (Soldier H, 2016) 
This type of response was unique through the course of interviewing, but it is difficult to say whether 
this soldier stood out only for his candour. He then talked to the absence of emotional burden 
regarding killing in other soldiers, but tended to frame it in more problematic ways:  
“He killed a lot of people and it got to a point at about half way through the tour- I think he 
banged himself in for a chat with the Padre or something and he said he wanted to talk about 
this because ‘I am not having a problem, but I am concerned because I am not having a 
problem’. I wouldn’t be surprised if that has come up a few times. I think the blokes, have a 
good instinct, and are well calibrated to, you know, they know that they should be bothered 
about it but when they are not they go, ‘ooh, that’s a bit strange’.” (Soldier H, 2016) 
Violence and the possibility of killing was more broadly discussed by the soldiers in relation to 
protecting oneself and one’s fellow soldiers as well as the fear of failure to do this. Also, the chain of 
command tended to be an important factor in being able to justify the decision to use force, 
particularly for snipers where temporally, violence tended to unfold at a slower, more considered 
pace:  
“For a sniper it is a far more considered act as they are usually sitting there watching someone 
about to do something rather than doing something. When there is a sign of clear intent- that 
is when they open fire. I think snipers are less likely to have a chance encounter and shoot 
someone and it turns out to be the wrong person… I suppose there is the element that if you 





“Everyone looks at conflict and war completely different, the Core Values are always there 
with you, but there are different aspects of doing it, you always have that choice to do it or 
not do it. The ‘why’ for me is who I am with, I have been a Sniper on all these Ops and I have 
made a bond with the lads, so, they have been getting engaged so I have never had the 
hesitation to pull the trigger. I have never had that thought, going ‘what will happen if I do 
this?’, it’s come to the point where if I needed to do it I have done it.” (Soldier Z, 2016) 
For this sniper the conscious reflection on enacting violence diminished as his experience increased 
alongside higher casualties:  
“I was a young lad, I had turned 21 when I was out there; those conscious decisions (about 
killing) were there with me…Herrick 12- that was worse for the Mercian regiment at the time. 
We had a lot of casualties- that give me that big force of ‘I don’t care now’, it was either them 
or me or my friends.” (Soldier Z, 2016). 
The following response represented one of the only times any of the soldiers that was interviewed 
discussed the emotional experience of killing directly: 
“It’s a strange feeling to kill someone, it’s a very strange feeling. It’s another human being, 
regardless of how much bravado you want to throw into it, it’s a hugely strange feeling. I had 
to be honest with myself and say I am actually experiencing some strange things here and 
then talk to my mucka (friend).” (Soldier K, 2016) 
The possible future emotional burden of failure to protect one’s fellow soldiers is mentioned by this 
soldier when discussing how he makes sense of killing: 
“If I know that I killed someone, if I know that I didn’t then he was either going to kill me or 
one of my friends then I would be feeling ten times worse if it was either him or us.” (Soldier I, 
2016).  
The concept of cowardice was mentioned only once and situated it in relation to the role of the 
Moral Component of Fighting Power. As mentioned previously, one of the few occasions where 
ethics have been explicitly linked to violence as an enabler: 
“The essence of the moral component is what makes people fight, and people don’t fight for 
Queen, they don’t fight for their country, they fight to not look like a coward in front of their 
mates- that is what they really fight for and that is one of the first reasons they fight. Most 
extreme is when they are showing loyalty and camaraderie and all that but mostly they will 
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stick their head above the parapet and open fire so as to not look like a coward- because there 
is no worse label- and I have seen it happen and it is awful.” (Soldier J, 2016) 
Core Values were constantly referred to within the context of combat and extended beyond to 
provide the basis for combat motivation, but also included their role in shaping ethical conduct: 
“I think all the Core Values go into build your head before you go on tour. You get beasted 
with it and do all your judgmental training, ive never seen it where someone has just shot at a 
random guy, just because they want to, because they are bored or something. They take over 
you when you are in combat- they are ingrained in you. Discipline again, if you get told to fire, 
obviously not indiscriminately, if you’re scared and you get told ‘shoot that cunt now’ then if 
you’ve got discipline and you are scared you will get your head above the parapet. Again, that 
also comes down to Respect for Others- they are all interlinked so closely. Courage is just 
stepping up to the game really, again there is physical courage where you want to do your 
best and protect the men around you or civilians. Moral courage is more ‘doing the right 
thing’- a term you have heard probably quite a lot doing this. Moral courage goes back to you 
knowing right from wrong.” (Soldier E, 2016) 
As argued previously, codified values are proxies for symbolic capital in the form of honour which 
express primarily a commitment to one’s peers within the primary social group. This form of 
symbolic capital is founded in relation to the primary group and an ethics of recognition. As a soldier, 
one’s standing is measured directly in relation to this alongside a distinct form of masculine symbolic 
capital as expressed in relation to combat experience. This form of symbolic capital determines an 
individual’s objective position within the military field as the following describes it relation to honour 
as derived from combat experience: 
“I think key events can lift someone’s value- combat experience would definitely be one of 
them without a shadow of a doubt, combat experience, just raw ability, and bearing would be 
the other one-  bearing, um, you know when someone walks into a room and you can tell that 
this guy is someone, you’ll see lads carry themselves in different ways, you get lads that have 
been in a year and they will carry it, you’ll see lads that have been in for 7 years and they 
won’t” (Soldier G, 2016) 
This seems to be alluding to some type of embodied dimension to symbolic capital in which there is 
a performative quality which relates to a specific type of masculinised experience in the military 
field. It stands as a marker which indicates an authentic experience which is a determinant of the 
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possession off this form of symbolic capital, this might be captured by words such as calmness, 
weariness, knowingness, assurance etc. 
Understandings of Core Values are both subjectively and intersubjectively constituted, they are also 
shaped by the relative contexts that soldiers find themselves in. In the infantry values such as 
Physical Courage will be understood differently to the other Corps. This is determined by the 
multitude of situated practices which see these values enacted and validated as well as the manner 
in which they are specifically instrumentalized by the institution itself. The following response by 
Soldier K emphasises how Core Values are understood according to the Corp one belongs to: 
“There was another great example- in Afghanistan they decided to use the tank regiments to 
move their men across into infantry. A Tanky is by nature not a robust person, not bad per se, 
but probably very good at tank warfare but that is not infantry warfare, it is a completely 
different environment, you need to be physically robust. So, they sent these Tankies into this 
area and there were more casualty extractions than the two previous tours together because 
they couldn’t sustain themselves. They had no fighting ability whatsoever as they had gone 
from this huge vehicle to just holding a rifle so they must have felt vulnerable- they extracted 
them because they weren’t doing the job and they sent our infantry unit in. (Soldier K, 2016) 
The unit, platoon, regiment and professional role, whether infantry or other Corps, all shape how 
Core Values come to be understood by soldiers. By their very nature, their meanings are not stable 
and are constantly in a process of contestation. In relation to a soldier’s professional role, the way in 
which Core Values are expressed intersubjectively enables soldiers to define their own roles in 
distinction to other Corps. Physical and Moral Courage will broadly be understood in the same way 
by most soldiers. However, when explained in parallel to other roles, for example between the 
infantry and Tank regiments as Soldier K discusses, physical courage will be defined specifically in a 
way in which to ground the exceptionalism of one Corp over another. For the infantryman, the 
embodiment of Physical and Moral Courage for them means something different, and superior to 
the Tank regiments understanding of it. The lack of physical ‘robustness’ and ability to sustain 
themselves whilst performing the infantrymen’s role is by implication the inability to embody the 
values of Physical and Moral Courage. Underpinning this failure and witnessed across several 
interviews, is the notion amongst the infantry that the embodiment of a soldierly ideal is through 
membership of the infantry, and along with this is the embodiment of the masculine ideal. The 
infantry represents the peak of a certain form of aggressive, physicalized masculine identity, one’s 
inability to perform at that level is a failure to meet that masculine ideal. In that way at least, certain 
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core values when defined in relation to specific roles such as the infantry tie closely into the 
possibility of attaining a hyper-aggressive masculine ideal.   
Soldiers are constantly orientating their practices so as to align with their understandings of what 
these values are, as the better the approximation of these practices the more likely it is that they will 
accumulate the symbolic capital associated to the embodiment of these values. Successful 
attainment of symbolic capital such as honour through the living out of these values marks the 
intersubjective validation of a certain set of practices as being a close enough examples of the value 
itself. This then provides the template for future enactment of the practices which correspond to the 
values itself, both for the soldier who attains that capital form and for others who seek to attain it. 
Intersubjective validation of the successful attainment of a specific value is never stable and subject 
to change.  
An example is the case of Loyalty and Selfless Commitment, as mentioned in previous interview 
responses, Core Values run the risk for providing a justification for a relative morality amongst 
soldiers. Whereby Loyalty to the unit can mean the covering up of serious violations of the Laws of 
Armed Conflict by members of that unit:  
“Misunderstanding the notion of loyalty can lead a soldier to doing the wrong thing- because 
he thinks he needs to show a classic Jack Nicholson thing- ‘unit, core, god, country’, rather 
than what is right. That is a difficult thing to get through to a young lad that has grown up as a 
football lout, possibly, very tribal, inherently tribal culture- they often have very strong family 
backgrounds Even if they may come from a broken family, they are very loyal to nearest and 
dearest- you put them in a section here and put them through a hard training organisation 
and put them through training exercises here that does, bound soldiers together, it really 
does, we came back from Kenya and you could feel the battalion was more cohesive because 
they had been through a tough couple of months. But then you say to them, ‘if you see your 
Lance Jack doing the wrong thing then you’ve got to go and drop him in the shit’, they’re like 
‘what is that all about? That’s not what we fight for’”. (Soldier J, 2016) 
This instability in the way in which this value is understood has been one of the factors which has 
prompted the institution to intervene and attempt to force a shift in understandings of this value. By 
reinterpreting Courage to include Moral Courage, this has allowed the Army to create boundaries in 
terms of how Selfless Commitment can be understood. If one acts with Moral Courage, one has an 
obligation to speak up regarding violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict by other members of one’s 
unit. Thus, Selfless Commitment to one’s unit cannot include covering up wrongdoing as this would 
clearly violate the institutionally defined understanding of Moral Courage.  
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This attempt to determine how Core Values are understood by the institution of the Army, 
represents a process of (mis)recognition emblematic of symbolic violence. Those that drive this 
process of symbolic violence such that solders may come to (mis)recognise these Values as they do, 
have capital compositions which enable them to do this, determined through rank, combat 
experience etc. The relative success of these attempts by the Army to determine these 
understandings of Core Values can be determined by the relative capital compositions of those who 
are attempting to force these processes of symbolic violence. 
 
8.7 Constraining the Act of Violence: Ethical Conduct in Combat 
Through the evolution of the ROE across the multiple operational tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where restraint on violence has been built into the operational environment, codified through the 
concept of Courageous Restraint, the individual soldier has been a constant subject to these 
processes. Card Alpha represented the final stage in the evolution of the ROE across these 
operational settings restricting the use of force to situations of imminent threat to life and for the 
purposes of self-defence or defence of others. This was in distinction to the broader ROE defined by 
Rule 429 A which gives soldiers the right to open fire before an imminent threat to life is present 
(Guardian, 2008). The majority of soldiers that were interviewed for this research, worked under 
Card Alpha which was present in both operational settings: 
“I had one tour in Iraq in 2005 for Tellick 6; and 1 tour in Afghanistan in 2012 for Herrick 14. 
(What do you see as the main difference between your tours in Iraq and Afghanistan?) We 
were under Card Alpha for the majority of both- Iraq was a lot more stand-off, it was mainly 
snipers, IEDs and mortars. Whereas in Afghan it was more combat, engaging with a set 
enemy- in Iraq they used to blend in a lot more with the civilians and they used to use the 
rules of engagement to their advantage a lot more. A friend I was talking to downstairs in the 
smoking area said he remember a time when a man was stood behind a women, shot at him 
then stood behind the women again. Afghan you did find that as well but that was more a 
bloke picking up a rifle, firing it then dropping it, depending on what rules of engagement you 
are on you can fire at them when they have dropped the rifle as they are no longer a threat.”  
Q: Is there an ethical aspect to this decision not to shoot the man when he drops the rifle? 
Soldier E: “Yes, I think it’s a matter of right and wrong, its more protecting yourself because 
you know if you shoot that person, and someone else sees that you are potentially going to 
prison for murder” (Soldier E, 2016) 
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This standpoint on the ROE as a matter of protection from legal consequences of unlawful killing, 
rather than an ethical frame for conduct was reflected across variety of responses, as captured in 
the following: 
“It’s a great idea, a lot of people think it’s working against soldiers- the legal side, it’s helping 
you because, you can say, yes there was a threat, so I acted. I think the way they teach it is 
wrong, a lot of young soldiers in Afghanistan were scared to operate- scared to return rounds. 
They were worried thinking what happens if I go to court, will I get locked up for this? Which is 
wrong because if you think there is a threat to your life then act on it- I don’t think blokes 
should be scared to defend themselves.” (Soldier A1, 2016) 
And: 
“The Army has put them there and at the end of the day you have got to work with those rules 
of engagement, they are not anything you play with- just for the legal side of things.” (Soldier 
F, 2016) 
And Soldier H discusses his understanding of the broader role of ROE and ethics in combat:  
“I think it is about making the right decisions that get the mission done and keep you out of 
jail- that would be my simplest definition of it.” (Soldier H, 2016) 
Soldier Z discusses his experience of both ROEs and the fundamental differences between them: 
“It’s gone from, you know Card Alpha, which you can understand because you can talk about 
it. It’s like, early Iraq, Card Alpha existed but it was more 429- it’s if you come under contact, 
there is no ‘ooh, I’ve got to think about this’, it’s ‘get some!’. I have never met anybody who 
thought, ‘oh, he hasn’t got a weapon, I’m going to shoot him’. The experience through each 
tour for me, I know what Card Alpha is now and I can justify it.  
Q: Do you have to think about it? 
Soldier Z: “No, it’s instantaneous for me now.” (Soldier Z, 2016) 
Violence is inherently unstable in its enacting, and for the purposes of state violence with its twin 
objectives of legitimising the state itself as well as carrying out the states aims, this violence is 
always in a process of constraint and enablement. These processes do not have an end point and are 
often experienced as conflictual at the level of the soldier. Soldier C describes a situation which 
captures the contradictory nature of these two processes which aim to both constrain violence but 
also enable it: 
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“We had a moment on Herrick 12, we were patrolling along and got shot at from a building 
and we pushed back into a field to obviously get out of the line of fire. We PID him in a 
building but because we couldn’t actually see him they wouldn’t let the lads fire at him. We 
got on the Net to the Joint Fire Cell and they basically said you need to walk back out into the 
field for him to fire at you so that we can then fire at him…You can imagine, it was a random 
open field and you had to patrol across an open field and we did it- it was either that or push 
back to the PB (Patrol Base) and that wasn’t really an option. We basically stood up in this 
cropped field walked out and got opened-up (fired upon) on.” (Soldiers C &C1, 2016) 
Soldier Z’s response goes further and understands the manner in which restraint has been 
trained into soldiers as being fundamentally in opposition to their professional roles: 
“It has now been pumped into them that much that they are afraid to do their job, they are 
afraid to pull that trigger. It is a good thing in the sense that you have to watch what the 
population- you don’t want to be shooting somebody who is not involved in it- it also puts the 
fear of God into some of the younger lads, that if they do pull the trigger, they are going to get 
investigated. In the way it has been trained, it has massively overemphasised the restraint 
aspect. It’s not that you are scared of doing the job, it is that you are scared of the 
repercussions. It’s like I have experienced it before on Herrick 17, because obviously with 
Courageous Restraint, we put up warning shots- I had a senior insurgent 600m away with a 
PKM (type of machine gun), I put a warning shot in and then I got told I’d be done for 
attempted murder, one of the officers turned around and said that I had attempted to murder 
somebody…You are always thinking that you have to cover yourself. Some people this does 
affect your behaviour, some people it doesn’t. Even if it came to the point that you were on a 
patrol and came under contact, there will always be some people who won’t engage.” (Soldier 
Z, 2016) 
An ethics of violence is bound up with an ethics of recognition in that violence is constituted partially 
through the development and maintenance of primary group relations which provide the basis for 
the possibility of individuals undertaking that violence. One of main combat motivations is to protect 
the lives of other members of that primary group. This motivation is dependent upon the strength of 
those relations and those relations are dependent on processes of mutual recognition. Performance 
of the soldierly role effectively is also tied up with the presentation of one’s self to other members of 
the primary group, and acts as a significant motivator to undertake violence. Restraint of violence of 
the type outlined by the soldiers above is experienced as conflictual to this ethics of violence which 
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is founded in primary group relations and an ethics of recognition. At a deliberative level though, 
soldiers understand the purpose of restraint of violence from both a strategic and moral standpoint: 
“I was in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012. Day to day life was just routine patrols, we mainly 
did intel gathering, searching buildings- if you were lucky you might go out on Ops. It was card 
Alpha at the time (rules of engagement), we didn’t fire upon anyone unless they fired on us. If 
we deemed they were a threat to our lives or anyone else’s then we could fire. That was 
common sense. There were touchy subjects, we had a lot of people planting IEDs in the 
ground, you knew they were the enemy, you could see them planting it in the ground and you 
asked over the radio ‘can I shoot him’- it was touch and go. It might not have been, it could 
have been a random civilian. He’s a threat to your life because he’s doing it, but he is not a 
threat to your life currently. That was the touchy subject- is he Taliban?- he could have just 
been a civvy made to do it. I’d just go through the chain of command to work out what to do. 
You wouldn’t just jump the gun, there is no reason to just randomly shoot them. (Soldier D, 
2016)” 
And the moral justifications for restraint are explicitly referred to in the following response: 
It’s a good idea, don’t get me wrong but, it can…paralyse you. (on restraint in the COIN 
environment) It’s a moral issue more than a strategic issue- its human life you’re talking 
about. (on ethical ‘decision making in combat) Its definitely instinct, its just there, you’re doing 
it, you can’t hesitate. At the start of the tour you’re more cautious but by the end its second 
nature. (Soldier D, 2016) 
Most of the soldiers that took part in this research, understood the purpose of restraint on violence 
from both a moral and strategic standpoint. However, there was a clear sense that the various 
processes which sought to restrain that violence ran the risk of meaning that soldiers were unable to 
perform their roles effectively as they were externally prevented from utilising violence; or these 
forces of restraint had shaped newer recruits in such a way that they became unable to deploy 
violence. This inability stems partially from the risk of external legal scrutiny of their actions as 
mentioned, but also it exists as a contradictory restraint when considered in relation to the warrior 
creed or ethics of violence. Soldier C discusses this tension clearly: 
“It had all gone down to collateral damage, we were winning hearts and minds and all that, we 
had gone from going in there and getting shot and shooting to getting shot at and not firing 
until we could PID something- you brought it up on the radio and said you had been shot at 
from this building- authorisation would then have to go up the chain of command to see if you 
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could fire back or mortars could be used. Many times we got called because the troops were 
under fire but we couldn’t fire back because of the collateral damage. You couldn’t properly 
do your job. We had to go through our chain of command to the Joint Fire Cell which is just a 
bunch of old guys chatting war, by the time you had done that, 15 minutes had passed. It was 
a bit frustrating; you go through all your training at 1000 miles an hour, hard, fast and 
aggressive- you get there, get it done and get out. When you go on tour, it ceases to exist, 
your training seems irrelevant, you just sit around and do nothing all day and your just like, 
what did I train for. As a rifleman your training is relevant for that, for mortars, we did weeks 
and weeks of exercises and we got there and just stagged on (went on patrol)” (Soldier C1, 
2016) 
Unconstrained violence leads to the violence being constituted as illegitimate; restrained violence 
becomes increasingly difficult to carry out. These boundaries which seek to structure violence and 
seek to make it legitimate, also develop responses to violence in soldiers which have contradictory 
effects. At a deliberative level restraint on violence is often experience as a restraint on being able to 
carry out the soldierly role effectively. However, as mentioned its moral and strategic rationale is 
largely accepted. The ability to effectively bridge these contradictory experiences of processes which 
seek to both enable violence and restrain it seem to be closely connected with the development of 
experience:  
“I had sent very single bit of detail over the radio and had told the officer I would be taking a 
warning shot- there were two officers at the time arguing saying yes he needs to do it, no he 
doesn’t, you I followed my instinct and took the warning shot. The Platoon Commander who 
was against it tried getting me done for attempted murder. I didn’t just take the shot- I had 
built up an entire picture of the situation and that covered me- a younger lad wouldn’t have 
had the experience to think about that” (Soldier Z, 2016) 
The experience Soldier Z refers to represents the successful bridging between these two competing 
forces which constitute state violence at the level of the soldier and is likely only achieved through 
extensive experience in combat. His discussion of the role of instinct in taking the warning shot was 
then contextualised in relation to the processes which underpinned that instinctive response. The 
material act of violence draws in upon it multiple meanings, ethics provide a discursive means of 
constituting those possible readings of the act.  
Core Values provide a possible source of moral justifications for the act of violence, in this sense the 
soldier is the first audience to the possible meaning of the act itself. The second audience to the 
violence which is particular to the COIN operational environment, is the populace of the country, 
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which must be brought to understand the meaning of that act of violence as being a necessity to 
purge that populace of its recalcitrant ‘other’ for a future promise of stability and liberal prosperity. 
The third audience is the population of the state itself, as they must be brought to believe that the 
meanings attached to the violence are legitimate and by extension the states claim to the monopoly 
of that violence is legitimate. The final audience to the meanings attached to the violence is the 
external legal bodies, which make up the network of ‘global surveillance’ (Shaw, 2005) which play a 
role in overseeing the conduct of war, whether the ICC, the legal institutions of the state and the 
media. The violence must be framed as both legal and moral as this restricts the possibility that 
soldiers are prosecuted and ties into the legitimisation of the violence. The violence can only 
become legitimate within a ‘liberal state’ if it is not subject to legal challenge and is taken as just by 
society itself. Ambiguity in this context coupled with the manifest desire to embody the warrior 
creed at times leads to tragic outcomes as this soldier describes: 
“On tour, It’s a bit of a vague one, we were on patrol with a platoon which hadn’t been under 
fire yet, we said to them they could come on this patrol with us, they were proper looking 
forward to getting into it. We persistently briefed their Platoon commander who was the 
same rank as our Platoon commander, although they were technically equal, it was that grey 
area- he needed to listen to our boss and that was the end of it. In the end he didn’t, because 
of that keenness to get into it, he completely ignored what we had said, one of his lads ended 
up getting killed. I see that as him being in the wrong totally. He chose to ignore what was 
being told to him, the experience, he was too keen to get forward and in my mind, arrogant. 
(Soldier K, 2016)” 
In this account, restraint of violence is also considered in relation to protection of oneself and one’s 
troops, the reigning in of the impulse to engage in violence is at times key also to not opening 
oneself up to violence unnecessarily. The initial period of a combat operation for inexperienced 
soldiers appears to be critical in terms of ethical conduct. In absence of that experience, both in 
terms of embodied dispositional responses and the ability to reflect with critical depth on the ethical 
dimensions of a situation, soldiers tend to fall back onto the type of responses trained into them 
through their initial training program. These are shaped predominantly around an ethics of violence, 
and this runs in parallel to the powerful motivation to fulfil the warrior creed in relation to oneself 
and one’s peers. The ‘falling back’ into a response/reactive engagement with an ethically ambiguous 
situation is itself a decision of sorts, and this impulse to react remains with more experienced 
soldiers, but this tends to be partially constrained. This constraint of violence that develops through 
experience and is the hallmark of ethical expertise in this context is discussed in the following:  
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Soldier C: I was always taught if you have got time to think then you don’t need to shoot, if 
you can think about it then you don’t need to shoot. If you spend more than 5-6 seconds 
thinking about it then you don’t need to shoot- you can calm the situation down and stop it 
escalating any further. Unless someone is actually pulling their rifle on me- if your standing 
there looking at someone thinking ‘are they going to shoot me’ then…. (Soldiers C &C1, 2016) 
This suggests a non-reflexive movement from the response to the situation where less experienced 
soldiers may react by shooting immediately, whereas amongst more ethically competent actors, this 
reflex is mediated, and one moves to conscious deliberation on the appropriateness of one’s 
intuitions regarding the situation. This also relates to what one soldier referred to as the ability to 
turn violence off, and tellingly the organisational fear that violence is inherently unbridled and 
constantly in need of constraint: 
“If you are in an environment which dictates you don’t need that violence; if you keep that 
violence up you are going to start hurting civilians, you are going to start risking more 
casualties on your side, if the enemy is virtually destroyed then, boom, you switch it off. If you 
don’t you are inviting more casualties, you can harm civilians and you are effecting the bigger 
picture, that COIN side of things- but they are so scared of people not being able to turn it off 
they say you can never do it in the first place” (Soldier K, 2016) 
Determining appropriate use of force seems to be an almost instantaneous non-reflective act at the 
level of the expert performer in this environment. Ethical experience or expertise brings with it the 
ability to shift from instantaneous response to a situation to deliberative engagement with that 
situation. Thus, this implies a non-reflective determination of the components of the situation which 
allows a pause, and movement into the deliberative mode. This represents a decision of sorts which 
likely passes without notice, but it also represents a critical moment within ethical conduct in 
combat. To respond to the trained impulse to engage in violence or delay that response and engage 
in conscious ethical reflection, represents deliberation on the appropriateness of one’s intuitions, 
which is the hallmark of ethical expertise as outlined by Dreyfus and Dreyfus. Where the novice will 
refer consciously to principles such as Card Alpha, the expert can intuitively determine whether a 
situation belongs to a particular class and apply the principle without falling back into a conscious 
reflection on ethical principles: 
“whatever situation you are in, if you look at Card Alpha...to start off with when you use Card 
Alpha it takes a bit of time to…I wouldn’t say a bit of time, maybe 30-40 seconds to realise 
what you are doing is just. (What’s happening during those seconds?) You are thinking about 
everything, depending on what the situation is, you are thinking ‘is it a threat to you? Is it a 
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threat to someone else?’- these are the type of things you are thinking of. If it came to that 
situation now I wouldn’t even need to think, I’d just act.” (Soldier Z, 2016) 
Built experientially into the moment where a response either takes hold and is enacted, or delayed, 
is the drawing upon prior experience of like situations, contained within the horizon of perception. 
This is a dispositional feature of habitus which is the embodied dimension of ethical expertise. This 
can be considered in the same way as the new driver who tends to respond in exaggerated ways to 
perceived threats on the road, as compared to the experienced driver who is able to determine, 
almost immediately whether a hazard requires an immediate response or can be tracked to see 
whether it develops. In this situation the driver or soldier is drawing on a resource of prior 
experiences which has shaped his habitus and associated dispositional responses in such a way that 
the delay of response, whilst not noticeable in a conscious sense, represents skilful application of 
prior experience.  
 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter primarily addressed itself to trying to understand how soldiers have experienced this 
emergent discourse of ethics in the context of training and the modern operational environment. It 
began by developing an understanding ethical conduct in combat through the work of Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus in their phenomenology of ethical expertise. The words of the soldiers of 2nd Mercian were 
examined in relation to this notion of ethical expertise considered as a form of coping and 
dispositional quality of habitus. It then went on to discuss in greater depth and with reference to the 
testimonies of the soldiers themselves, themes developed through the course of the proceeding 
chapters, in particular the relationship between Core Values and violence in the training and combat 
setting. With respect to the notion of ethical conduct as a form of comportment, ethical training was 
viewed in these terms in order to hopefully shed light on the way pre-existing aspects of current 
training regimes function to develop ethical expertise considered in this way.  
The chapter returned to discussion of codified Core Values, arguing that they provide a significant 
set of ethics which shape ethical conduct in combat in terms of enabling violence, through them 
providing implicitly an ethics which supports the maintenance of the primary group and affords the 
possibility of recognition as a result. Alongside this promise of recognition, violence also was argued 
to offer the promise of ‘given being’ in the Sartrean sense. It then argued that the possibility of 
political or militaristic violence is dependent on the construction of the enemy as Other, external to, 
and outside the political order of the state and in opposition to its ‘ways of life’. Finally, this chapter 
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examined the ethical ambiguity and complexity which has arisen within the COIN operational 
environment which has been experienced by soldiers at times in a contradictory sense. There exists 
a contradiction between an ethics of violence as expressed through the warrior creed and an ethics 
of restraint expressed through the concept of Courageous Restraint. The ethics which has emerged 
























Chapter 9: Concluding the Study 
 
9.1 A Survey of the Argument 
This research had the aim of exploring two questions related to ethics in the context of the Military 
and specifically the British Army; namely, why has a discourse around ethics emerged in the British 
Military over the last 30 years; and how have soldiers experienced this discourse of ethics? These 
questions implied and opened up further lines of enquiry regarding how ethics can be understood 
sociologically in relation to the institution of the Army; the relationship between these ethics and 
soldiers; and how these potential understandings play out in the operational context of combat. The 
field of military ethics has often taken them as given in the spontaneous sociological sense, or at the 
very most understood in terms of their functionality in producing certain behaviours which suite 
military objectives. Occasionally they are discussed with reference to their aspirational 
characteristics in terms of how they shape individuals in morally praiseworthy ways considered as 
end in itself. What these accounts share is their tendency to foreclose a more detailed analysis of 
ethics as sociologically significant objects. This research has attempted to treat them in this way, as 
novel and unique social objects the context of the institution of the Army, bearing significant 
relationships of meaning and value to the soldiers themselves as well as playing a crucial role in 
shaping ethical conduct. 
The shift in analytical focus that this research has engaged has opened up a whole new set of 
possible questions, not least, as this research has explored, what ethics even are and how and why 
individuals orient themselves toward them. Within studies on military ethics there is a great deal 
written about ethical imperatives, what one ought to do given some ethical dilemma and this is 
certainly an appropriate avenue of research. Yet this has come at the expense of examining how we 
understand ethics in terms of the relationship they bear sociologically to the individual carriers of 
ethical conduct. In order to reach a desired ethical outcome, whatever that may be, we must first 
understand the processes by which ethical conduct is shaped.  
In answering these research questions, we have seen that Core Values are fundamental to the 
ethical fabric of military life and represent one of the main features of the emergence of this 
discourse of ethics. They contribute to primary group cohesion, connectedly provide a possible 
resource to legitimate acts of violence, and shape ethical conduct in combat. Core values as strive 
worthy ends also stand as means through their embodiment of achieving symbolic capital such as 
honour. The effort to accumulate this primary capital form in the military field, represents the search 
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for recognition. As such the military field is founded primarily upon an ethics of recognition without 
which militaristic violence would be impossible to achieve. This being one of the primary ways in 
which soldiers have experienced this emergent ethics.  
This research claimed that this represents the way in which the military ‘makes’ war through ethics 
by overcoming resistance to violence at the level of the individual soldier, and by constraining that 
violence such that it maintains legitimacy. Their importance in these respects has been evidenced 
through an increasing institutional ‘turn’ towards ethics over the last 30 years, however in the case 
of the British Army this ‘turn’ found its initial roots in the operational experiences of the Infantry in 
Northern Ireland in the 1970s. This has been precipitated by a number of other factors such as 
perceptions concerning a ‘deterioration’ in recruit background which has been a persistent theme 
within Army culture which predates the empirical focus of this research; a response to government 
interference in the Army’s institutional culture; increasing external moral scrutiny concerning 
operational and peacetime actions framed as a form of ‘Global Surveillance’; the inherent ethical 
complexities implied through recent COIN operational experiences; and finally the wider ethical 
‘turn’ characterised by ‘humanitarian interventionism’ in the New Western Way of War.  
At the level of the relationship between the military and the state, the various forms of ethics 
attached to militaristic violence of which Core Values represent one example, serve a crucial role in 
the symbolic ordering of violence. By considering the state as “the sector of the field of power, or 
bureaucratic field, which is defined by a possession of the monopoly of legitimate physical and 
symbolic violence” (Loyal, 2017:67), it opened up an account of the relationship between the 
military field and state field where ethics was considered as a symbolic process of (mis)recognition. 
It was argued that this process is one which aims to make militaristic violence legitimate and is 
closely tied up with the ongoing ‘making’ of the state. The symbolic construction of state violence as 
legitimate makes the state by constituting its’ ongoing claim over the monopoly on legitimate 
violence.  
This research claimed that there is an emerging a tension between a traditional Army conception of 
an ethics of violence, formed in relation to conventional understandings of warfare and an ethics of 
restraint implied in the COIN operational environment. Whilst some degree of restraint on 
militaristic or state violence has always been an inherent feature of that violence, the COIN 
operational setting is inherently an ethical terrain where ethics becomes enmeshed in the strategic 
objective. Finally, it argued that ethical conduct in the context of combat, ought to be considered as 
much an act of intuitive coping and a dispositional feature of an individual’s habitus, as it is a process 
of conscious deliberation.  
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9.2 Limitations of the Research and its Findings 
In many respects, one of the most fundamental problems this research faced was that there was the 
potential scope for two independent research questions which could have been examined at length 
in separate research projects. The decision to deal with both questions within this research was a 
conscious one which entailed certain sacrifices. It was a fundamental objective to examine the 
experiences of the soldiers themselves with respect to ethics within the Army which could not have 
been undertaken without a substantive analysis of the sociological and historical context within 
which this institutional ethics had emerged. Likewise, any effort to understand and account for as 
fully as possible why this discourse of ethics had taken shape in the way it had more recently, invited 
questions concerning combat motivation and ethical conduct in combat. These could only have been 
answered with respect to the words of the soldiers themselves.  
Certain choices were made with respect to how deeply the research delved into the empirical data. 
Chapter 7 only touched the surface on themes related to recruit background, habitus fit to the 
military field and the broader relationship these bore to Core Values and connectedly symbolic 
capital. As more theoretical argument was necessary to bring out some of the themes surrounding 
recognition seeking practices and the relationship to Core Values and symbolic capital, the decision 
was made to scale back the empirical data in order to elucidate these themes. This meant chapter 7 
may have looked somewhat novel in the sense that it was not traditionally an empirical chapter as it 
drew on both theoretical argument, literature and empirical data equally. This decision lead to 
chapter 8 being the main empirical chapter where the attempt was made to deal with the core 
themes (enabling violence; constraining violence; ethical conduct as an intuitive aspect of habitus) 
directly with respect to the soldier’s experiences.  
The limitations imposed by the requirements of the length of a piece of research are always present. 
In respect to chapter 8, the nature of the subject matter and the responses from the soldiers meant 
that the interview extracts tended to be very long. This was a conscious decision which was taken as 
it was important not to abridge these responses too much, as the context and detail regarding their 
experiences was crucial in elucidating the points that were trying to be made. In particular, Soldier 
H’s discussion of his experience of a riot in Al Amara17 and his response concerning the use of force 
could not have been fully accounted for without knowing some detail about the Platoons prior 
experiences there, the full details of what actually took place as well as his understanding of the 
events as they unfolded. The result of using interview responses which tended to be quite long 
meant that it reduced the scope for including more responses to support the various arguments that 
 
17 See 8.3 
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were being made. In addition, chapter 8 also included some theoretical debate with reference to its 
development of Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s account of the phenomenology of skill acquisition in the 
context of ethical conduct and the phenomenology of enmity. The decision to introduce this in the 
final empirical chapter was to provide the frame for understanding the accounts of the soldiers 
concerning their own ethical conduct in the context of combat. Had all of this have been included in 
the theory chapter it would have potentially lost its rhetorical weight and it was felt that this part of 
the argument represented the final point in the development of other themes which had taken place 
in previous chapters. Chapter 7 attempted to draw out the relationship between habitus and the 
predominant symbolic capital forms in the military field, the objective was to elucidate the 
phenomenological dimension to habitus and ethical conduct followed directly from discussion of 
habitus in relation to symbolic capital.  
The final limitation this research faced sits squarely with the researcher himself. This research has 
explicitly attempted to bridge an uncomfortable divide in its attempt to provide a critical and 
professional sociology (Burawoy, 2004) of ethics in the military. Its discussion of ethics as a means of 
legitimising state violence and making the state itself could be characterised as being more critically 
orientated whilst its discussion of this institutional ethics as having a primary, life affirming value to 
soldiers, and also its normative emphasis on bringing out the intuitive dimension to ethical conduct 
for the purpose of improving ethical ‘training’, stands clearly in the professional domain of military 
sociology. This researcher believes that these two positions do not stand in opposition to one 
another. However, the choice in attempting to deal with both perspectives on the military has 
inevitably meant that certain lines of enquiry have been closed off. For example, this research could 
have spent more time examining the role of masculinities in constituting militaristic violence. For the 
purposes of length this would however have limited the existing lines of analysis that did take place. 
In addition, a research project cannot be all things at all times and it was decided early on in this 
process that the role of masculinities in relation to constituting military subjectivities was one which 
had been dealt with at length extensively in other academic contributions.   
Connected to the features of this research which can correctly be characterised as professional 
sociology, is the normative position of the researcher. As stated from the outset this research 
represents the partial attempt to say something regarding ethics which might serve the purpose of 
improving understandings from within the Army. The aim is that this might contribute to a small 
change in the way ethics come to be instructed to soldiers. This normative stance will have had 
consequences both acknowledged and unacknowledged. What remains clear is that the 
fundamental limitation of adopting this stance is that this research will have been written with this 
audience also in mind. The production of research will always be informed by its potential audience 
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and in this case, this included the soldiers who were participants within its empirical component. 
The knowledge that the research would be read and likely presented to these participants in the 
future has likely shaped aspects of its form. This sense of audience was most clearly kept in mind by 
the researcher in terms of doing justice to the words of the soldiers themselves in respect to 
guarding against acts of symbolic violence to those words. This guarding against the disabuse 
through selective interpretation (Schostak, 2006:60) of interview data to fit the analytical objective 
in the way Bourdieu frames it, also itself runs the risk of over sympathy with the interview data and 
the taking of it at face value. It will be up to the reader to determine the degree of success or failure 
in this respect. It has endeavoured to be as vigilant as possible and has where possible let the words 
of the soldiers speak for themselves.  
 
9.3 Some Implications Arising from this Research 
The most a research project such as this can hope for is to establish partial responses to the research 
question and the success and coherency of those responses might be judged by the degree to which 
they offer the potential of opening up further possible questions. This research has only attempted 
to touch the surface of the question of ethics in the military and British Army. Perhaps the most 
suitable way to consider the implications arising from this research is to suggest further questions 
that might be drawn from the outcomes of its analysis.  
This research represented a limited application of the ideas and concepts developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu within the context of the military. Whilst it arguably stands as a more substantive 
application of the concepts of field, capital and habitus than has been undertaken previously with 
respects to the military; it raises the question of what a more in depth and substantive application of 
these concepts might tell us for example about the relationship between different capital forms 
within the military field. What a comprehensive Bourdieusian study of the military field might reveal 
with relation to how the military field interacts with the state field. Finally, are there multiple military 
fields, as this research has implied?  
The predominant focus of this research was on the role of symbolic capital considered as a primary 
capital form within the military field, however, the objective positions of individuals in any field are 
determined relationally by their position of various forms of capital, as such this opens up further 
questions concerning the functions of different capital compositions. Also, in relation to the question 
just raised this research argued that the military field plays a significant role in relation to the state 
field in terms of how ethics contributes to legitimising state violence and ‘making’ the state. This 
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implies a relationship between the two fields which has currently not been explored with reference 
to this type of Bourdeusian analysis.  
Connectedly, the theme of the family field was looked at in terms of its role in potentially shaping 
individual’s habitus to make it practically orientated to the military field. Whilst there has been some 
work which has considered the question of military-civilian transition; what this research has 
potentially raised is the connected question of how does the experience of soldiers in the context of 
the field of family contribute to understanding their entry into the military field and the formation of 
their subsequent military subjectivities understood in relation to habitus? This question has the 
potential to open up a whole new line of research into civilian-military transition which invites us to 
think of fields in the relational sense that Atkinson (2016) asks us to and also potentially allows us to 
consider militarism through this type of relational field analysis.  
This research also represents the broad attempt to understand the role of ethics in the context of 
state-organised violence through its emphasis on the military. The arbitrary relationship between 
the possibility of legitimate violence and the state has already been discussed, as well as the role 
ethics plays in relation to this. What has rarely been considered is how the question of ethics plays 
out in the context of non-state fighting groups. This raises the following question; How do non-state 
fighting groups employ ethical systems both explicitly and implicitly to constitute and make possible 
violence; how does ethics come to constitute the subjectivities of the individuals involved in the 
participation in that violence? This takes as its starting point, and problematizes, the dichotomy 
forwarded in traditional IR that the nation state is the only social organisation that has the claim 
over legitimate violence. By considering non-state fighting groups as also engaged in ongoing 
processes of trying to make violence legitimate both to those undertaking that violence and external 
audiences to that violence, it potentially opens up the study of military ethics in a far broader sense, 
challenging its implicit normative claim that ethics as related to organised violence is only attached 
to state fighting groups.  
Finally, this research has attempted to provide a critical re-evaluation of some of the theoretical 
orthodoxies which have marked a large proportion of military sociology. Whilst this research does go 
some way in supporting previous work on the significance of primary group relations in the context 
of constituting the possibility of violence in military organisations; it also asks the reader to re-
examine some of the core assumptions which have marked out the self-imposed boundaries of 
military sociology. Leaving aside the crucial work both Hockey and Burke have done in their unit 
level studies, military sociology often neglects this level of analysis. Through bringing the ideas of 
Pierre Bourdieu to bear on military practices, this work has brought into focus the situated social 
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practices of individual soldiers at the level of unit and tied these into wider processes by which the 
military field is mediated and how other social fields intersect to shape an individual soldiers habitus. 
This goes some way in breaking down the self-imposed categories of the civil-military binary which 
still constrain military sociology. In the context of the sub-field of military ethics, this research’s 
emphasis on the phenomenological level of ethical conduct ought to force a re-evaluation of 
persistent assumptions that ethical conduct is exclusively a deliberative process.  
 
9.4 Recommendations 
The previous section examined some potential questions that this research has raised, the following 
will briefly make suggestions for how some of these questions might specifically be opened-up in 
relation to further research agendas. Considering the phenomenon of military-civilian transition with 
respect to the ideas of Bourdieu, it brings into focus the possible application of the concept of 
‘hysteriesis’  which describes the “discord occurring when the new field encountered is too different 
from the field to which one’s habitus is previously adjusted. Hysteresis may manifest in certain 
‘‘negative sanctions’’ such as fear, anxiety, or resistance to change” (Cooper et al, 2016:9). The 
application of this concept as a means to understand the experiences of social dislocation and other 
negative responses that soldiers experience when attempting to transition into civilian life is already 
being undertaken by some writers in the field of military sociology (ibid). What has not received 
attention at present is the potential negative life outcomes of this hysteriesis in relation to military 
veterans being disproportionately represented in prison populations, making up more than 4% 
(Ministry of Justice, 2018).  
Two potential themes of analysis are suggested by this focus- firstly what makes military veterans 
predisposed to enter specific types of criminality? A recent lecture delivered by a veteran (Jones, 
2019) who is currently serving a 15 year sentence for his involvement a in an Organised Criminal 
Group (OCG) that was part of a conspiracy to sell illegal drugs discussed his attraction to this type of 
activity. Two themes were raised which suggest the potential purchase a field analysis with an 
emphasis on military values and ethics might bring. In particular, he discussed how the types of 
activities involved in the criminality he was engaged in such as risk taking and avoiding detection 
were experienced as being similar to military life. This suggests that his habitus had been attuned to 
specific social practices within the military field and combat specifically which made it practically 
orientated to similar types of behaviours involved in serious organised crime. He also ended by 
discussing his sense of loss in relation to the values which had defined his life in the military and his 
motivations for entering into an OCG- “it was about belonging” (Ibid). Field analysis of the transition 
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of veterans into criminality with an emphasis on values and ethics has the potential to upon up a 
richer understanding of the life trajectories found within the military-civilian transition.  
A further emergent trend which this type of focus has the potential of shedding light upon, is the risk 
posed by the recruitment of ex-servicemen and women into both Islamist and far-right extremist 
organisations (Guardian, 2017). This obviously poses a unique and significant threat due to the 
training and potential access to weaponry that military veterans bring with them. It is likely that 
some of the psycho-social dynamics related to hysteriesis mentioned previously play a role in making 
veterans particularly vulnerable to recruitment into these types of organisations. Also, themes 
related to values likely play a role in that many soldiers feel a sense of abandonment by the military 
when they have left, as well as a sense that the values that have defined their military subjectivities 
are not present or are perceived to be devalued by civilian life. A Bourdieusian focus on military-
civilian transition in this context would potentially contribute to examining the type of vulnerabilities 
ex-service men and women face in this context. An emphasis on military values and ethics would 
potentially go some way in explaining how these vulnerabilities emerge in the way that they do.  
Finally, this research has hopefully contributed towards highlighting the significance of the opinions 
and perspectives of junior soldiers in relation to values and ethics in the context of the Army and 
combat. The broad implication of these various observations is that further attention should be 
given to examining the role that NCOs have in the shaping of the ethical conduct of junior soldiers, 
and a reconsideration of the divide between military training and ethical education. Whilst there will 
always be a role for the classroom based ethical education at all ranks; more focus should be given 
to training in an ethical dimension to military training, so soldiers practical and intuitive ethical 
responses are shaped from the start.  
 
9.5 Final Reflections 
Ethics has always and will continue to be a fundamental part of state violence. This research has 
attempted to reveal some of the ways in which ethics function to both enable that violence, restrain 
it and legitimise it. The targets of these processes are wide and encompass those that are tasked to 
carry out that violence on behalf of the state, as well as society which is witness to that violence. If 
anything, the main hope of this research has been to foreground the role ethics plays in such a way 
that one must necessarily consider ethics when asking questions in relation to military socialisation 
and soldierly conduct in the context of war and other operational settings. Ethics is an inescapable 
part of war and whilst war remains a reality for the state, individual and institutional ethics must be 
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a central consideration in the way in which it is prosecuted. This research has hopefully gone some 
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